Nuclear Energy Sustainable- High startup costs offset by low operation costs
Daily Energy Report 11
(The Daily Energy Report, “The Economics of Nuclear Power,” 6/9/11, http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/The-Economics-of-Nuclear-Power.html, CJC)
From the beginning, the basic attraction of nuclear energy has always been its low fuel costs compared with those for coal, oil and gas-fired plants. Unlike other sources, Uranium must be processed, enriched and fabricated into fuel elements, with roughly half of the cost associated with enrichment and fabrication, according to NEI Data. Allowances must also be made for the management of radioactive used fuel and the ultimate disposal of this used fuel or the wastes separated from it. However, as reported by similar data from a Finnish Study, even with these additional costs included, the total fuel costs of a nuclear power plant are typically about a third of those for a coal-fired plant, and between a quarter and a fifth of those for a gas combined-cycle plant.
Sustainable- ridiculous profit margins at a decreased cost to consumers
Daily Energy Report 11
(The Daily Energy Report, “The Economics of Nuclear Power,” 6/9/11, http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/The-Economics-of-Nuclear-Power.html, CJC)
In summary, Nuclear power has long been economically characterized by its higher upfront costs when compared with fossil energy. However if its lower fuel costs (including resistance to price sensitivity), as well its savings in operations costs, are considered, Nuclear Power has a significant long-term advantage over fossil and gas forms of power generation. As confirmed by the World Nuclear Association’s Report, which summarizes intergovernmental analysis published by the International Energy Agency, the value of nuclear power in providing price stability, security of energy supply, and low-emission base load electricity at a reasonable cost is finally being recognized. This, in addition to on-going developments and advancements in technology, makes the “new economics” of nuclear power much more competitive and ultimately less expensive than other forms of electricity generation.
Nuclear energy is sustainable- Key to CO2 mitigation and economic growth
Mallah 10- Devi University India nuclear power expert
(Subhash, “Nuclear energy option for energy security and sustainable development in India,” 11/10/10, http://india.mit.edu/~varun_ag/readinggroup/images/d/db/Nuclear_Energy_Option.pdf, CJC)
The energy security and sustainable development is the prime focus nowadays for the countries of the world. Developing countries are under pressure to mitigate green house emissions. Because energy is the main driver for any economy to grow with rapid pace. India is also a developing country therefore similar pressure to reduce green house gas has been imposed from the community of the world. In this paper, several scenarios have been developed for the energy security as well as for green house gas mitigation. The above discussions of various scenarios show that if only c advanced nuclear technologies are applied to the power sector we cannot get a sustainable energy future. An integrated approach is required for the resource generation and also for the CO2 mitigation. The introduction of advanced nuclear technologies in Indian power sector can change the proportion of each resource for electricity generation but cannot reduce significantly the carbon dioxide. Since Indian power sector emits major proportion of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, therefore, at present it feels huge pressure to switch over to the renewable sources for power generation. Due to high investment cost and gestation period it is not viable in near future. Therefore, the holistic approach of energy conservation is most suitable at this time for immediate action. The nuclear energy is also considered as clean energy in context of global warming. So there is an urgent need to install centralized power plants for long-term energy supply and reduce environmental externalities. Various scenarios show a reduction of carbon dioxide. Full energy savings potential with advanced nuclear shows about 52% carbon dioxide reduction in the year 2045.
Nuclear energy key to sustainability- all other methods fail
Mian 11- Retired senior World Bank official, Director of the general office of utility regulation
(Zia, “Energy sustainability and supply security,”7/17/11, http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110717/focus/focus9.html, CJC)
It is clear that the global energy future would be determined by sustainability goals. Oil is not likely to provide sustainability, as its price would continue to be determined by non-energy fundamentals (eg geopolitics, financials, hedge funds or commodity-price speculations). It is within these sustainability goals that the nuclear energy would play an important role in the future supply and security. Vision 2030 Jamaica, having recognised these sustainability goals, has placed emphasis on: "An energy sector that possesses the flexibility and creativity to adopt and adapt to new and appropriate energy technologies (such as fuel cells, small nuclear plants) that may emerge over the long term."
