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The man who stole the bread from the baker, as before, did it with
no other view than merely to impoverish and afflict him: accordingly,
when he had got the bread, he did not eat, or sell it; but destroyed it.
That the disposition, evidenced by such a transaction, is a bad one, is
what every body must perceive immediately.
XXVI. Thus much with respect to the circumstances from which
the mischievousness or meritoriousness of a man’s disposition is to be
inferred in the gross: we come now to the measure of that mischievous-
ness or meritoriousness, as resulting from those circumstances. Now
with meritorious acts and dispositions we have no direct concern in the
present work. All that penal law is concerned to do, is to measure the
depravity of the disposition where the act is mischievous. To this object,
therefore, we shall here confine ourselves.
XXVII. It is evident, that the nature of a man’s disposition must
depend upon the nature of the motives he is apt to be influenced by: in
other words, upon the degree of his sensibility to the force of such and
such motives. For his disposition is, as it were, the sum of his intentions:
the disposition he is of during a certain period, the sum or result of his
intentions during that period, If, of the acts he has been intending to
engage in during the supposed period, those which are apparently of a
mischievous tendency, bear a large proportion to those which appear to
him to be of the contrary tendency, his disposition will be of the mischie-
vous cast: if but a small proportion, of the innocent or upright.
XXVIII. Now intentions, like every thing else, are produced by the
things that are their causes: and the causes of intentions are motives. If,
on any occasion, a man forms either a good or a bad intention, it must
be by the influence of some motive.
XXIX. When the act, which a motive prompts a man to engage in,
is of a mischievous nature, it may, for distinction’s sake, be termed a
seducing or corrupting motive: in which case also any motive which, in
opposition to the former, acts in the character of a restraining motive,
may be styled a tutelary, preservatory, or preserving motive.
XXX. Tutelary motives may again be distinguished into standing
or constant, and occasional. By standing tutelary motives, I mean such
as act with more or less force in all, or at least in most cases, tending to
restrain a man from any mischievous acts he may be prompted to en-
gage in; and that with a force which depends upon the general nature of
the act, rather than upon any accidental circumstance with which any
individual act of that sort may happen to be accompanied. By occa-

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114/Jeremy Bentham
sional tutelary motives, I mean such motives as may chance to act in
this direction or not, according to the nature of the act, and of the par-
ticular occasion on which the engaging in it is brought into contempla-
tion.
XXXI. Now it has been shown, that there is no sort of motive by
which a man may not be prompted to engage in acts that are of a mis-
chievous nature; that is, which may not come to act in the capacity of a
seducing motive. It has been shown, on the other hand, that there are
some motives which are remarkably less likely to operate in this way
than others. It has also been shown, that the least likely of all is that of
benevolence or good-will: the most common tendency of which, it has
been shown, is to act in the character of a tutelary motive. It has also
been shown, that even when by accident it acts in one way in the charac-
ter of a seducing motive, still in another way it acts in the opposite
character of a tutelary one. The motive of good-will, in as far as it
respects the interests of one set of persons, may prompt a man to engage
in acts which are productive of mischief to another and more extensive
set: but this is only because his good-will is imperfect and confined: not
taking into contemplation the interests of all the persons whose interests
are at stake. The same motive, were the affection it issued from more
enlarged, would operate effectually, in the character of a constraining
motive, against that very act to which, by the supposition, it gives birth.
This same sort of motive may therefore, without any real contradiction
or deviation from truth, be ranked in the number of standing tutelary
motives, notwithstanding the occasions in which it may act at the same
time in the character of a seducing one.
XXXII. The same observation, nearly, may be applied to the semi-
social motive of love of reputation. The force of this, like that of the
former, is liable to be divided against itself. As in the case of good-will,
the interests of some of the persons, who may be the objects of that
sentiment, are liable to be at variance with those of others: so in the case
of love of reputation, the sentiments of some of the persons, whose good
opinion is desired, may be at variance with the sentiments of other per-
sons of that number. Now in the case of an act, which is really of a
mischievous nature, it can scarcely happen that there shall be no per-
sons whatever who will look upon it with an eye of disapprobation. It
can scarcely ever happen, therefore, that an act really mischievous shall
not have some part at least, if not the whole, of the force of this motive
to oppose it; nor, therefore, that this motive should not act with some

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/115
degree of force in the character of a tutelary motive. This, therefore,
may be set down as another article in the catalogue of standing tutelary
motives.
XXXIII. The same observation may be applied to the desire of am-
ity, though not in altogether equal measure. For, notwithstanding the
mischievousness of an act, it may happen, without much difficulty, that
all the persons for whose amity a man entertains any particular present
desire which is accompanied with expectation, may concur in regarding
it with an eye rather of approbation than the contrary. This is but too apt
to be the case among such fraternities as those of thieves, smugglers,
and many other denominations of offenders. This, however, is not con-
stantly, nor indeed most commonly the case: insomuch, that the desire
of amity may still be regarded, upon the whole, as a tutelary motive,
were it only from the closeness of its connexion with the love of reputa-
tion. And it may be ranked among standing tutelary motives, since, where
it does apply, the force with which it acts, depends not upon the occa-
sional circumstances of the act which it opposes, but upon principles as
general as those upon which depend the action of the other semi-social
motives.
XXXIV. The motive of religion is not altogether in the same case
with the three former. The force of it is not, like theirs, liable to be
divided against itself. I mean in the civilized nations of modern times,
among whom the notion of the unity of the Godhead is universal. In
times of classical antiquity it was otherwise. If a man got Venus on his
side, Pallas was on the other: if Æolus was for him, Neptune was against
him. Æneas, with all his piety, had but a partial interest at the court of
heaven. That matter stands upon a different footing now-a-days. In any
given person, the force of religion, whatever it be, is now all of it on one
side. It may balance, indeed, on which side it shall declare itself: and it
may declare itself, as we have seen already in but too many instances,
on the wrong as well as on the right. It has been, at least till lately,
perhaps is still, accustomed so much to declare itself on the wrong side,
and that in such material instances, that on that account it seemed not
proper to place it, in point of social tendency, on a level altogether with
the motive of benevolence. Where it does act, however, as it does in by
far the greatest number of cases, in opposition to the ordinary seducing
motives, it acts, like the motive of benevolence, in an uniform manner,
not depending upon the particular circumstances that may attend the
commission of the act; but tending to oppose it, merely on account of its

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