Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

Focus upon domestic developments

From mid-1980s through mid-1990s the country turned out predominantly inward-looking and relatively less passionate about what was happening in the external world. Indeed, the access of Michael Gorbachev to power in 1985 and the beginning of 'perestroika' were producing by far more thrilling scenario than the Single European Act and debates related thereto. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty was a small, ordinary episode against the background of the disappearance of the Soviet Union—which was the event indeed. The enlargement of the EU passed almost unnoticed in the country that came up to the threshold of civil war which could only be prevented by shooting at the parliament with tanks. Even the debate in the EU on security and defence matters looked light years away from realities in Russia engaging in the Chechen war.

This list could be longer, although it certainly does not look methodologically convincing. Indeed, in most countries domestic affairs, as a rule, have predominance over the external developments. Foreign policies could rarely compete with interior ones. However, Russia's phenomenon of indifference was remarkable by its scale even in the framework of this general rule.

It was also remarkable in comparison to the country's own tradition in two respects. On the one hand, Moscow's foreign policy during the Soviet period had been traditionally considered as assertive (or 'active', if one uses the political and propagandistic cliché of that time), whereas at the beginning of 1990s the country looked invalidating this tradition. On the other hand, the general public during the Soviet period had been by and large interested in foreign affairs (even if only because it was impossible to manifest interest towards domestic ones), whereas in the early post-Soviet period this interest declined to almost zero level.

At the same time, keeping in mind the scope of transformation, the intensity of domestic political debate on the course to be adopted, the rigidity of struggle between competing interest groups and other similar factors, there seems nothing abnormal in such excessive concentration on the country's own problems. Relative decrease of interest towards the external environment was the price to pay for exciting domestic developments.

Certainly, the importance of domestic developments does not necessarily make foreign policy a low profile issue. Any country could face situations when the role of external factors becomes crucial in terms of its domestic developments. However, this was not exactly the case of the Soviet/Russian history during the last ten to fifteen years—both in terms of actual development and as far as its perception is concerned.

It is true that some policy-related analyses tend to make the West responsible for the demise of the USSR, the most dramatic event during this period. In principle, within this line of thinking, the EU could be a subject of negative attention. But Russian intellectual debate does not support this abstract assumption. Indeed, the conspiracy-oriented theories (focusing upon external influence as decisive factor of the collapse of the country) represent only a meaningless part of the whole spectrum of the debate. In addition, even within these theories, blaming the EU would mean focusing upon the wrong 'responsible' since this role is undoubtedly reserved to the United States.

There was an opposite vector in some Russian assessments regarding the interplay of domestic and external factors—when the support of 'democratic West' was regarded as crucial for ensuring Russia's political, economic and social transformation and preventing its return to the past. It would be logical, within this approach, to expect considerable support from the EU and to focus upon it in a more significant way. However, in practice this relationship emerged only later; at the initial phase after the demise of the USSR, the unlimited support was expected as granted and did not seem to require any specific intellectual or political efforts on the part of Moscow (in particular, with respect to the EU).

Foreign policy disorientation

Notwithstanding all reasons for focusing upon domestic issues, explaining the lack of adequate reaction to new EU-related phenomena only by predominantly inward-oriented character of Russia's political developments seems neither satisfactory nor sufficient. Part of the explanation (and perhaps a very significant part) could reside in the realm of foreign policy per se.

It is worth recalling that the post-Soviet Russia came onto the international scene with a strong pro-Western orientation. Destroying the old regime, getting rid of the communist past, proclaiming itself decisively in favour of democracy and a market economy—all this was considered to provide Russia with a ticket to the 'community of the civilized countries '. Now, yesterday's foes were regarded as the most reliable friends; they were expected to welcome the new Russia with enthusiasm as an equal partner—both in Europe and elsewhere. Operating together, they would constitute a nucleus of the 'new world order'.

Thus, Russia was both politically and psychologically ready to join the club of the international elite and expected to be recognized as a full-fledged participant therein. This vision had three basic implications for designing Russia's perspectives on the EU.

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  First, there was a kind of tacit assumption (even if it was not proclaimed publicly): Russia 's interests in the international arena are basically identical to those of the West. Evidently, this fully applied to the EU as its organic part. The developments in and around the EU are to be accepted as such, without any concern and unnecessary doubts, since they, by definition, cannot be incompatible with Russia's interests.
  
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  Secondly, with such 'radiant future' in view, there was no need to be excessively specific in assessing the developments within the West. The latter as a whole was the target of Russia's policy of new friendship, and losing time and efforts for dealing with meaningless details was simply not necessary. The EU was too small for new Russia's 'grand strategy' that was globally oriented. In a sense, this was a democratic variant of megalomanic ambitions inherited from the past¹.
  
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  Thirdly, the EU could hardly be Russia's preferable choice for organizing the European political space. New Russia was thinking about a new post-cold war pattern in a new Europe, with all interested countries participating in its construction as equal partners. The emerging pan-European pattern was to replace the outdated bipolar organization of the continent. Meanwhile, the EU was an element of the past, and it did not include Russia—therefore the latter had all grounds for not focusing its foreign policy upon this structure.
  

Certainly, the above description only gives a schematic picture, but it reflects the character of Russian thinking in the early post-Soviet period. This thinking was full of expectations, hopes and illusions that all prevented Moscow from paying due attention to the EU developments.

Moreover, even political actions of the EU addressed to what was disappearing as a single state, USSR, and what was becoming something new, passed practically unnoticed in Moscow. This was, for instance, the case of the EU decision to elaborate criteria for recognizing the new states emerging on the territory of the former superpower—criteria that were adopted by the foreign ministers of 'the Twelve'² on 16 December 1991, but did not meet interest in Moscow. Meanwhile, they included notions that were of significant importance for Russia, such as guarantees to ethnic and national minorities, respect of non-violability of frontiers, recognition of international obligations, commitment to settle disagreements by negotiations and so on. At the least, this created a good starting point for developing constructive interaction with the EU at the very early period of post-Soviet Russia. This opportunity, however, was missed or, rather, passed unnoticed.