Principles of Morals and

84/Jeremy Bentham
XII. With respect to goodness and badness, as it is with very thing
else that is not itself either pain or pleasure, so is it with motives. If they
are good or bad, it is only on account of their effects: good, on account
of their tendency to produce pleasure, or avert pain: bad, on account of
their tendency to produce pain, or avert pleasure. Now the case is, that
from one and the same motive, and from every kind of motive, may
proceed actions that are good, others that are bad, and others that are
indifferent. This we shall proceed to show with respect to all the differ-
ent kinds of motives, as determined by the various kinds of pleasures
and pains.
XIII. Such an analysis, useful as it is, will be found to be a matter of
no small difficulty owing, in great measure, to a certain perversity of
structure which prevails more or less throughout all languages. To speak
of motives, as of anything else, one must call them by their names. But
the misfortune is, that it is rare to meet with a motive of which the name
expresses that and nothing more. Commonly along with the very name
of the motive, is tacitly involved a proposition imputing to it a certain
quality; a quality which, in many cases, will appear to include that very
goodness or badness, concerning which we are here inquiring whether,
properly speaking, it be or be not imputable to motives. To use the com-
mon phrase, in most cases, the name of the motive is a word which is
employed either only in a good sense, or else only in a bad sense. Now,
when a word is spoken of as being used in a good sense, all that is
necessarily meant is this: that in conjunction with the idea of the object
it is put to signify, it conveys an idea of approbation: that is, of a plea-
sure or satisfaction, entertained by the person who employs the term at
the thoughts of such object. In like manner, when a word is spoken of as
being used in a bad sense, all that is necessarily meant is this: that, in
conjunction with the idea of the object it is put to signify, it conveys an
idea of disapprobation: that is, of a displeasure entertained by the per-
son who employs the term at the thoughts of such object. Now, the
circumstance on which such approbation is grounded will, as naturally
as any other, be the opinion of the goodness of the object in question, as
above explained: such, at least, it must be, upon the principle of utility:
so, on the other hand, the circumstance on which any such disapproba-
tion is grounded, will, as naturally as any other, be the opinion of the
badness of the object: such, at least, it must be, in as far as the principle
of utility is taken for the standard.
 Now there are certain motives which, unless in a few particular

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/85
cases, have scarcely any other name to be expressed by but such a word
as is used only in a good sense. This is the case, for example, with the
motives of piety and honour. The consequence of this is, that if, in speak-
ing of such a motive, a man should have occasion to apply the epithet
bad to any actions which he mentions as apt to result from it, he must
appear to be guilty of a contradiction in terms. But the names of motives
which have scarcely any other name to be expressed by, but such a word
as is used only in a bad sense, are many more.
7
 This is the case, for
example, with the motives of lust and avarice. And accordingly, if in
speaking of any such motive, a man should have occasion to apply the
epithets good or indifferent to any actions which he mentions as apt to
result from it, he must here also appear to be guilty of a similar contra-
diction.
This perverse association of ideas cannot, it is evident, but throw
great difficulties in the way of the inquiry now before us. Confining
himself to the language most in use, a man can scarce avoid running, in
appearance, into perpetual contradictions. His propositions will appear,
on the one hand, repugnant to truth; and on the other hand, adverse to
utility. As paradoxes, they will excite contempt: as mischievous para-
doxes, indignation. For the truths he labours to convey, however impor-
tant, and however salutary, his reader is never the better: and he himself
is much the worse. To obviate this inconvenience, completely, he has
but this one unpleasant remedy; to lay aside the old phraseology and
invent a new one. Happy the man whose language is ductile enough to
permit him this resource. To palliate the inconvenience, where that method
of obviating it is impracticable, he has nothing left for it but to enter into
a long discussion, to state the whole matter at large, to confess, that for
the sake of promoting the purposes, he has violated the established laws
of language, and to throw himself upon the mercy of his readers.
§ 3.
 Catalogue of motives corresponding to that of
Pleasures and Pains.
XIV. From the pleasures of the senses, considered in the gross, results
the motive which, in a neutral sense, maybe termed physical desire: in a
bad sense, it is termed sensuality. Name used in a good sense it has
none. Of this, nothing can be determined, till it be considered separately,
with reference to the several species of pleasures to which it corresponds.
XV. In particular, then, to the pleasures of the taste or palate corre-
sponds a motive, which in a neutral sense having received no name that

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86/Jeremy Bentham
can serve to express it in all cases, can only be termed, by circumlocu-
tion, the love of the pleasures of the palate. In particular cases it is
styled hunger: in others, thirst. The love of good cheer expresses this
motive, but seems to go beyond: intimating, that the pleasure is to be
partaken of in company, and involving a kind of sympathy. In a bad
sense, it is styled in some cases greediness, voraciousness, gluttony: in
others, principally when applied to children, lickerishness. It may in
some cases also be represented by the word daintiness. Name used in a
good sense it has none. 1. A boy, who does not want for victuals, steals
a cake out of a pastry-cook’s shop, and eats it. In this case his motive
will be universally deemed a bad one: and if it be asked what it is, it may
be answered, perhaps, lickerishness. 2. A boy buys a cake out of a
pastry-cook’s shop, and eats it. In this case his motive can scarcely be
looked upon as either good or bad, unless his master should be out of
humour with him; and then perhaps he may call it lickerishness, as be-
fore. In both cases, however, his motive is the same. It is neither more
nor less than the motive corresponding to the pleasures of the palate.
XVI. To the pleasures of the sexual sense corresponds the motive
which, in a neutral sense, may be termed sexual desire. In a bad sense, it
is spoken of under the name of lasciviousness, and a variety of other
names of reprobation. Name used in a good sense it has none.
1. A man ravishes a virgin. In this case the motive is, without scruple,
termed by the name of lust, lasciviousness, and so forth; and is univer-
sally looked upon as a bad one. 2. The same man, at another time,
exercises the rights of marriage with his wife. In this case the motive is
accounted, perhaps, a good one, or at least indifferent: and here people
would scruple to call it by any of those names. In both cases, however,
the motive may be precisely the same. In both cases it may be neither
more nor less than sexual desire.
XVII. To the pleasures of curiosity corresponds the motive known
by the same name: and which may be otherwise called the love of nov-
elty, or the love of experiment; and, on particular occasions, sport, and
sometimes play.
1. A boy, in order to divert himself, reads an improving book: the
motive is accounted, perhaps, a good one: at any rate not a bad one. 2.
He sets his top a spinning: the motive is deemed, at any rate, not a bad
one. 3. He sets loose a mad ox among a crowd; his motive is now,
perhaps, termed an abominable one. Yet in all three cases the motive
may be the very same: it may be neither more nor less than curiosity.

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