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208/Jeremy Bentham
are not the grandson of either of your real grandfathers or grandmoth-
ers; and so on without end: all which persuasions result from, and are
included in, the one original false persuasion of your being the son of
this your pretended mother.
It should seem, therefore, at first sight, that none of the offences
against these uncontiguous relations could ever come expressly into
question: for by the same rule that one ought, so it might seem ought a
thousand others: the offences against the uncontiguous being merged as
it were in those which affect the contiguous relations. So far, however,
is this from being the case, that in speaking of an offence of this stamp,
it is not uncommon to hear a great deal said of this or that uncontiguous
relationship which it affects, at the same time that no notice at all shall
be taken of any of those which are contiguous. How happens this? Be-
cause, to the uncontiguous relation are annexed perhaps certain remark-
able advantages or disadvantages, while to all the intermediate relations
none shall be annexed which are in comparison worth noticing. Sup-
pose Antony or Lepidus to have contested the relationship of Octavius
(afterwards Augustus) to Caius Julius Cæsar. How could it have been
done? It could only have been by contesting, either Octavius’s being the
son of Atia, or Atia’s being the daughter of Julia, or Julia’s being the
daughter of Lucius Julius Cæsar, or Lucius Julius Cæsar’s being the
father of Caius. But to have been the son of Atia, or the grandson of
Julia, or the great grandson of Lucius Julius Cæsar, was, in compari-
son, of small importance. Those intervening relationships were, com-
paratively speaking, of no other use to him than in virtue of their being
so many necessary links in the genealogical chain which connected him
with the sovereign of the empire.
As to the advantages and disadvantages which may happen to be
annexed to any of those uncontiguous relationships, we have seen al-
ready that no powers over the correlative person, nor any corresponding
obligations, are of the number. Of what nature then can they be? They
are, in truth, no other than what are the result either of local and acci-
dental institutions, or of some spontaneous bias that has been taken by
the moral sanction. It would, therefore, be to little purpose to attempt
tracing them out a priori by any exhaustive process: all that can be done
is, to pick up and lay together some of the principal articles in each
catalogue by way of specimen. The advantages which a given relation-
ship is apt to impart, seem to be referable chiefly to the following heads:
1. Chance of succession to the property, or a part of the property, of the

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/209
correlative person. 2. Chance of pecuniary support, to be yielded by the
correlative person, either by appointment of law, or by spontaneous
donation. 3. Accession of legal rank; including any legal privileges which
may happen to be annexed to it: such as capacity of holding such and
such beneficial offices; exemption from such and such burthensome
obligations; for instance, paying taxes, serving burthensome offices, &c;.
&c;. 4. Accession of rank by courtesy; including the sort of reputation
which is customarily and spontaneously annexed to distinguished birth
and family alliance: whereon may depend the chance of advancement in
the way of marriage, or in a thousand other ways less obvious. The
disadvantages which a given relation is liable to impart, seem to be
referable chiefly to the following heads: 1. Chance of being obliged,
either by law, or by force of the moral sanction, to yield pecuniary sup-
port to the correlative party. 2. Loss of legal rank: including the legal
disabilities, as well as the burthensome obligations, which the law is apt
to annex, sometimes with injustice enough, to the lower stations. 3. Loss
of rank by courtesy: including the loss of the advantages annexed by
custom to such rank. 4. Incapacity of contracting matrimony with the
correlative person, where the supposed consanguinity or affinity lies
within the prohibited degrees.
LV. We come now to civil conditions: these, it may well be imag-
ined, may be infinitely various: as various as the acts which a man may
be either commanded or allowed, whether for his own benefit, or that of
others, to abstain from or to perform. As many different denominations
as there are of persons distinguished with a view to such commands and
allowances (those denominations only excepted which relate to the con-
ditions above spoken of under the name of domestic ones) so many civil
conditions one might enumerate. Means however, more or less explicit,
may be found out of circumscribing their infinitude.
What the materials are, if so they may be called, of which condi-
tions, or any other kind of legal possession, can be made up, we have
already seen: beneficial powers, fiduciary powers, beneficial rights, fi-
duciary rights, relative duties, absolute duties. But as many conditions
as import a power or right of the fiduciary kind, as possessed by the
person whose condition is in question, belong to the head of trusts. The
catalogue of the offences to which these conditions are exposed, coin-
cides therefore exactly with the catalogue of offences against trust: un-
der which head they have been considered in a general point of view
under the head of offences against trust: and such of them as are of a

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210/Jeremy Bentham
domestic nature, in a more particular manner in the character of of-
fences against the several domestic conditions. Conditions constituted
by such duties of the relative kind, as have for their counterparts trusts
constituted by fiduciary powers, as well as rights on the side of the
correlative party, and those of a private nature, have also been already
discussed under the appellation of domestic conditions. The same ob-
servation maybe applied to the conditions constituted by such powers of
the beneficial kind over persons as are of a private nature: as also to the
subordinate correlative conditions constituted by the duties correspond-
ing to those rights and powers. As to absolute duties, there is no in-
stance of a condition thus created, of which the institution is upon the
principle of utility to be justified; unless the several religious conditions
of the monastic kind should be allowed of as examples. There remain,
as the only materials out of which the conditions which yet remain to be
considered can be composed, conditions constituted by beneficial pow-
ers over things; conditions constituted by beneficial rights to things (that
is, rights to powers over things) or by rights to those rights, and so on;
conditions constituted by rights to services; and conditions constituted
by the duties corresponding to those respective rights. Out of these are
to be taken those of which the materials are the ingredients of the sev-
eral modifications of property, the several conditions of proprietorship.
These are the conditions, if such for a moment they may be styled, which
having but here and there any specific names, are not commonly consid-
ered on the footing of conditions: so that the acts which, if such condi-
tions were recognised might be considered as offences against those
conditions, are not wont to be considered in any other light than that of
offences against property.
Now the case is, as hath been already intimated, that of these civil
conditions, those which are wont to be considered under that name, are
not distinguished by any uniform and explicit line from those of which
the materials are wont to be carried to the head of property: a set of
rights shall, in one instance, be considered as constituting an article of
property rather than a condition: while, in another instance, a set of
rights of the same stamp is considered as constituting rather a condition
than an article of property. This will probably be found to be the case in
all languages: and toe usage is different again in one language from
what it is in another. From these causes it seems to be impracticable to
subject the class of civil conditions to any exhaustive method: so that
for making a complete collection of them there seems to be no other

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