***China Adv
China Adv – 1AC
China has begun a space race with the US – they’re ahead, which crushes hegemony and US-China relations while ensuring a massive proliferation-driven arms race
Trivedi 2011(Sahiba, research analyst working on security and sustainable development in South and East Asia for Strategic Foresight Group, “SPACE: THE FINAL FRONTIER OF SINO-US RIVALRY?” http://sustainablesecurity.org/article/space-final-frontier-sino-us-rivalry) HDG
China's development of a space programme threatens to increase Sino-US tension as the latter's dominance of space, with all its military and commercial potential, is undermined. China’s sky-high space ambitions have the potential to upset the current world order. Within the coming decade, China may become capable of challenging America’s dominance over space and its monopoly over global navigational systems. Over the past few years, China has engaged in completing high-profile, grand projects like high-speed rail, the world’s biggest airport terminal (since overtaken by Dubai) and the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Its space programme, like all else, is a matter of Chinese prestige. On successful completion, it will be yet another grand feather in China’s cap signalling its ambition of becoming a world power. China’s ambitious space programme has three tracks. Track one is the setting up of China’s own space station. The Chinese were successful in launching their first astronaut or taikonaut into space in 2003. Since then, China’s space programme has witnessed major breakthroughs. By summer 2011, it plans to launch its first unmanned space module called ‘Tiangong – 1’. The ‘Shenzhou – 8’, scheduled for later this year (2011), will attempt to dock with the ‘Tiangong – 1’. Both these launches are the initial stages of Chinese plans for setting up a space station by 2015. Once its space station is completed, China will become the third country in the world, after Russia and the US to do so with indigenous technology. The second track is China’s lunar ambitions, scheduled to be carried out over three phases. The first phase of this was successfully completed in October 2010 with the launch of the “Chang’e – 2” lunar orbiter. By 2020, China could actually land its first astronaut on the moon. The third track of its space programme involves the development of a Chinese global navigational system called ‘Beidou’. Until now, the US has had a monopoly over navigation systems with its global positioning system (GPS). China aims to make ‘Beidou’ available to Asia-Pacific by 2012, which will go global by 2020. China’s programme could have repercussions for the Sino-US relationship. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s recent US visit resulted in a number of trade and investment deals being inked between the two countries. However, space was not one of them even though according to Washington, the 4 main areas of potential cooperation with China include space alongside cyber-security, missile defense and nuclear weapons. But since mutual trust is important for any kind of cooperation between the two nations, space is a ‘no-go’. The US and Chinese space programmes cannot be compared directly. The American programme precedes China’s by at least 40 years and China has yet to land its first man on moon. The US satellite and spacecraft technology is still years ahead of China. But China is on the fast track right now. In 2011 alone, China aims to put more than twenty vehicles into space. Compared to this, the US space programme is in a state of inertia. It has had to scrap its ‘Constellation Program’ since the struggling American economy cannot afford the huge price tag attached to the programme at present. Details of the Chinese space programme remain undisclosed and even its civilian component is run primarily by its military. For the US, this limits strategic cooperation to a large extent. The US is also wary of China’s growing military ambitions. China has recently tested its first stealth fighter aircraft. Since space technology almost always has military uses like missile development and remote monitoring and control, it is likely that a successful space programme in China would bolster its military and naval prowess. Hence, the US is clearly uneasy about the programme even though the administration has downplayed reports of China’s goal of a manned moon mission. For China, the US skepticism over its space programme as well as its ban on high-tech exports to China is a hurdle to cooperation in space. The navigational system ‘Beidou’ is crucial for the Chinese military as presently it has to depend on the US GPS. The Chinese fear is that this GPS could be blocked or manipulated in case of a conflict. The US is also jittery because of fears of technology proliferation since China’s allies include countries like Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. Supremacy in space would also aid China in elevating it to the status of a global superpower. Commercially too, an advanced space programme could eventually result in China being first in the race to extract lunar resources like uranium and titanium. Over the next few years, it is unlikely that the speed of China’s progress in its space programme will go down. Also, as it achieves its goals, China’s programme will definitely make many countries around the world nervous. Hence, with each of China’s successes, the world will see other countries taking frantic action to catch up with it. It is also possible that with a robust and thriving space programme in its kitty, China may be the next nation to be included in International Space Station (ISS). Such a situation may lessen the atmosphere of mutual suspicion to a certain degree.
