Russia-Middle East: The Influence of the Arab Factor
139
The mufti of Tatarstan, Gabdulla Galiullin, was perhaps one of the
first to start talking directly about the harm foreign education was causing
to Tatars, though some statements, which did not name any addressees, had
been given previously by the head of CSAM of CIS and Siberia, Talgat
Tadzhutdin.
8
In 1996, Galiulin was still trying to play on the federal field as
the Chairman of the Highest Coordination Center (HCC) of spiritual
administrations of Muslims of Russia, but some of his pointed statements,
which lacked coordination with the opinions of the leadership of Tatarstan,
along with inadequate actions, raised the question of changing the spiritual
leader of Muslims.
Pretending to be loyal, in an interview for Interfax Agency, he
declared that there was a danger of schism in Tatarstan, which would be
“favourable for Moscow.” Graduates from foreign Islamic higher education
institutions returning home were the source of this. According to his
calculations, at that time approximately 100 people from Tatarstan were
being trained in countries such as Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Libya, Morocco,
Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, the Arab Emirates, Malaysia and Indonesia. He
opined that “they will inevitably bring something new that could come into
collision with the settled customs. I don’t doubt that hostility, intrigues and,
as a result, schism will follow. Harm will be done to the whole religious
environment.”
9
He saw a way out through creating local religious
educational institutions, but there was no money for organizing these, and
“the state [was] remaining aloof.”
It was difficult to take this statement seriously, as it was Gabdulla
Galiullin who in the early nineties had organized the training of young
Tatars in Arab countries, and the author of this article took part in an
interview with him on this subject. Furthermore, according to another ex-
mufti of Tatarstan, Ildus Fayzov, the boom in departures of Tatar youth for
Islamic countries took place in 1995-6.
10
The events of August-September 1999 in Dagestan introduced a new
term - “Wahhabism” - into the lexicon of experts and politicians. The
discussion began as to whether there was a basis for Wahhabism in
Tatarstan. Against this background, the federal mass media were given carte
blanche by the opponents of the acting mufti of SAM of RT, Gusman
Iskhakov, and in particular by his former competitor Fareed Salman. In his
famous letter to The Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Salman wrote that the Muslim clergy
trained abroad:
8
Lider musul’man Rossii protiv vmeshatel’stva zarubezhnyh islamskih organizacij v duhovnuju sferu svoej
konfessii (
Postfactum.Ru., 20 July 1994, accessed 5 May 2014).
9
Islam v Rossii 1996.
10
Kak protivostojat’ 2011.
www.cclbsebes.ro/muzeul-municipal-ioan-raica.html / www.cimec.ro
A. M. Akhunov
140
“don’t hide their ideas hostile to national Russian Islam. After all, for them
we are traditionalists, heretics and ignoramuses. The personnel situation is
that there is a dramatic shortage of staff (mullahs). The majority of mosques
have appeared recently and the number of these which are empty is great.
Supporters of traditional Islam are in every possible way pushed aside and
displaced. Graduates of Wahhabite institutions are put in their places.”
11
He also wrote that all religious power was in hands of people who
had received a Saudi education or those depending on the Saudi financially.
The ideal time for attacking the official SAM of RT was chosen
successfully. One could hardly say that the criticism was completely
groundless, but the issues at hand did not come within miles of the events
occurring at that moment in Chechnya and Dagestan. The authorities of
Tatarstan, frightened by this letter, were compelled to issue a statement
three days later in the same Rossiyskaya Gazeta. The Chairman of the State
Council of Tatarstan, Farid Mukhametshin, reported that all competent
authorities were currently conducting a review of all publications in the
press and other information connected with penetration of alien ideology
into the territory of the Republic. As Mukhametshin stated,
“If this information is confirmed, I don’t exclude the possibility of a ban on
similar activity in the territory of Tatarstan. Besides this, we will address the
federal authorities with a similar proposal.”
12
Thus, the question of adopting the law similar to the one in Dagestan,
Regarding a Ban on Wahhabite and Other Extremist Activities, was seriously
considered.
After the situation calmed down a little, Tatarstan officials started
conducting counter-propaganda activities. A well-known expert in Islamic
studies, Professor Gulnara Baltanova, published an article O zhupele
“vakhkhabizma” ili politicheskoy bor’be vokrug islama in the local press, declaring
declared that: “it is obvious to any intellectual that real roots of Wahhabism
in RT don’t exist as Islam and have no impact on the political situation in
the Republic.”
Speaking about the system of religious education, she declared
unsuccessful the approach of the President of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev,
who ordered licenses to be withdrawn from educational institutions
financed by foreign states or organizations:
“So in itself, rejecting foreign help will not solve the problem but will only
aggravate it ... The same could be said about the second channel of
influence of ‘Wahhabism,’ namely the training of our youth abroad. This
practice is inevitable, and it isn’t worth rejecting it, it is another matter where
11
Wahhabism 1999.
12
Predsedatel’ Gossoveta 1999.
www.cclbsebes.ro/muzeul-municipal-ioan-raica.html / www.cimec.ro