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stance on Hamas after the Palestinian elections, which “strongly reinforced
sensitivities” and “paralysed the discussion on this issue”.
Among the opponents of the common approach, a Portuguese
diplomat voiced the concern that regardless of the Islamist issue, there
could be “no general policy regulating opposition contacts that fits all”. A
French representative stressed that it was not a question of creating special
conditions for Islamists, but of including them “just like all other
representative societal groups”, and therefore a particular “Islamist
strategy” was not only unnecessary, but would also lead to an unhealthy
exposure of a particular group defined by a religious reference. Moreover,
the whole initiative had been inspired partly by pressure from the US
government, which had “always wanted us to engage with the Muslim
Brotherhood”. According to a Swedish diplomat, Swedish scepticism is
rooted in the conviction that “all that is not forbidden should be allowed”
and thus a set of common principles at the EU level would create
unnecessary additional regulations to the detriment of diplomatic
flexibility. Furthermore, the scope and depth of engagement also depends
on the priorities and financial resources of each member state. A German
diplomat explained that the idea of adopting common principles on how to
approach Islamists was, from the German point of view, “completely
beside the point”, as dealing with these issues on a bilateral level was both
diplomatically safer and more efficient. Any common EU initiative was
likely to appear as an “attempt to bring the [forces of] good to the Islamic
world” and would be “a sure way of immediately turning all the
governments of the region against us”.
As far as EU technical and financial cooperation with Islamist
organisations is concerned, Commission staff assure that there is no explicit
EU provision that prohibits channelling aid to Islamist groups. Islamist
civil society funding is said to be determined according to what drives the
group’s interest in each case. In practice, however, while working-level
contacts are reported to be frequent, parties and civil society organisations
with an Islamist leaning are de facto mostly excluded from formalised
involvement in EU aid and cooperation programmes.
15
Overall, neither the
15
A. Boubekeur and S. Amghar, Islamist Parties in the Maghreb and their Links with
the EU: Mutual Influences and the Dynamics of Democratisation, EuroMeSCo Paper
No. 55, EuroMeSCo, Lisbon, October 2006, p. 21.
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Barcelona process nor the European Neighbourhood Policy has been
advancing engagement with moderate Islamists. This is not expected to
change under the forthcoming Union for the Mediterranean.
The European Parliament has always had a rather different approach.
As it is subject to less scrutiny and constraint by both the European and
MENA governments’ sensitivities, the European Parliament has a long
history of direct engagement with Islamist political actors. Parliamentary
delegations meet Islamist parliamentarians in inter-parliamentary exchange
and visiting programmes across the region, and European Parliament
resolutions explicitly advocate a proactive, open engagement with MENA
opposition groups, including moderate Islamists. Similar ties also exist
with a number of national parliaments in Europe (such as the German–
Egyptian parliamentary group). Unfortunately, the European Parliament’s
more proactive approach towards Islamist political actors goes relatively
unnoticed; so far, it has failed to have a meaningful influence on the
policies of European governments.
Member states: Political constraints
The fundamental policy dilemma of European governments with respect to
the MENA is the widespread perception of a permanent contradiction
between the long-term development agenda, on the one hand, and the
short-term security and trade agendas, on the other. Including all relevant
societal actors for the sake of broad participation and de-radicalisation, and
maintaining smooth relations with MENA governments, are two lines of
action European governments are having trouble reconciling. The wider
European public and even governmental institutions are also severely split
over the issue. Several civil servants point to the “unpopularity” of
advocating engagement with Islamists in their ministries. A Dutch
diplomat remarked that by engaging with Islamists “you don’t get
popular” and that where engagement was not officially forbidden, it was
“definitely not encouraged”. Diplomats from several member states noted
substantial internal obstacles in this respect and even feared disadvantages
to their careers. Internal sensitivities in European ministries are largely
ascribed to undifferentiated views on Islamism and the fear of harsh
reactions on the part of domestic constituencies. As one diplomat noted,
“rationality has nothing to do with it”, concluding that the entire political
environment in Europe was “not conducive to such a dialogue”.
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It is therefore not surprising that during interviews, most European
government interlocutors ask not to be quoted on a personally attributable
basis, and often display reluctance and insecurity regarding the
information they are allowed to reveal. In addition to the fear of career
setbacks, the lack of capacity and the inability to communicate fluently in
Arabic are also mentioned as common obstacles that inhibit diplomats from
proactively seeking dialogue with Islamists. On several occasions,
diplomats (including French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner)
16
have
sought to relativise engagement with controversial groups through
apologetic remarks (e.g. “we are not the only ones”). Insecurity and
controversy within ministries, and even within the very units dealing with
engagement, is at times considerable. One European diplomat working on
dialogue with the Islamic world stated that he saw “no need for a position
like mine” as dialogue was “dangerous” and “leading nowhere”, and that
he was therefore “trying to destroy [his own] function”.
In a few instances, diplomats deliberately leaked information about
confidential policy shifts towards certain Islamist groups in an attempt to
prevent their government from taking actions of which they personally
disapproved. In 2005–06, a British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO) official leaked to the press a number of secret internal memos
advocating a more active UK engagement with the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood – a policy shift reportedly approved by then foreign secretary
Jack Straw. The leaks led to several very critical articles in the New
Statesman and the Observer, and a polemic debate about “the British state’s
flirtation with radical Islamism”.
17
The FCO whistleblower later claimed he
had leaked the documents to “expose dangerous government policy” and
that his own unease was shared by many others in the FCO.
European officials also emphasise the role of Muslim immigrant
communities in Europe as a major factor linking engagement with Islamists
abroad to the domestic context. A French representative even identified the
different immigrant communities in EU member states as the one key factor
16
See “France Admits Contacts with Hamas”, New York Times, 20 May
2008 (retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/world/europe/
20france.html
).
17
M. Bright, “When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries: The British state’s
flirtation with radical Islamism”, Policy Exchange, July 2006.
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