The clock is ticking – dulling China’s edge in satellite development is crucial to preventing an aggressive shift in Chinese force posture
Blanchard, ‘11 (BEN, Space, China's final frontier” July 12, 2011, http://mg.co.za/article/2011-07-12-space-chinas-final-frontier)
While the United States used to be unrivalled in this area, China is catching up fast, it added. "China's constellation of satellites is transitioning from the limited ability to collect general strategic information, into a new era in which it will be able to support tactical operations as they happen," the report said. "China may already be able to match the United States' ability to image a known, stationary target and will likely surpass it in the flurry of launches planned for the next two years." Beijing has consistently denied it has anything other than peaceful plans for space and says its growing military spending and prowess are for defensive purposes and modernisation of outdated forces. But with the recent unveiling of a stealth fighter, the expected launch of its first aircraft carriers and more aggressive posture over territorial disputes such as one in the South China Sea, Beijing has rattled nerves regionally and globally. China's space programme has come a long way since late leader Mao Zedong, who founded Communist China in 1949, lamented that the country could not even launch a potato into space. Since then, it has launched men into orbit and brought them home, sent out its first lunar probe and begun longer-term programmes to explore Mars and establish a space station. The successful missile "kill" of an old satellite in early 2007 represented a new level of ability for the Chinese military, and last year China successfully tested emerging technology aimed at destroying missiles in mid-air. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates warned earlier this year that advances by China's military in cyber and anti-satellite warfare technology could challenge the ability of US forces to operate in the Pacific. 'Strategically disquieting China's need to use satellites to up its military game became apparent during the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis, when the US dispatched a carrier group after China menaced the self-ruled island with war games, the report said. Beijing realised it could neither track nor respond to the US ships. The incident also led China to realise it needed the means to keep Washington from using its navy to intervene in a war over Taiwan. Beijing regards the island as a rebel province. "The most immediate and strategically disquieting application [of reconnaissance satellites] is a targeting and tracking capability in support of the anti-ship ballistic missile, which could hit US carrier groups," the report said. "But China's growing capability in space is not designed to support any single weapon; instead it is being developed as a dynamic system, applicable to other long-range platforms. With space as the backbone, China will be able to expand the range of its ability to apply force while preserving its policy of not establishing foreign military bases." More broadly speaking, satellites will be able to help China project power. "As China's capabilities grow, with space reconnaissance as an example, it will be increasingly hard to reconcile the rhetoric of a defensive posture and a more expansive capability." – Reuters
The nuclear propulsion race is the critical battle ground – it’s vital to US hegemony, deflating Chinese ambitions and halting the China-Russia axis
Smith 03 (Wayne , founder of NuclearSpace, “Will There Be A Nuclear Space Race Between America And China,” http://www.spacedaily.com/news/nuclearspace-03d.html) HDG
How will other nations react to this startlingly bold new objective? The nuclear initiative was first announced over a year ago with NASA requesting a billion dollar funding over five years for nuclear space research and development. Little response was generated overseas as nuclear power in the form of RTG's (Radioisotope Thermionic Generators) for space probes and satellites is nothing new. However, the latest announcement places nuclear power at the forefront of future space development. Spacefaring nations such as the European Union and Russia cannot ignore this challenge. In particular the newest emerging superpower, China, will closely watch how events unfurl. In just over three years, China has gone from Satellite launches to planning a human spaceflight in October of this year. This remarkably rapid advancement was spurred by the realization of the strategic importance of space. Space will be central to tomorrow's world order and national security dictates that a space presence is a sign of strength. Huang Chunping, commander-in-chief of the chinese Shenxhou space launch program has said, "Just imagine, there are outer space facilities of another country at the place very, very high above your head, and so others clearly see what you are doing, and what you are feeling. That's why we also need to develop space technology." Clearly the Chinese have more on their minds than national prestige in attempting to become the third nation to ever have launched a man into space. Manned aerospace is the epitome of space technology. National prestige is clearly an important consideration, and one which westerners can easily relate to as they fondly reminisce about the moon landings. However, the military implications are just as important, if not greater, a consideration. China has already invested too much money into developing a space launch capability to consider pulling back now. In past interviews, they