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operations, engaged in open battle with Jamaah until its imprisoned
leaders renounced violence and dealt with the MB through partial
toleration followed by periodic repression, to both overcome the radical
threat and prevent the growth of the movement.
In parallel with the crackdown on Islamist movements, the regime
also ‘nationalised’ the official religious institutes, most importantly the al-
Azhar University. Aware of the extensive influence of this most prestigious
Islamic institute, Nasser’s regime started amending legislation to
undermine al-Azhar’s autonomy. Nasser, who “wanted to send a message
to different parties affirming he is the only strong man in the country”,
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began to restrict all civil society and non-state actors. The regime continued
its restrictive policies, undercutting al-Azhar’s autonomy and further
weakening the institution. Consequently, the credibility of al-Azhar
scholars progressively diminished as they were viewed as ‘state co-opted’
scholars who supported or continuously turned a blind eye to the regime’s
social policies.
Through this strategy, the regime succeeded in containing all kinds of
institutional Islamist movements and preventing them from getting out of
control. It influenced the position of each movement within its ideological
framework, sometimes delaying revisions within the Jihad and Jamaah
movements
61
and sometimes pushing the MB towards the less moderate
end. In this way, Islamists were constantly used as bogeymen to threaten
domestic non-Islamists as well as the international community.
At the same time, this strategy also reduced the ability of
institutionalised Islamist movements to attract more supporters.
Meanwhile, the demand for Islamism increased with growing
Westernisation and the disempowerment of official religious institutes,
giving rise to post-institutional Islamists. Perhaps Wasat’s split from the
MB is the first significant example of this phenomenon, except that Wasat,
which bypassed the MB’s partial retreat from moderate stances owing to
60
M.S. Al-Awwa, Thawret Yulio Wal Islam [July Revolution and Islam] , Cairo:
Shorouq al Dawliya, 2006, p. 37.
61
Jamaah leaders report several incidents in which they tried to announce their
revisions but were prevented from doing so by the regime. They also claim that
Jihad leaders wanted to engage in revisions but were similarly prevented by the
regime and were moved to another prison (see Ahmed, 2003, op. cit. and Awwa,
2005, op. cit.).
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institutional pressures, has attempted to institutionalise itself through its
bid for legal recognition.
During the mid- and late 1990s, other manifestations of post-
institutional Islamism emerged. Two trends are more significant than the
others are. The first is the phenomenon of ‘new preachers’ and the second
is that of ‘neo-terrorism’.
New preachers
The phenomenon of new preachers first emerged in the late 1990s, but
became more powerful in the first years of the 21
st
century. The failure of
institutionalised movements, accompanied by scepticism towards ‘official’
institutions – such as al-Azhar – has left two alternatives: uncritical
Westernisation or an association with Islamist movements, involving
confrontations with the state and perhaps endorsement of radical thinking.
Both alternatives seemed unpleasant and a societal demand for a third
alternative ensued.
Independent preachers have provided a perfect third alternative:
“safe religiosity, which entail[s] no confrontation with [the] state or
society”.
62
Initially, Amr Khaled was the sole star preacher, but within a
few years, an exponential increase in the number of preachers took place.
New preachers are primarily young Islamist activists (mostly
between their late 20s and early 40s), who did not receive a traditional
religious education but are rather self-educated Muslims. For various
reasons, including computer and Internet literacy, simple commercial
discourses and modern outfits, they can better relate to the new generation
of Muslims who are searching for spiritual elements in their lives.
Some of the new preachers and their audiences are part of the new
bourgeoisie, which has achieved career and material success and wants to
fill a spiritual vacuum, or are among those who have worked in the Gulf
and been influenced by its tamed version of Wahhabism.
To be sure, not all preachers have preached moderation. While not
explicitly advocating violence or even openly criticising the regime’s
62
W. Lotfy, The State of New Preachers ( Dawlet Al Du’aat Al Jodod), Cairo: Dar Al
Khayaal, 2005, p. 28.
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policies (for obvious reasons), some preachers’ discourses “were not
against the use of violence, but were only violence-free”.
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The popularity of each of these preachers draws on the same factors
that sustain Islamist movements. It is for this specific reason that the Al Nas
TV channel – presenting a predominantly Salafist–Wahhabi discourse – is
the most popular among Islamist channels and that it hosts programmes
for some conservative MB preachers.
Some of these preachers are affiliated with different Islamic
movements and have clear ideological orientations. Some openly and
constantly criticise the regime, such as Wagdi Ghoneim, a former right-
wing MB member who enjoys high popularity among the middle and
lower-middle classes and who presents an ultraconservative discourse
highly critical of the West and the regime alike. Ghoneim, who lives in
exile, appears on satellite channels and YouTube videos, preaching the ideas
of mainstream Jamaah in a modern, less complicated manner.
Adherence to Salafism – which is radical but not violent – is now
“visible in many parts of Cairo” where, for instance “women wear the
niqab…rather than the hijab ”. Non-violence, though, is no synonym for
Salafism or Wahhabism. Indeed, Khalil Al-Anani, a visiting scholar at the
Brookings Institution, fears that “Salafism maybe transferred into Jihadi
Salafism”.
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Overall, new preachers represent a variety of non-violent apolitical
discourses that fill the vacuum left by institutionalised Islamist movements.
Neo-Terrorism
The other trend of post-institutional Islamism is ‘neo-terrorism’. While
Egypt’s regime succeeded in disabling militant Islamist movements, it
failed to cure the atmosphere that breeds radicalism. Young Islamists –
critical of the inabilities of institutionalised group leaders or the
renunciation of violence – moved forward with their ‘sacred mission’ alone.
Leaders of Jamaah assert that some of the terrorist attacks of the 1990s were
63
Ibid., p. 21.
64
Associated Press, “Ultraconservative Islam on Rise in Mideast”, PR-inside.com, 19
October 2008 (retrieved from http://www.pr-inside.com/print868674.htm).
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