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necessarily the case in other contexts. Yet, in so far as democracy promotion
in the Middle East has been one of the self-styled goals of the West over the
decades, the analysis below sets aside these considerations, simply taking
Western aims of democracy promotion at face value.
The objectives of Western engagement with political Islam
Which objectives could be realistically pursued by the European and
American actors toying with the idea of engagement with Islamist
movements qua mass-opposition political actors in authoritarian contexts?
Three principal objectives come to the fore.
A lower-threshold objective is to understand Islamist movements and
their evolution, and through them – in view of their societal and political
relevance – understand trends in the Middle East. The recent history of
Western policy in the region is rife with gross miscalculations of the
fundamental trends at work. Examples include the overestimation of Ayad
Allawi’s strength in Iraq in 2005, the surprise victory of Hamas in Palestine
in 2006 or the unexpected alliance between Christian leader Michel Aoun
and the Shiite Hizbullah in Lebanon following the latter’s walkout from
government in the autumn of 2006. Much of the reason for these
miscalculations is the over-reliance of Western actors on the messages
delivered by liberal, secular ‘friends’ in the Middle East, which while being
supported politically and financially by Europe and the US, have little
standing in the region. The West may not necessarily like the picture
painted by Islamists or their interpretation of trends in the region; but as
political actors more embedded in society than their liberal, secular
counterparts, they could provide information and analysis that would help
the West formulate its foreign policies more accurately and effectively. This
does not mean that the West should halt its consultations with liberal and
secular groups. It is simply to say that it should diversify its sources of
information and exchange to gain a more complete and nuanced picture of
trends in the region.
The second more ambitious objective is that of engaging political
Islam in order to enhance its role as a force for political change in the
region.
3
The rationale for this objective does not stem from the inherent
3
On this, see for example E. El-Din Shahin, Political Islam: Ready for Engagement,
FRIDE Working Paper No. 3, FRIDE, Madrid; see also A. Hamzawy, The Key to
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acceptance by Islamists of democracy and its virtues.
4
It rather derives from
the political reality of these movements as mass opposition actors. In so far
as political change comes by shifting domestic (as well as regional and
international) political balances, and given that Islamists in the Middle East
represent to date the only mass opposition groups worthy of the name, a
second possible objective would be to engage Islamists for the purpose of
promoting democracy. Given that democracy cannot be imposed or
generated by externally breeding secular liberals, if the West is serious
about democracy promotion, it must be prepared to engage with who is
out there by working with Islamists in their struggle for political
participation. In some instances, Western actors have started treading this
path. Examples include the efforts made by the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) in supporting
an Islamist–socialist coalition in Yemen in 2003–04. It also and most notably
includes the insertion of the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development,
the Jordanian Wasat or the Yemeni Islah in the NDI’s programmes for
party building, parliamentary strengthening, women’s participation,
advocacy, strategic planning, recruitment, constituency outreach and
media training.
5
Yet these remain ad hoc and limited initiatives carried out
by American non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and they are not
extended to Islamist actors that are viewed as more radical or anti-systemic
by their regimes or by the West.
The third and most ambitious objective, relevant in conflict contexts,
is to ensure the success of peace processes on the ground. In conflict
situations such as Palestine, Lebanon or Syria, peace does not simply
require a formal agreement signed by ‘moderate’ elites. If an agreement is
to be accepted by the people and subsequently implemented on the
ground, it must hedge against the ‘spoiler’ potential of domestic
Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists, Policy Brief No. 40, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, D.C., 2005.
4
M. Asseburg, Moderate Islamists as Reform Actors, SWP Research Paper No. 4,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 2007.
5
M. Yacoubian, Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy: A Preliminary
Assessment, USIP Special Report No. 190, United States Institute for Peace,
Washington, D.C., August 2007.
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opponents.
6
To do this, popular radical actors such as Hamas and
Hizbullah must be brought into the picture, as their engagement and
involvement may well be the only recipe for acceptance. The underlying
factor to bear in mind here is that those excluded from a peace process
often tend to oppose it. Hence, it is important to engage with actors such as
Hamas and Hizbullah, because of both their spoiling potential and the
popularity of their political messages. Driven by this logic, the EU Observer
Group coordinated by Alistair Crooke, involving diplomats from different
European embassies, had established such a dialogue between 2000 and
late 2003, although this was subsequently halted.
7
Lessons from Europe: The Cases of Spain, Ukraine and Georgia
How can these complementary objectives be met? In seeking lessons and
best practices, what can be learned from Western experiences of
engagement with opposition actors in other authoritarian contexts in the
past? As noted at the outset, Western interest in political Islam is growing.
Yet engagement with Islamists remains at a stage of infancy. In the case of
the US, American institutes have worked with Islamists in relatively
‘unproblematic’ countries such as Morocco, Yemen and to a lesser extent
Jordan. In these countries, Islamist parties are legally recognised and do not
work against their pro-Western regimes. At the same time, they espouse a
more open rhetoric on democracy, rights and the rule of law than their
regimes do, making them evident targets for democracy promotion
programmes. In the EU, while official engagement is harder to come by,
there have been attempts such as the initiative on “Dialogue with the
Islamic World” launched by the German ministry of foreign affairs in 2002,
the informal dialogue opened by a group of member state embassies led by
Sweden with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 2003–04 and the training
seminars on political Islam held by the Commission since 2007.
6
On the concept of spoilers in peace processes, see E. Newman and O. Richmond
(eds), Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution,
Tokyo: UN University Press, 2006.
7
See A. Crooke, “Bottom-up Peace-building in the Occupied Territories”, Conflicts
Forum, Beirut/London/Washington, D.C., 2007 (retrieved from
www.conflicts.forum.org
).
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