have announced the intention to build space stations, reach the moon and build bases there, and even boasted they will beat the United States with a manned mission to Mars. Their Shenxhou launch system has been played down by critics as primitive but is probably level with 1990's US technology. The fact is we are still using 1990's US technology. The big Saturn V boosters America once used for moonshots are now all gone and funding for NASA's ailing programs such as the ISS have been diminishing annually. With Russia suffering economic problems and the ESA unsure of its future, China seems to be on an inside straight to success. However, Prometheus changes everything. NASA is "moving from windpower to steam" as Sean O'Keefe puts it and that may leave China suddenly out in the cold. Unless of course, they respond with their own nuclear space program. China and Russia have been increasing ties for a number of years now.Space and Arms technology trade in particular have increased due to new treaties. The Russians, who launched more nuclear reactors than the US, are no strangers to nuclear space technology having had their own shadowy nuclear propulsion program -- which no doubt compared very favourably to past US efforts. If pushed to develop their own nuclear space initiative, the Chinese will likely enquire of Russia for help. The Russians, in turn, will demand a high cost for such secret technology, just as they have done for all previously purchased space systems technologies. China will either pay or attempt to develop their own. China, also no stranger to nuclear power, has stated owned national nuclear facilities and a state owned space programme. Efforts at combining nuclear and space branches of Government will face very little red tape within a communist regime. A chinese INSPI or Los Alamos seems very possible
We’’ll isolate three impacts –
a. Asian arms race – it immediately escalates and causes extinction
Cirincione, 2k
[Joseph, director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain” Carnegie Proliferation Brief, 3:3, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=76&prog=zgp&proj=znpp]
Unfortunately, these firewalls are now crumbling in much of the world - particularly in Asia, where declining faith in arms control is prompting advanced and developing countries alike to contemplate the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons. Like neutrons splitting from an atom, one nation's actions may trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn stimulate additional actions. Asian nations form an interlocking nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. Breeding Reactions South Asia is the region most likely to see the combat use of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan - two nuclear-armed nations sharing a common border and a history of aggression - are developing new missiles and crafting nuclear-deployment doctrines. The disputed Kashmir region, the cause of two past wars between these nations, remains a frightening flash point. But it is Japan that may well be the critical element in this chain. In 1998, the Japanese were caught by surprise when the Indian-Pakistani tit-for-tat nuclear tests suddenly doubled the number of Asian nuclear-weapon states. Many Japanese were disturbed by how quickly the world accepted India and Pakistan's de facto status as new nuclear powers. This was not the bargain Japan had agreed to when - after a lengthy internal debate - it joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976. North Korea's launch of a long-range Taepo Dong missile in August 1998 further agitated Japanese policymakers, stirring new debates over security policies. Then-Vice Defense Minister Shingo Nishimura argued that Japan "ought to have aircraft carriers, long-range missiles, long-range bombers. We should even have the atomic bomb." Mr. Nishimura was forced to resign over his comments, but if nuclear-weapon deployments increase in Asia, Japan may well conclude that its security is best served by building its own nuclear arsenal. And Japanese withdrawal from the NPT would almost certainly trigger the collapse of the treaty. Finally, there are two new emerging risks in Asia: Russia faces the prospect of fragmentation into separate, nuclear-armed states, while the possible unification of Korea - although solving one set of problems - could create a single country with nuclear ambitions and capabilities. If these new nations find themselves in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-weapon states, they may well opt to join the club. Wishful Thinking In this environment, it would be foolish to let the nonproliferation and arms- reductions treaties unravel, thereby disarming the US of its most effective weapons for fighting nascent nuclear threats. Some critics, such as Henry Kissinger, argue that the US can pick and choose which particular arms treaties it finds most advantageous. Unfortunately, an arms control a-la-carte strategy will not work - the non-proliferation regime functions only as an integrated whole. Taking elements we don't like out of the regime structure starts a dangerous round of Jenga, the tabletop game where blocks are sequentially removed from a wooden tower until the whole structure collapses. Provocative US actions, such as the deployment of national missile defense, could well set in motion a chain of events that diplomacy will be powerless to stop. Only by expanding the resources devoted to international negotiations and leading by example in reducing nuclear dangers can the US hope to prevent a nuclear tsunami from sweeping out of Asia.
