Principles of Morals and

142/Jeremy Bentham
a chance; for the purchasing of which, whatever punishment is employed,
is so much expended into advance. However, for the sake of giving it the
better chance of outweighing the profit of the offence,
The greater the mischief of the offense, the greater is the expense
which it may be worth while to be at, in the way of punishment.
XI. Rule 3. The next object is, to induce a man to choose always the
least mischievous of two offenses; therefore,
Where two offences come in competition, the punishment for the
greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.
XII. Rule 4. When a man has resolved upon a particular offense,
the next object is, to induce him to do no more mischief than what is
necessary for his purpose: therefore
The punishment should be adjusted in such manner to each par-
ticular offence, that for every part of the mischief there may be a mo-
tive to restrain the offender frown giving birth to it.
XIII. Rule 5. The last object is, whatever mischief is guarded against,
to guard against it at as cheap a rate as possible: therefore
The punishment ought in no case to be more than what is neces-
sary to bring it into conformity with the rules here given.
XIV. Rule 6. It is further to be observed, that owing to the different
manners and degrees in which persons under different circumstances
are affected by the same exciting cause, a punishment which is the same
in name will not always either really produce, or even so much as ap-
pear to others to produce, in two different persons the same degree of
pain: therefore
That the quantity actually indicted on each individual offender
nay correspond to the quantity intended for similar offenders in gen-
eral, the several circumstances influencing sensibility ought always to
be taken into account.
XV. Of the above rules of proportion, the first four, we may per-
ceive serve to mark out limits on the side of diminution; the limits below
which a punishment ought not to be diminished: the fifth the limits on
the side of increase; the limits above which it ought not to be increased.
The five first are calculated to serve as guides to the legislator: the sixth
is calculated in some measure, indeed, to the same purpose; but princi-
pally for guiding the judge in his endeavors to conform, on both sides, to
the intentions of the legislator.
XVI. Let us look back a little. The first rule, in order to render it
more conveniently applicable to practice, may need perhaps to be a little

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/143
more particularly unfolded. It is to be observed, then, that for the sake
of accuracy, it was necessary, instead of the word quantity to make use
of the less perspicuous term value. For the word quantity will not prop-
erly include and the circumstances either of certainty or proximity: cir-
cumstances which, in estimating the value of a lot of pain or pleasure,
must always be taken into the account. Now, on the one hand, a lot of
punishment is a lot of pain; on the other hand, the profit of an offense is
a lot of pleasure, or what is equivalent to it. But the profit of the offense
is commonly more certain than the punishment, or, what comes to the
same thing, appears so at least to the offender. It is at any rate com-
monly more immediate. It follows, therefore, that, in order to maintain
its superiority over the profit of the offense, the punishment must have
its value made up in some other way, in proportion to that whereby it
falls short in the two points of certainty and proximity. Now there is no
other way in which it can receive any addition to its value, but by re-
ceiving an addition in point of magnitude. Wherever then the value of
the punishment falls short, either in point of certainty, or of proximity,
of that of the profit of the offence, it must receive a proportionable
addition in point of magnitude.
XVII. Yet farther. To make sure of giving the value of the punish-
ment the superiority over that of the offence, it may be of necessary, in
some cases, to take into account the profit not only of the individual
offence to which the punishment is to be annexed, but also of such other
offences of the same sort as the offender is likely to have already com-
mitted without detection. This random mode of calculation, severe as it
is, it will be impossible to avoid having recourse to, in certain cases: in
such, to wit, in which the profit is pecuniary, the chance of detection
very small, and the obnoxious act of such a nature as indicates a habit:
for example, in the case of frauds against the coin. If it be not recurred
to, the practice of committing the offence will be sure to be, upon the
balance of the account, a gainful practice. That being the case, the leg-
islator will be absolutely sure of not being able to suppress it, and the
whole punishment that is bestowed upon it will be thrown away. In a
word (to keep to the same expressions we set out with) that whole quan-
tity of punishment will be inefficacious .
XVIII. Rule 7. These things being considered, the three following
rules may be laid down by way of supplement and explanation to Rule
1.
To enable the value of the punishment to outweigh that of the profit

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144/Jeremy Bentham
of the offense, it must be increased, in point of magnitude, in propor-
tion as it falls short in point of certainty.
XIX. Rule 8. Punishment must be further increased in point of
magnitude, in proportion as it falls short in point of proximity.
XX. Rule 9. Where the act is conclusively indicative of a habit, such
an increase must be given to the punishment as may enable it to outweigh
the profit not only of the individual offence, but of such other like offenses
as are likely to have been committed with impunity by the same offender.
XXI. There may be a few other circumstances or considerations
which may influence, in some small degree, the demand for punishment:
but as the propriety of these is either not so demonstrable, or not so
constant, or the application of them not so determinate, as that of the
foregoing, it may be doubted whether they be worth putting on a level
with the others.
XXII. Rule 10. When a punishment, which in point of quality is
particularly well calculated to answer its intention cannot exist in less
than a certain quantity, it may sometimes be of use, for the sake of
employing it, to stretch a little beyond that quantity which, on other
accounts, would be strictly necessary.
XXIII. Rule 11. In particular, this may sometimes be the case,
where the punishment proposed is of such a nature as to be particu-
larly well calculated to answer the purpose of a moral lesson.
XXIV. Rule 12. The tendency of the above considerations is to dic-
tate an augmentation in the punishment: the following rule operates in
the way of diminution. There are certain cases (it has been seen) in
which, by the influence of accidental circumstances, punishment may
be rendered unprofitable in the whole: in the same cases it may chance
to be rendered unprofitable as to a part only. Accordingly,
In adjusting the quantum of punishment, the circumstances; by
which all punishment may be rendered unprofitable, ought to be at-
tended to.
XXV. Rule 13. It is to be observed, that the more various and minute
any set of provisions are, the greater the chance is that any given article
in them will not be borne in mind: without which, no benefit can ensue
from it. Distinctions, which are more complex than what the concep-
tions of those whose conduct it is designed to influence can take in, will
even be worse than useless. The whole system will present a confused
appearance: and thus the effect, not only of the proportions established
by the articles in question, but of whatever is connected with them, will

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