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conditioning the way each EU member
state deals with Islamist
movements abroad. Certainly, France, the UK and Germany, the EU states
with the largest MENA immigrant communities, are also among the
countries that most proactively approach the issue of engagement.
The aftermath of 9/11, and the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London
bombings have seen several European governments set up specific
units/posts with proper human and financial resources
in their foreign or
development ministries and embassies. These new units have aimed at
enhancing dialogue and cooperation between the West and the Islamic or
Arab world, with varying scope, approaches and priorities. Institutions
have included a division for “Dialogue with the Predominantly Islamic
World” in the German foreign office (since 2002), an adviser for relations
with the Islamic world at the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs (2002), an
ambassador-at-large for relations with the Islamic world at the Spanish
ministry for foreign affairs and cooperation (2006) and a unit for “Engaging
with the Muslim World” in the UK (which in 2007 was
tellingly merged
into the anti-terrorism department). Moreover, specific “Islam observers”
have been placed at 25 German embassies around the world (2002) and
regional public diplomacy officers for the Arab world/MENA have been
located at the Dutch (2008) and British embassies in Cairo, respectively. In
addition to specific institutions, a number of special policy initiatives
seeking to enhance dialogue and understanding along with political
cooperation and cultural/social exchange between Europe and the Muslim
world have been established (including the Alliance of Civilisations
initiated by Spain and the Swiss-led Montreux Initiative).
The French ministry of foreign affairs does
not have a specific unit for
engaging with Islamists, but the staff of the semi-independent policy-
planning unit of the Quai d’Orsay is reported to have a greater margin of
manoeuvre with regard to contacts. Notably, unlike similar posts in other
member states, the mandate of the French
conseiller pour les affaires
religieuses is strictly limited to religious affairs and clearly separated from
political dialogue activities with Islamists. The UK,
eager to prevent
radicalisation against the background of its military engagement in Iraq, is
the European country that most systematically links external and internal
dimensions of engaging with Islamists through an integrated inter-
ministerial approach with a clear security/anti-terrorism focus. The UK
model is widely seen by other member states as a good example
institutionally, as its integrated inter-ministerial approach is believed to
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maximise synergies between the internal
and external dimensions of
political Islam. At the same time, the UK’s unequivocal security/anti-terror
focus also raises some criticism as reinforcing simplistic perceptions
equating Islamism with terrorism. While the security dimension is decisive
in all national policies, some European countries approach the issue from a
more pronounced security focus that directly links Islam or Islamism with
anti-terrorism measures (the UK and Switzerland). Others set a stronger
focus on inter-civilisational
dialogue in a broader sense, including from a
long-term, democratic development angle, and draw clearer institutional
lines between security and inter-civilisational dialogue units (Germany and
Spain). Meanwhile, some do not appear to engage much at all (smaller and
Eastern European member states). Sweden and Norway consider
themselves particularly suited to engage in dialogue activities owing to
their lack of negative historical baggage in the region.
An overarching theme affecting Europe’s relations with Islamists is
the former’s prevailing religious or culturalist perceptions of Islamism.
European
political activities, institutions and policy documents aimed at
engaging with Islamist political actors are often undertaken under the
heading of interfaith, inter-civilisational or intercultural dialogue. France,
with its distinctive laic heritage, is a notable exception in this regard.
Germany, by contrast, has a unit for Dialogue with the Islamic World in the
German foreign office that is financed from the ministry’s culture budget
line, although – as German diplomats admit – the unit’s
activities and
objectives are of a political rather than cultural nature. Several European
diplomats in charge of dialogue cautioned against mistaking the decidedly
political engagement issue for a religious matter (“we are not here to bring
rabbis, monks and imams together”). This concern is often shared by
moderate Islamist politicians who complain about being invited to talk
about Islam instead of pressing societal problems in the MENA.
There are some concerns among EU diplomats that the current
engagement debate is directed towards “engagement for its own sake”.
Many emphasise that dialogue with Islamists is not a goal in itself, but
must be a means to achieve clear strategic objectives.
Another common
notion across European ministries and EU institutions is that the challenge
is not engagement with Islamists as a specific target group, but rather their
inclusion in dialogue activities and civil society initiatives as currently
undertaken with secular societal groups. They stress the need to “de-
essentialise Islamism”, that is, to avoid replacing negative discrimination