b. Chinese doctrine shift – it leads to aggressive escalation by China inviting an escalating conflict.
Chase, ‘9
[Michael, Andrew & Christopher, assistant professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the US Naval War College, Assistant Professor China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 32:1, February 2009]
At the strategic level, China’s nuclear force modernization is focused on improving survivability to make its nuclear deterrence posture more credible, a task that has taken on increased urgency as a result of growing concerns regarding US nuclear preeminence, missile defense plans and conventional precision strike capabilities. China is moving toward a much more survivable, and thus more credible, strategic nuclear posture with the development of the road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs and the JL-2 SLBM. Indeed, as experts have highlighted, the introduction of road-mobile strategic missiles and SSBNs will allow China to achieve ‘a degree of credible minimal deterrence vis-a` -vis the continental United States’.140 The modernization of Chinese nuclear forces and the transition from silo-based to road-mobile nuclear missiles and SSBNs might thus enhance strategic deterrence stability. Indeed, deterrence theory suggests that a more secure second-strike capability should enhance stability by causing both the United States and China to behave much more cautiously. The United States, for its part, should not be tempted to contemplate a preemptive counterforce strike against China’s strategic missiles, since US planners and decisionmakers would know that China would still be capable of launching a damaging retaliatory strike against the United States or its allies. At the same time, China’s ability to launch a damaging retaliatory blow even after absorbing a preemptive counterforce attack should enable it to avoid becoming trapped in a desperate, ‘use it or lose it’ situation – one in which the party without a secure second-strike capability would theoretically be tempted to strike first, before an adversary could eliminate its vulnerable nuclear forces. At the same time, however, there are reasons to be concerned that the transition to a more secure second-strike capability will not necessarily translate immediately or automatically into greater stability. Indeed, it is entirely possible that these developments could in fact decrease crisis stability under certain circumstances, particularly if China’s growing nuclear and missile capability tempts Beijing to behave more assertively, the undersea environment becomes a point of uncomfortably close approach between US attack submarines and Chinese SSBNs, changes in force posture or technological developments result in heightened insecurity, or the alerting and de-alerting of strategic forces creates a temporary state of increased vulnerability. Some observers have suggested that a more secure second-strike capability will embolden Beijing to act more aggressively. For example, former Taiwan deputy defense minister Lin Chong-pin predicts that China’s road-mobile ICBMs will enable its leaders to adopt a more assertive foreign policy stance. According to Lin, ‘China’s heightened nuclear status, as perceived by the world, will serve as the backbone of what Beijing has announced to be its ‘‘independent foreign policy’’: increasingly assertive in an emerging, multipolar world.’141 Some analysts have even speculated that China’s more robust nuclear posture could lead to a US–China conflict, possibly by making its leaders overconfident of their ability to achieve intra-war nuclear escalation control, an explicit mission of the Second Artillery,142 and thereby undermine crisis communication and management. This is true, to a lesser extent, at the conventional level where the Second Artillery is charged with ‘conducting missile deterrence operations’ to ‘contain the enemy’s sinister strategic intentions or significant military misadventures’ with its ‘long-range, precise, fast, and powerful’ surface-tosurface missiles, thereby ‘profoundly influencing the overall situation of political, diplomatic, and military struggles’ at the strategic level.143 One proponent of this view is Su Tzu-yun, a former adviser to Taiwan’s National Security Council. In Su’s words, ‘With these new tools, the PLA is like a teenager eager to show off and potentially drag China into a military misadventure with the US.’144 At the same time, however, Beijing would still have good reason for caution, given that it would still be dealing with a vastly more capable nuclear power. An additional aspect of China’s evolving nuclear doctrine that bears careful thought relates to the operation of the new Jin-class SSBNs as they come on line. Conventional