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Training and capacity building with opposition actors: Broadening
the scope of engagement
Moving from the first objective of understanding political Islam to the more
ambitious second and third objectives of promoting the reform and peace
potential of Islamist actors, what can be learned from the experiences of
Spain, Georgia and Ukraine?
Western engagement in our three case countries took the form of
capacity building and training directed at different sectors.
14
In Spain,
engagement primarily took the form of political party building. The party
building of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) was undertaken
chiefly by the SI, which over the period 1946–61 channelled funds to train
the party’s rank and file,
15
established permanent offices of the PSOE in
Spain and provided for the full-time employment of its senior officials.
French socialists supported the PSOE by printing its newspaper El
Socialista. The German SPD arranged training programmes, provided
advice to party leaders on policy and campaign techniques and sponsored
meetings of the Conferencia de Unidad Socialista. Likewise, in the cases of
Ukraine and Georgia, Western foundations concentrated heavily on party
building. In the run-up to the Orange revolution, Viktor Yushenko’s
election campaign was supported almost entirely by Western
foundations.
16
In the case of Shevardnadze’s Georgia, the growth of the
only two real opposition parties, the National Movement and the United
Democrats, was supported by USAID (United States Agency for
International Development), the NDI and IRI, through training
programmes, seminars and assistance in efforts to build coalitions around
reform agendas. In the Ukrainian case in particular, party training was
carried out alongside institutional capacity-building programmes aimed at
14
L. Whitehead, “Democracy by convergence and Southern Europe: A comparative
politics perspective”, in G. Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy: The International
Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, London: Leicester University Press,
1991, p. 56.
15
Anaya Ortuno (2002), op. cit., p. 21.
16
M. McFaul, “Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange
Revolution”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2007, pp. 67-68.
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the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. Hence, there were
initiatives such as the Indiana University Parliamentary Development
project, which provided technical assistance to increase parliamentary
effectiveness.
Capacity building also branched out to wider sectors of civil society.
In the Spanish case, special emphasis was put on building trade union
capacity. The German IG Mettall [West German Metalworkers’ Union]
supported the Union General de Trabajadores with the publication of its
periodicals, El Noticiero and Servicio de Prensa. The International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions assisted Spanish trade unions in their
actions against the regime, supporting workers financially during strikes,
enhancing organisational unity across industries and levels of government,
and training activists on publicity techniques.
In the Georgian and Ukrainian cases, greater emphasis was placed on
youth organisations, NGOs and the independent media. Important actors
behind the colour revolutions were the youth organisations PORA [‘It is
time’] in Ukraine and KMARA [‘Enough’] in Georgia. These movements
provided the necessary educational and training functions to mobilise
thousands of young activists on issues such as freedom of expression, the
establishment of transparent power structures, and the holding of free and
fair elections. They conducted numerous regional pickets, mass rallies and
distributed printed material in the most isolated regions of the country.
17
PORA notably created a website that became one of the most popular
online information sources before and during the revolution, allowing
activists to overcome the general information blockade at the time. Its
activities were backed by the US administration, through its ties with key
members of the Ukrainian diaspora.
18
The US–Ukraine Foundation,
17
V. Kaskiv, I. Chupryna and Y. Zolotariov, “It’s Time! PORA and the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine”, in J. Forbrig and P. Demeš (eds), Reclaiming Democracy:
Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe, German Marshall
Fund of the United States, Washington, D.C., 2008, p. 139 (retrieved from
http://www.gmfus.org//doc/ReclaimingDemocracy_web5.pdf
).
18
F. Arias-King, “Orange People: A Brief History of Transnational Liberation
Networks in East Central Europe”, Demokratizatsiya, Winter, 2007, p. 18 (retrieved
from
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200701/ai_n19432273/
print
).
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supported by USAID, helped organise the Znayu campaign and trained
young opposition representatives. In Georgia, KMARA’s origins can be
traced back to a group of reformist students at Tbilisi State University, who
benefited from links to major Georgian NGOs as well as the two principal
opposition parties. These organisations provided KMARA with legal
representation, services and training.
19
Its activities were supported by the
IRI, Freedom House, the German Marshall Fund and the Westminster
Foundation, as well as several Western embassies. In addition, the
International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) carried out several projects on
youth education, aimed at encouraging modern and democratic thinking
among younger generations. For this purpose, it financed several study
tours of Georgian youth to visit European partner organisations. The
opposition youth momentum in both Ukraine and Georgia was also
supported by private philanthropists like George Soros, whose OSI and
Central European University in Budapest aimed at reinforcing democratic
values through Western-style, social science education. Indeed, many of the
young revolutionary leaders from Ukraine and Georgia were Western-
educated.
NGOs also proved pivotal in triggering the colour revolutions. In
Ukraine, USAID financed the Citizen Action Network programme, which
strengthened the legal framework to protect and encourage civil activism,
and trained NGO representatives in political debate, organisational and
financial capacity and in recruiting supporters. Freedom House and the
German foundations worked with smaller NGOs at regional levels,
20
by
financing activities to foster citizen empowerment and human rights
education. The US–Ukrainian foundation supported the largest NGO,
Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU), which focused on voter education
and mobilisation. The CVU later proved important in conducting
monitoring activities and exit polls, along with spreading information
about the violation of voters’ rights in the 2004 elections. Meanwhile, the
IRF encouraged cooperation between NGOs and government structures,
encouraged civil society monitoring of government regulations and
established the Civil and Political Consultative Council of the Ukrainian
19
Ibid., p. 106.
20
C.A. Wallander, “Ukraine’s Election: The Role of One International NGO”,
International Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2005, pp. 2-3.
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