Principles of Morals and

Principles of Morals and Legislation/145
be destroyed. To draw a precise line of direction in such case seems
impossible. However, by way of memento, it may be of some use to
subjoin the following rule.
Among provisions designed to perfect the proportion between pun-
ishments and offences, if any occur, which, by their own particular
good effects, would not make up for the harm they would do by adding
to the intricacy of the Code, they should be omitted.
XXVI. It may be remembered, that the political sanction, being that
to which the sort of punishment belongs, which in this chapter is all
along in view, is but one of four sanctions, which may all of them con-
tribute their share towards producing the same effects. It maybe ex-
pected, therefore, that in adjusting the quantity of political punishment,
allowance should be made for the assistance it may meet with from
those other controlling powers. True it is, that from each of these sev-
eral sources a very powerful assistance may sometimes be derived. But
the case is, that (setting aside the moral sanction, in the case where the
force of it is expressly adopted into and modified by the political) the
force of those other powers is never determinate enough to be depended
upon. It can never be reduced, like political punishment, into exact lots,
nor meted out in number, quantity, and value. The legislator is therefore
obliged to provide the full complement of punishment, as if he were sure
of not receiving any assistance whatever from any of those quarters. If
he does, so much the better: but lest he should not, it is necessary he
should, at all events, make that provision which depends upon himself.
XXVII. It may be of use, in this place, to recapitulate the several
circumstances, which, in establishing the proportion betwixt punish-
ments and offenses, are to be attended to. These seem to be as follows:
I. On the part of the offence:
1. The profit of the offense;
2. The mischief of the offense;
3. The profit and mischief of other greater or lesser offences, of
different sorts, which the offender may have to choose out of;
4. The profit and mischief of other offenses, of the same sort, which
the same offender may probably have been guilty of already.
II. On the part of the punishment:
5. The magnitude of the punishment: composed of its intensity and
duration;
6. The deficiency of the punishment in point of certainty;
7. The deficiency of the punishment in point of proximity;

---

146/Jeremy Bentham
8. The quality of the punishment;
9. The accidental advantage in point of quality of a punishment, not
strictly needed in point of quantity;
10. The use of a punishment of a particular quality, in the character
of a moral lesson.
III. On the part of the offender:
11. The responsibility of the class of persons in a way to offend;
12. The sensibility of each particular offender
13. The particular merits or useful qualities of any particular of-
fender, in case of a punishment which might deprive the community of
the benefit of them;
14. The multitude of offenders on any particular occasion.
IV. On the part of the public, at any particular conjuncture:
15. The inclinations of the people, for or against any quantity or
mode of punishment;
16. The inclinations of foreign powers.
V. On the part of the law: that is, of the public for a continuance:
17. The necessity of making small sacrifices, in point of propor-
tionality, for the sake of simplicity.
XXVIII. There are some, perhaps, who, at first sight, may look
upon the nicety employed in the adjustment of such rules, as so much
labour lost: for gross ignorance, they will say, never, troubles itself about
laws, and passion does not calculate. But, the evil of ignorance admits
of cure: and as to the proposition that passion does not calculate, this,
like most of these very general and oracular propositions, is not true.
When matters of such importance as pain and pleasure are at stake, and
these in the highest degree (the only matters, in short, that can be of
importance) who is there that does not calculate? Men calculate, some
with less exactness, indeed, some with more: but all men calculate. I
would not say, that even a madman does not calculate. Passion calcu-
lates, more or less, in every man: in different men, according to the
warmth or coolness of their dispositions: according to the firmness or
irritability of their minds: according to the nature of the motives by
which they are acted upon. Happily, of all passions, that is the most
given to calculation, from the excesses of which, by reason of its strength,
constancy, and universality, society has most to apprehend: I mean that
which corresponds to the motive of pecuniary interest: so that these
niceties, if such they are to be called, have the best chance of being
efficacious, where efficacy is of the most importance.

---

Chapter XV: Of the Properties to be Given to a
Lot of Punishment
I. It has been shown what the rules are, which ought to be observed in
adjusting the proportion between the punishments and the offense. The
properties to be given to a lot of punishment, in every instance, will of
course be such as it stands in need of, in order to be capable of being
applied, in conformity to those rules: the quality will be regulated by the
quantity.
II. The first of those rules, we may remember, was, that the quantity
of punishment must not be less, in any case, than what is sufficient to
outweigh the profit of the offence: since, as often as it is less, the whole
lot (unless by accident the deficiency should be supplied from some of
the other sanctions) is thrown away: it is inefficacious. The fifth was,
that the punishment ought in no case to be more than what is required by
the several other rules: since, if it be, all that is above that quantity is
needless. The fourth was, that the punishment should be adjusted in
such manner to each individual offence, that every part of the mischief
of that offence may have a penalty (that is, a tutelary motive) to encoun-
ter it: otherwise, with respect to so much of the offense as has not a
penalty to correspond to it, it is as if there were no punishment in the
case. Now to none of those rules can a lot of punishment be conform-
able, unless, for every variation in point of quantity, in the mischief of
the species of offense to which it is annexed, such lot of punishment
admits of a correspondent variation. To prove this, let the profit of the
offence admit of a multitude of degrees. Suppose it, then, at any one of
these degrees: if the punishment be less than what is suitable to that
degree, it will be inefficacious; it will be so much thrown away: if it be

---