Principles of Morals and

122/Jeremy Bentham
may be termed the primary, which it sustained by an assignable indi-
vidual, or a multitude of assignable individuals. That share may be termed
the secondary, which, taking its origin from the former, extends itself
either over the whole community, or over some other multitude of unas-
signable individuals.
IV. The primary mischief of an act may again be distinguished into
two branches: 1. The original: and, 2. The derivative. By the original
branch, I mean that which alights upon and is confined to any person
who is a sufferer in the first instance, and on his own account: the per-
son, for instance, who is beaten, robbed, or murdered. By the derivative
branch, I mean any share of mischief which may befall any other as-
signable persons in consequence of his being a sufferer, and no other-
wise. These persons must, of course, be persons who in some way or
other are connected with him. Now the ways in which one person may
be connected with another, have been already seen: they may be con-
nected in the way of interest (meaning self-regarding interest) or merely
in the way of sympathy. And again, persons connected with a given
person, in the way of interest, may be connected with him either by
affording support to him, or by deriving it from him.
V. The secondary mischief, again, may frequently be seen to consist
of two other shares or parcels: the first consisting of pain; the other of
danger. The pain which it produces is a pain of apprehension: a pain
grounded on the apprehension of suffering such mischiefs or inconve-
niences, whatever they may be, as it is the nature of the primary mis-
chief to produce. It may be styled, in one word, the alarm. The danger is
the chance, whatever it may be, which the multitude it concerns may in
consequence of the primary mischief stand exposed to, of suffering such
mischiefs or inconveniences. For danger is nothing but the chance of
pain, or, what comes to the same thing, of loss of pleasure.
VI. An example may serve to make this clear. A man attacks you on
the road, and robs you. You suffer a pain on the occasion of losing so
much money: you also suffered a pain at the thoughts of the personal ill-
treatment you apprehended he might give you, in case of your not hap-
pening to satisfy his demands. These together constitute the original
branch of the primary mischief, resulting from the act of robbery. A
creditor of yours, who expected you to pay him with part of that money,
and a son of yours, who expected you to have given him another part,
are in consequence disappointed. You are obliged to have recourse to
the bounty of your father, to make good part of the deficiency. These

---

Principles of Morals and Legislation/123
mischiefs together make up the derivative branch. The report of this
robbery circulates from hand to hand, and spreads itself in the
neighbourhood. It finds its way into the newspapers, and is propagated
over the whole country. Various people, on this occasion, call to mind
the danger which they and their friends, as it appears from this example,
stand exposed to in travelling; especially such as may have occasion to
travel the same road. On this occasion they naturally feel a certain de-
gree of pain: slighter or heavier, according to the degree of ill-treatment
they may understand you to have received; the frequency of the occa-
sion each person may have to travel in that same road, or its
neighbourhood; the vicinity of each person to the spot; his personal
courage; the quantity of money he may have occasion to carry about
with him; and a variety of other circumstances. This constitutes the first
part of the secondary mischief, resulting from the act of robbery; viz.,
the alarm. But people of one description or other, not only are disposed
to conceive themselves to incur a chance of being robbed, in conse-
quence of the robbery committed upon you, but (as will be shown pres-
ently) they do really incur such a chance. And it is this chance which
constitutes the remaining part of the secondary mischief of the act of
robbery; viz., the danger.
VII. Let us see what this chance amounts to; and whence it comes.
How is it, for instance, that one robbery can contribute to produce an-
other? In the first place, it is certain that: it cannot create any direct
motive. A motive must be the prospect of some pleasure, or other ad-
vantage, to be enjoyed in future: but the robbery in question is past: nor
would it furnish any such prospect were it to come: for it is not one
robbery that will furnish pleasure to him who may be about to commit
another robbery. The consideration that is to operate upon a man, as a
motive or inducement to commit a robbery, must be the idea of the plea-
sure he expects to derive from the fruits of that very robbery: but this
pleasure exists independently of any other robbery.
VIII. The means, then, by which one robbery tends, as it should
seem, to produce another robbery, are two. 1. By suggesting to a person
exposed to the temptation, the idea of committing such another robbery
(accompanied, perhaps, with the belief of its facility). In this case the
influence it exerts applies itself, in the first place, to the understanding.
2. By weakening the force of the tutelary motives which tend to restrain
him from such an action, and thereby adding to the strength of the temp-
tation. In this case the influence applies itself to the will. These forces

---