Principles of Morals and

Principles of Morals and Legislation/127
of extent, and therefore, upon the whole, in point of magnitude, much
superior.
XVI. Two instances more will be sufficient to illustrate the most
material of the modifications above exhibited.
A man drinks a certain quantity of liquor, and intoxicates himself.
The intoxication in this particular instance does him no sort of harm: or,
what comes to the same thing, none that is perceptible. But it is prob-
able, and indeed next to certain, that a given number of acts of the same
kind would do him a very considerable degree of harm: more or less
according to his constitution and other circumstances: for this is no
more than what experience manifests every day. It is also certain, that
one act of this sort, by one means or other, tends considerably to in-
crease the disposition a man may be in to practise other acts of the same
sort: for this also is verified by experience. This, therefore, is one in-
stance where the mischief producible by the act is contingent in other
words, in which the tendency of the act is no otherwise mischievous
than in virtue of its producing a chance of mischief. This chance de-
pends upon the concurrence of other acts of the same kind; and those
such as must be practiced by the same person. The object of the mis-
chief is that very person himself who is the author of it, and he only,
unless by accident. The mischief is therefore private and self-regarding.
As to its secondary mischief, alarm, it produces none: it produces
indeed a certain quantity of danger by the influence of example: but it is
not often that this danger will amount to a quantity worth regarding.
XVII. Again. A man omits paying his share to a public tax. This we
see is an act of the negative kind. Is this then to be placed upon the list of
mischievous acts? Yes, certainly. Upon what grounds? Upon the follow-
ing. To defend the community against its external as well as its internal
adversaries are tasks, not to mention others of a less indispensable na-
ture which cannot be fulfilled but at a considerable expense. But whence
is the money for defraying this expense to come? It can be obtained in
no other manner than by contributions to be collected from individuals;
in a word, by taxes. The produce then of these taxes is to be looked upon
as a kind of benefit which it is necessary the governing part of the com-
munity should receive for the use of the whole. This produce, before it
can be applied to its destination, requires that there should be certain
persons commissioned to receive and to apply it. Now if these persons,
had they received it, would have applied it to its proper destination, it
would have been a benefit: the not putting them in a way to receive it, is

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128/Jeremy Bentham
then a mischief. But it is possible, that if received, it might not have
been applied to its proper destination; or that the services, in consider-
ation of which it was bestowed, might not have been performed. It is
possible, that the under-officer, who collected the produce of the tax,
might not have paid it over to his principal: it is possible that the princi-
pal might not have forwarded it on according to its farther destination;
to the judge, for instance, who is to protect the community against its
clandestine enemies from within, or the soldier, who is to protect it against
its open enemies from without: it is possible that the judge, or the sol-
dier, had they received it, would not however have been induced by it to
fulfil their respective duties: it is possible, that the judge would not have
sat for the punishment of criminals, and the decision of controversies: it
is possible that the soldier would not have drawn his sword in the de-
fense of the community. These, together with an infinity of other inter-
mediate acts, which for the sake of brevity I pass over, form a connected
chain of duties, the discharge of which is necessary to the preservation
of the community. They must every one of them be discharged, ere the
benefit to which they are contributory can be produced. If they are all
discharged, in that case the benefit subsists, and any act, by tending to
intercept that benefit, may produce a mischief. But if any of them are
not, the benefit fails: it fails of itself: it would not have subsisted, al-
though the act in question (the act of non-payment) had not been com-
mitted. The benefit is therefore contingent; and, accordingly, upon a
certain supposition, the act which consists in the averting of it is not a
mischievous one. But this supposition, in any tolerably-ordered govern-
ment, will rarely indeed be verified. In the very worst ordered govern-
ment that exists, the greatest part of the duties that are levied are paid
over according to their destination: and, with regard to any particular
sum, that is attempted to be levied upon any particular person upon any
particular occasion, it is therefore manifest, that, unless it be certain
that it will not be so disposed of, the act of withholding it is a mischie-
vous one.
The act of payment, when referable to any particular sum, espe-
cially if it be a small one, might also have failed of proving beneficial on
another ground: and, consequently, the act of nonpayment, of proving
mischievous. It is possible that the same services, precisely, might have
been rendered without the money as with it. If, then, speaking of any
small limited sum, such as the greatest which any one person is called
upon to pay at a time, a man were to say, that the non-payment of it

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