wisdom holds that the development of such a secure, second-strike, strategic force increases strategic stability, theoretically restraining response options on both sides in the event of a crisis. While such an assumption may hold during peacetime, the movement, maneuver, and alerting of nuclear forces in the transition to crisis holds the threat of grave miscalculation. The alert operation of SSBNs by China during a crisis (to include full or partial sailing of the force out of port) may actually significantly decrease the stability of the situation, since it is unlikely that the United States will forgo the option to conduct trailing and surveillance operations in support of strategic anti-submarine warfare (ASW) against those assets. Depending upon the aggressiveness of the strategic ASW operations and PLAN countermeasures, such a situation has the potential to dramatically and unexpectedly escalate the crisis. In fact, the ensuing undersea battlespace will likely be first and closest point of approach between US forces and PLA nuclear forces. Moreover, the crisis could easily escalate beyond mere conventional or even theater warfare. Thus, this undersea interaction should become a point of intense interest, and perhaps discussion, for both sides. The unintended consequences of interaction between force posture changes and technological developments in the Chinese and US militaries may also contribute to greater instability in the event of a future crisis or conflict. This could happen in at least four different ways. First, China will likely attempt to expand its longer-range conventional theater missile capabilities as the US military strengthens its presence in the Pacific. For example, the more heavily the Pentagon relies on Guam to bolster its presence in the Pacific, the greater the incentive China will have to develop conventional ballistic missiles capable of reaching Guam. Beijing may believe that it needs a conventional missile capability with the range to strike targets on Guam to avoid being faced with a choice between crossing the nuclear threshold or allowing the US military to use Guam as a sanctuary. This could result in the geographic expansion of a conflict over Taiwan or in vertical escalation if China launches missile attacks against US territory. Second, intercontinental conventional strike capabilities could further undermine strategic stability or lead to unintended escalation. China faces a fundamental strategic asymmetry in any conflict with the United States. The US military already has the ability to carry out conventional attacks on Chinese territory, potentially including strikes against strategic targets, but the PLA currently has no ability (except, perhaps, some limited special forces capability) to strike targets in Hawaii, Alaska, or the continental United States without using nuclear weapons. The US may increase its dominance in intercontinental conventional strike capabilities with the potential future deployment of conventionally armed SLBMs or other long-range conventional strike systems.145 Chinese analysts express concern about such developments, particularly about potential US plans to place conventional warheads on SLBMs. An unidentified author writes that highly accurate conventionally armed SLBMs would give the United States the ability to destroy strategic point targets without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, which might raise the risk of war or escalation.146 In the longer-term, China may want to respond to this imbalance and the associated perceived vulnerabilities by developing longer-range conventional strike capabilities of its own that would allow it to threaten at least a limited number of critical targets in Hawaii, Alaska (i.e., missile defense installations), and the continental United States. Although there has not been any evidence of Chinese interest in pursuing extremely long-range conventional strike capabilities to date, a limited strategic conventional strike capability might prove attractive to the Chinese to fill the gap between conventional theater capabilities and strategic nuclear forces. There would also be possible benefits from accentuating the risks of conventional operations against the Chinese mainland, since conventional retaliation would appear more credible than the threat of a nuclear first strike in response to US conventional attacks on the Chinese homeland.147 This could be destabilizing in a conflict. It is possible that employing conventional intercontinental strike capabilities, or perhaps even simply placing such assets on higher alert levels, would result in miscalculation if either side interpreted such moves as preparations for a nuclear first strike.
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