Principles of Morals and

136/Jeremy Bentham
case, 1. In extreme infancy; where a man has not yet attained that state
or disposition of mind in which the prospect of evils so distant as those
which are held forth by the law, has the effect of influencing his con-
duct. 2. In insanity; where the person, if he has attained to that disposi-
tion, has since been deprived of it through the influence of some perma-
nent though unseen cause. 3. In intoxication; where he has been a de-
prived of it by the transient influence of a visible cause: such as the use
of wine, or opium, or other drugs, that act in this manner on the nervous
system: which condition is indeed neither more nor less than a tempo-
rary insanity produced by an assignable cause.
X. 4. Where the penal provision (although, being conveyed to the
party’s notice, it might very well prevent his engaging in acts of the sort
in question, provided he knew that it related to those acts) could not
have this effect, with regard to the individual act he is about to engage
in: to wit, because he knows not that it is of the number of those to
which the penal provision relates. This may happen, 1. In the case of
unintentionality; where he intends not to engage, and thereby knows not
that he is about to engage, in the act in which eventually he is about to
engage. 2. In the case of unconsciousness; where, although he may know
that he is about to engage in the act itself, yet, from not knowing all the
material circumstances attending it, he knows not of the tendency it has
to produce that mischief, in contemplation of which it has been made
penal in most instances 3. In the case of missupposal; where, although
he may know of the tendency the act has to produce that degree of mis-
chief, he supposes it, though mistakenly, to be attended with some cir-
cumstance, or set of circumstances, which, if it had been attended with,
it would either not have been productive of that mischief, or have been
productive of such a greater degree of good, as has determined the leg-
islator in such a case not to make it penal.
XI. 5. Where, though the penal clause might exercise a full and
prevailing influence, were it to act alone, yet by the predominant influ-
ence of some opposite cause upon the will, it must necessarily be inef-
fectual; because the evil which he sets himself about to undergo, in the
case of his not engaging in the act, is so great, that the evil denounced by
the penal clause, in case of his engaging in it, cannot appear greater.
This may happen, 1. In the case of physical danger; where the evil is
such as appears likely to be brought about by the unassisted powers of
nature. 2. In the case of a threatened mischief; where it is such as ap-
pears likely to be brought about through the intentional and conscious

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/137
agency of man.
XII. 6. Where (though the penal clause may exert a full and prevail-
ing influence over the will of the party) yet his physical faculties (owing
to the predominant influence of some physical cause) are not in a condi-
tion to follow the determination of the will: insomuch that the act is
absolutely involuntary. Such is the case of physical compulsion or re-
straint, by whatever means brought about; where the man’s hand, for
instance, is pushed against some object which his will disposes him not
to touch; or tied down from touching some object which his will dis-
poses him to touch.
§ 4.
 Cases where punishment is unprofitable.
These are,
XIII. 1. Where, on the one hand, the nature of the offense, on the
other hand, that of the punishment, are, in the ordinary state of things,
such, that when compared together, the evil of the latter will turn out to
be greater than that of the former.
XIV. Now the evil of the punishment divides itself into four branches,
by which so many different sets of persons are affected. 1. The evil of
coercion or restraint: or the pain which it gives a man not to be able to
do the act, whatever it be, which by the apprehension of the punishment
he is deterred from doing. This is felt by those by whom the law is
observed. 2. The evil of apprehension: or the pain which a man, who
has exposed himself to punishment, feels at the thoughts of undergoing
it. This is felt by those by whom the law has been broken, and who feel
themselves in danger of its being executed upon them. 3. The evil of
sufferance: or the pain which a man feels, in virtue of the punishment
itself, from the time when he begins to undergo it. This is felt by those
by whom the law is broken, and upon whom it comes actually to be
executed. 4. The pain of sympathy, and the other derivative evils result-
ing to the persons who are in connection with the several classes of
original sufferers just mentioned. Now of these four lots of evil, the first
will be greater or less, according to the nature of the act from which the
party is restrained: the second and third according to the nature of the
punishment which stands annexed to that offence.
XV. On the other hand, as to the evil of the offense, this will also, of
course, be greater or less, according to the nature of each offense. The
proportion between the one evil and the other will therefore be different
in the case of each particular offence. The cases, therefore, where pun-

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