Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

The EU as a partner

The EU as a partner is another way of considering this organization when looking from Moscow. Actually, this is the most developed line of thinking, the one that usually comes to the foreground when the issue of relations with the EU is raised in political and academic debates as well as on the level of the decision-making process within the governmental structures.

Obvious factors make this line of thinking predominant in Russia. The EU accounts for approximately 40 per cent of Russia's external trade; it is the largest source of foreign investments providing more than two thirds of them; it generates the lion's part of economic assistance directed to Russia from the outside world. By all these parameters, the EU is the most important counterpart of Russia and is certainly appreciated in this capacity which makes Russia's cooperative interaction with it imperative¹⁴.

This is of particular importance in terms of Russia's crucial self-assigned task of ensuring economic sustainability of the country. Against this background, incentives towards promoting the EU to the very top in the list of Russia's foreign policy priorities look very powerful indeed.

Moreover, there is a general belief in Russia that the EU approach determines the overall dynamics of Russia's relations with external partners. If the EU develops trade with Russia, or provides credits, or becomes more active in terms of investments, or manifests flexibility in settling Russia's debts, and so on—this is expected to be a strong signal to other international partners that will most probably follow suit. In other words, the EU as Russia's external partner sets the pattern of behaviour to other actors. It is therefore not surprising that Moscow pays considerable attention to the EU position on some specific problems. For instance, the EU support is considered essential on such issues like Russia's accession to the WTO or the recognition of Russia's status as market economy country¹⁵.

The economic power of the EU generates both respect and apprehension. Respect is a more 'direct' reaction to the EU strength which is expected to take part in promoting Russia's economic development. Apprehension relates to some longer term assessments which makes Russia think about the EU in competitive terms. Indeed, if a scenario of Russia's economic resurrection proves true, the EU might become a challenger rather than a source of support.

Many in Russia would consider this scenario over-optimistic as far as Russia's economic recovery is concerned; for them, the EU economic strength as a problem for Russia is a very remote prospect. Others would argue that competitiveness in relations with the EU is an existential problem. Even nowadays, the EU as a partner might be also a source of irritation. There are numerous complaints about anti-dumping procedures and other 'discriminatory practices' by the EU against Russia. Thus, at the beginning of 2001, Russia's 'losses' because of the EU export quotas (on metals, chemical productions) and twelve on-going 'anti-dumping measures' were assessed at $2,5 bln.¹⁶

Building 'organic' cooperative relationship with the EU requires considerable adjustments on Russia's part. Proponents of rapprochement with the EU believe that this is essential not only for developing relations with this organization but also in terms of promoting Russia's further transformation. In fact, the large-scale 'Europeanization' of Russia's economic pattern, political mechanism, judicial system, social norms and so on should consist in adopting the EU standards, both to make Russia compatible with the EU and, even more importantly, to make it modern and sustainable. Some opponents of this approach, those who profess irreconcilable anti-western beliefs, would reject it as a matter of principle; others would argue that introducing the EU standards is an enormous time- and effort-consuming operation requiring both patience and cautiousness. The 'pro-EU' extremists would reject such objections and reservations as meaningless; they would argue in favour of enhanced rapprochement at any price and believe that the ultimate advantages would outweigh any eventual costs of Russia.

There is a peculiar combination of economic and political motives in Russian thinking about the EU as a partner. Economics is predominant in 'technocratic' thinking; indeed, there are numerous examples when the line developed by various governmental institutions is only focused upon clearly 'countable' parameters: volume of trade, flow of investments, norms of profit, specific clauses in agreements and so on. In fact, this is often characterized by a surprising lack of assessing the political aspects of partnership with the EU. Political calculations, on the other hand, may look superficial, proceeding from normative stands and insufficiently aware of real requirements, constraints and obstacles. Ensuring an adequate combination of both approaches is a formidable challenge in developing Russia's attitude to the EU as a partner.

The inertia of considering the EU as an economic entity par excellence affects the character of Russia's understanding of 'partnership' with this structure. However, the on-going trend consists in considering the EU also as a political actor.

The EU itself, with its significant transformation in the 1990s, has certainly played a role in promoting such changes of the Russian attitude. But they were also generated by the evolution of Russia's foreign policy thinking—in particular by the emerging understanding that Russia has to search for its own place and role in the international arena. This required adequate assessment of other actors, either as potential cooperative partners in the international political interplay or as potential rivals and competitors. Assessing in this context the EU is becoming a growing necessity, because of the EU's developing Common Foreign and Security Policy that also starts embracing military-related issues.

By and large, this has turned into a kind of a two-ways street: the international political identity of the EU becomes more prominent, while Russia experiences growing need in political interaction with other actors on the international scene. Both processes represent independent variables; their intersection is not inevitable, but the chances for them to reinforce each other are by no means meaningless.

Here again, one could refer to Russia's first 'Foreign Policy Concept' of 1993 where possible political interaction with the EU was mentioned with respect to some international issues. This concerns, for instance, the eventual involvement of the EU in preventive diplomacy and conflict management—in particular, in Yugoslavia.

It should be added, however, that the view on the EU as potential competitor of Russia could be applied to the political dimension even to a greater extent than to the economic one. Indeed, if 'recovered' Russia tries one day to re-establish its influence in Europe, the EU as a political power will be a serious obstacle thereto. In a broader sense, the EU as a global actor in the making could also undermine prospects of Russia's 'greatpowerness'. It is true that such propositions look theoretical and politically irrelevant, without affecting much Russia's thinking about the EU. But within a more narrow focus—for instance, in regard to the CIS zone where Russia pretends to have 'special interests'—the vision of the EU as Russia's rival does not look as something generated only by ill-grounded intellectual exercises.