Principles of Morals and

226/Jeremy Bentham
superintend the conduct of the whole community, it may be termed the
art of public education.
VI. As to ethics in general, a man’s happiness will depend, in the
first place, upon such parts of his behaviour as none but himself are
interested in; in the next place, upon such parts of it as may affect the
happiness of those about him. In as far as his happiness depends upon
the first-mentioned part of his behaviour, it is said to depend upon his
duty to himself. Ethics then, in as far as it is the art of directing a man’s
actions in this respect, may be termed the art of discharging one’s duty
to one’s self: and the quality which a man manifests by the discharge of
this branch of duty (if duty it is to be called) is that of prudence. In as
far as his happiness, and that of any other person or persons whose
interests are considered, depends upon such parts of his behaviour as
may affect the interests of those about him, it may be said to depend
upon his duty to others; or, to use a phrase now somewhat antiquated,
his duty to his neighbour. Ethics then, in as far as it is the art of direct-
ing a man’s actions in this respect, may be termed the art of discharging
one’s duty to one’s neighbour. Now the happiness of one’s neighbour
may be consulted in two ways: 1. In a negative way, by forbearing to
diminish it. 2. In a positive way, by studying to increase it. A man’s duty
to his neighbour is accordingly partly negative and partly positive: to
discharge the negative branch of it, is probity: to discharge the positive
branch, beneficence.
VII. It may here be asked, How it is that upon the principle of pri-
vate ethics, legislation and religion out of the question, a man’s happi-
ness depends upon such parts of his conduct as affect, immediately at
least, the happiness of no one but himself: this is as much as to ask,
What motives (independent of such as legislation and religion may chance
to furnish) can one man have to consult the happiness of another by
what motives, or, which comes to the same thing, by what obligations,
can he be bound to obey the dictates of probity and beneficence. In
answer to this, it cannot but be admitted, that the only interests which a
man at all times and upon all occasions is sure to find adequate motives
for consulting, are his own. Notwithstanding this, there are no occa-
sions in which a man has not some motives for consulting the happiness
of other men. In the first place, he has, on all occasions, the purely
social motive of sympathy or benevolence: in the next place, he has, on
most occasions, the semi-social motives of love of amity and love of
reputation. The motive of sympathy will act upon him with more or less

---

Principles of Morals and Legislation/227
effect, according to the bias of his sensibility: the two other motives,
according to a variety of circumstances, principally according to the
strength of his intellectual powers, the firmness and steadiness of his
mind, the quantum of his moral sensibility, and the characters of the
people he has to deal with.
VIII. Now private ethics has happiness for its end: and legislation
can have no other. Private ethics concerns every member, that is, the
happiness and the actions of every member, of any community that can
be proposed; and legislation can concern no more. Thus far, then, pri-
vate ethics and the art of legislation go hand in hand. The end they have,
or ought to have, in view, is of the same nature. The persons whose
happiness they ought to have in view, as also the persons whose conduct
they ought to be occupied in directing, are precisely the same. The very
acts they ought to be conversant about, are even in a great, measure the
same. Where then lies the difference? In that the acts which they ought
to be conversant about, though in a great measure, are not perfectly and
throughout the same. There is no case in which a private man ought not
to direct his own conduct to the production of his own happiness, and of
that of his fellow-creatures: but there are cases in which the legislator
ought not (in a direct way at least, and by means of punishment applied
immediately to particular individual acts) to attempt to direct the con-
duct of the several other members of the community. Every act which
promises to be beneficial upon the whole to the community (himself
included) each individual ought to perform of himself: but it is not every
such act that the legislator ought to compel him to perform. Every act
which promises to be pernicious upon the whole to the community (him-
self included) each individual ought to abstain from of him: but it is not
every such act that the legislator ought to compel him to abstain from.
IX. Where then is the line to be drawn?—We shall not have far to
seek for it. The business is to give an idea of the cases in which ethics
ought, and in which legislation ought not (in a direct manner at least) to
interfere. If legislation interferes in a direct manner, it must be by pun-
ishment. Now the cases in which punishment, meaning the punishment
of the political sanction, ought not to be inflicted, have been already
stated. 2. If then there be any of these cases in which, although legisla-
tion ought not, private ethics does or ought to interfere, these cases will
serve to point out the limits between the two arts or branches of science.
These cases. it may be remembered, are of four sorts: 1. Where punish-
ment would be groundless. 2. Where it would be inefficacious. 3. Where

---