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108/Jeremy Bentham
the motive indicates is dubious: it may be a mischievous or a meritori-
ous one, as it happens; according as the mischievousness of the act is
more or less apparent.
XIII. It may be thought, that a case of this sort cannot exist; and
that to suppose it, is a contradiction in terms. For the act is one, which,
by the supposition, the agent knows to be a mischievous one. How then
can it be, that good-will, that is, the desire of doing good, could have
been the motive that led him into it? To reconcile this, we must advert to
the distinction between enlarged benevolence and confined. The motive
that led him into it, was that of confined benevolence. Had he followed
the dictates of enlarged benevolence, he would not have done what he
did. Now, although he followed the dictates of that branch of benevo-
lence, which in any single instance of its exertion is mischievous, when
opposed to the other, yet, as the cases which call for the exertion of the
former are, beyond comparison, more numerous than those which call
for the exertion of the latter, the disposition indicated by him, in follow-
ing the impulse of the former, will often be such as in a man, of the
common run of men, may be allowed to be a good one upon the whole.
XIV. A man with a numerous family of children, on the point of
starving, goes into a baker’s shop, steals a loaf, divides it all among the
children, reserving none of it for himself. It will be hard to infer that that
man’s disposition is a mischievous one upon the whole. Alter the case,
give him but one child, and that hungry perhaps, but in no imminent
danger of starving: and now let the man set fire to a house full of people,
for the sake of stealing money out of it to buy the bread with. The
disposition here indicated will hardly be looked upon as a good one.
XV. Another case will appear more difficult to decide than either.
Ravaillac assassinated one of the best and wisest of sovereigns, at a
time when a good and wise sovereign, a blessing at all times so valuable
to a state, was particularly precious: and that to the inhabitants of a
populous and extensive empire. He is taken, and doomed to the most
excruciating tortures. His son, well persuaded of his being a sincere
penitent, and that mankind, in case of his being at large, would have
nothing more to fear from him, effectuates his escape. Is this then a sign
of a good disposition in the son, or of a bad one? Perhaps some will
answer, of a bad one; for, besides the interest which the nation has in the
sufferings of such a criminal, on the score of the example, the future
good behaviour of such a criminal is more than any one can have suffi-
cient ground to be persuaded of.

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/109
XVI. Well then, let Ravaillac, the son, not facilitate his father’s
escape; but content himself with conveying poison to him, that at the
price of an easier death he may escape his torments. The decision will
now, perhaps, be more difficult. The act is a wrong one, let it be al-
lowed, and such as ought by all means to be punished: but is the dispo-
sition manifested by it a bad one? Because the young man breaks the
laws in this one instance, is it probable, that if let alone, he would break
the laws in ordinary instances, for the satisfaction of any inordinate
desires of his own? The answer of most men would probably be in the
negative.
XVII. 5. Where the tendency of the act is good, and the motive is a
semi-social one, the love of reputation. In this case the disposition indi-
cated is a good one.
 In a time of scarcity, a baker, for the sake of gaining the esteem of
the neighbourhood, distributes bread gratis among the industrious poor.
Let this be taken for granted: and let it be allowed to be a matter of
uncertainty, whether he had any real feeling for the sufferings of those
whom he has relieved, or no. His disposition, for all that, cannot, with
any pretence of reason, be termed otherwise than a good and beneficent
one. It can only be in consequence of some very idle prejudice, if it
receives a different name.
XVIII. 6. Where the tendency of the act is bad, and the motive, as
before, is a semi-social one, the love of reputation. In this case, the
disposition which it indicates is more or less good or bad: in the first
place, according as the tendency of the act is more or less mischievous:
in the next place according as the dictates of the moral sanction, in the
society in question, approach more or less to a coincidence with those of
utility. It does not seem probable, that in any nation, which is in a state
of tolerable civilization, in short, in any nation in which such rules as
these can come to be consulted, the dictates of the moral sanction will so
far recede from a coincidence with those of utility (that is, of enlight-
ened benevolence) that the disposition indicated in this case can be oth-
erwise than a good one upon the whole.
XIX. An Indian receives an injury, real or imaginary, from an In-
dian of another tribe. He revenges it upon the person of his antagonist
with the most excruciating torments: the case being, that cruelties in-
flicted on such an occasion, gain him reputation in his own tribe. The
disposition manifested in such a case can never be deemed a good one,
among a people ever so few degrees advanced, in point of civilization,

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110/Jeremy Bentham
above the Indians.
XX. A nobleman (to come back to Europe) contracts a debt with a
poor tradesman. The same nobleman, presently afterwards, contracts a
debt, to the same amount, to another nobleman, at play. He is unable to
pay both: he pays the whole debt to the companion of his amusements,
and no part of it to the tradesman. The disposition manifested in this
case can scarcely be termed otherwise than a bad one. It is certainly,
however, not so bad as if he had paid neither. The principle of love of
reputation, or (as it is called in the case of this partial application of it)
honour, is here opposed to the worthier principle of benevolence, and
gets the better of it. But it gets the better also of the self-regarding prin-
ciple of pecuniary interest. The disposition, therefore, which it indi-
cates, although not so good a one as that in which the principle of be-
nevolence predominates, is better than one in which the principle of self
interest predominates. He would be the better for having more benevo-
lence: but would he be the better for having no honour? This seems to
admit of great dispute.
XXI. 7. Where the tendency of the act is good, and the motive is the
semi-social one of religion. In this case, the disposition indicated by it
(considered with respect to the influence of it on the man’s conduct
towards others) is manifestly a beneficent and meritorious one.
A baker distributes bread gratis among the industrious poor. It is
not that he feels for their distresses: nor is it for the sake of gaining
reputation among his neighbours. It is for the sake of gaining the favour
of the Deity: to whom, he takes for granted, such conduct will be ac-
ceptable. The disposition manifested by such conduct is plainly what
every man would call a good one.
XXII. 8. Where the tendency of the act is bad, and the motive is that
of religion, as before. In this case the disposition is dubious. It is good
or bad, and more or less good or bad, in the first place, as the tendency
of the act is more or less mischievous; in the next place, according as the
religious tenets of the person in question approach more or less to a
coincidence with the dictates of utility.
XXIII. It should seem from history, that even in nations in a toler-
able state of civilization in other respects, the dictates of religion have
been found so far to recede from a coincidence with those of utility; in
other words, from those of enlightened benevolence; that the disposition
indicated in this case may even be a bad one upon the whole. This how-
ever is no objection to the inference which it affords of a good disposi-

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