The eu’s Legitimacy in the Eye of the Beholders

9.2 – Similar Narratives or Not?

The Americans have a saying: ‘There are lies, damn lies and statistics.’ Statistics are the worst kind of lie, because they have an aura of objectivity and truth. Numbers can tell us a story, but they can also hide parts of it. In order to show that the empirical findings are reliable qualitative translations will follow. These qualitative translations are referred to as narratives in order to differentiate them from discourses, for both the numbers and the narratives present the same discourses. We start with the narrative behind the similarities.

9.2.1 – General Support and a Legitimacy Deficit

The first similarity is the general support for the European project, but a very negative evaluation of its legitimacy. The reason for this mismatch becomes clear later on. In both the Dutch and the French discourse the support for the European project might not come as a surprise, but the British support might be, because they are generally acknowledged as Euro-sceptics.

It is true that the statistics give a skewed image of the overall British discourse. Most British articles describe the United Kingdom as ‘a nation of Euro-sceptics’ and the mass media as ‘unchallenged anti-EU journalism’ (Guardian May 30, 2001). This indicates a negative view of the European project in general. Here we encounter the first mass media contribution in a perceived biased media.

The reason for this skewed image is the selection of British newspapers. The centrist-left leaning Independent and leftwing Guardian are both pro-European newspapers. Newspapers mainly publish editorials and other opinionated articles that are in line with their ideology (Oosterbaan and Wansink 2008: 154-162), thus in this case the newspapers favour pro-European articles. Dismissing the findings for this reason would be pre-mature, because, as we will see, the discourse in the newspapers will show an essentially different pro-Europeanism than in the Netherlands and France. Further, the misrepresentation of the British discourse as pro-Europeanism will be corrected in the British narrative later on.

9.2.2 – The Diversity of the Democratic Deficit

The second ‘group’ of similarities we just discussed seem to indicate that the three discourses recognize a universalist democratic deficit. The most prominent indicator is the many perceptions characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation. This perception seems to indicate a lack of direct influence and/or representation of the European people and/or the lack of power of their representative institutions. As a Dutch commentator puts it:
If one believes in a future with an actual European Political Union ... then the goals should be more powers for the European Parliament; an expansion of the number of issues that are discussed, so that it becomes more important; introduction of referenda; European, thus not national, lists for the elections of the European parliament; direct election of the president of the European commission. In short, the creation of an actual federation (Volkskrant October 17, 2001).⁹²
But more lies hidden behind this type of perception then the democratic deficit described above. This is merely one of three ‘themes’ leading to a negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy based on a universalist conceptualisation with a focus on input and direct legitimacy.

Another line of reasoning, which is closely related to the interpretation above, is that Brussels or the EU is too far away or too technocratic for people to identify with or ‘[t]he sense that the EU's institutions are increasingly remote, that decisions affecting the lives of citizens are made by unaccountable bodies’ (Independent October 5, 2000). The difference is that this observation does not automatically imply that direct mechanisms of legitimacy need to be introduced in order to solve this. This federalist argument has an indirect counterpart: the Gaullist solution. Their solution is to increase the role of national parliaments (indirect legitimacy), but we will return to this position in the narratives of both France and the United Kingdom.

On a different note, one might interpretate the observation that the EU is ‘too far away’ as a lack of identification or of a ‘thick’ identity, rather than of popular mandate and accountability. Then the problem is nationalist rather than universalist in nature: identification instead of democratisation. The commentators though often do not acknowledge this interpretation. They relate the gap to democratic ideas of popular mandate and direct representation as described above. This though is not a necessary conclusion and as we will see not the only conclusion drawn in discourse either.

The second ‘hidden’ theme is the quality of the debate on Europe. In all the discourses there are complains about the quality of the debate. This argument is made in general (e.g. Volkskrant October 17, 2001), aimed specifically at government – ‘The weakness of the campaign of parties who defend the "yes", [is] their lack of enthusiasm’ (Libération May 10, 2005)⁹³ –, or the mass media – ‘The media [...] was not present’ (Figaro May 21, 2005).⁹⁴ In the Netherlands and France this argument takes the shape of complains about a lack of clarity, lies and/or the lack of an organised ‘no’ in the debate on the EU-constitution. In the British discourse, complains about the mass media also focus on clarity and deceit, the latter in the form of observations (some might say accusations) of Europhobia: ‘The phobic press, after all, has decided on its story already [and it cannot] moderate its inexhaustible campaign to mislead the British public’ (Guardian December 5, 2000).⁹⁵ The difference is they complain about the lack of a well organised yes-campaign on EU issues rather than a no-campaign. (Here the pro-European of the British newspapers play a role.)⁹⁶

Now for another element of the democratic deficit: throughput legitimacy. It is judged as ‘unaccountable and illegitimate’ (Guardian January 29, 2000). Furthermore, comprehensibility and openness are seen as problematic: ‘[The] complex decision-making procedures [should be] simplified’ (Volkskrant November 21, 2001).⁹⁷ This argument is most often raised as a technical argument with regards to enlargement and in support of the constitution. One argument within this category shines by its absence: legality. In none of the discourses is the EU described as juristically illegal. Corrupt yes, but the actual institutions are not seen as illegal.

Another factor worth pointing out is the limited focus on throughput legitimacy. Although, important for the ideal of constitutional democracy (and those [scholars] active in public administration) it seems to play a very limited role in the general discourse on the EU’s legitimacy. This might indicate that it is unimportant in comparison or that there is no problem! For legitimacy surfaces when it is disputed. Admittedly, the former is more likely than the latter.⁹⁸

9.2.3 – The Tension between Nationalist Government and Multi-level Governance

The findings above might fit the universalist, democratic mould, but the third group of similarities are more in line with the hypothesis of ‘multi-level government’. They give rise to the idea that the EU also lacks a common ‘thick’ identity, which is not a universalist, but a nationalist republican demand. We already saw this aspect come up in the fact that ‘too far away’ might also be interpretated as a lack of identification: a nationalist interpretation. Let us analyse the evidence for this hypothesis.

The common perception characterised by a nationalist conceptualisation with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation takes two forms. On the one hand, there is the argument that the EU needs a national identity. The lack thereof leads to the call for a common identity based on a shared heritage. This idea is also often dismissed: ‘Europe's identity cannot be based on a glorified heritage celebration’ (Guardian June 15, 2005). Although, there are also some who argue the EU does have such a shared heritage, for example Dutch prime-minister Jan Peter Balkenende, who argues: ‘The European Union is, in its essence, a value community’ (Figaro May 24, 2005).⁹⁹

On the other hand, the perception represents also an approach from the national level to the EU’s legitimacy. Several French authors argue that nation(-states) form the natural democratic order – ‘the nations are the natural spaces for democracy’ (Figaro July 15, 2000)¹⁰⁰ or ‘[a]t the heart of the chasm of misunderstanding: the nation. It is for the people the natural framework for democratic expression’ (Libération June 9, 2005).¹⁰¹ Democratisation, let alone federalisation, is from this perspective an attack upon the naturally sovereign democracies of Europe. This French argument explicitly combines both versions of republicanisms in a single argument against further democratisation. This shows that a ‘corruption’ of democratic theory has taken place.

Throughput legitimacy also has a nationalist conceptualisation, although it is not very prevalent it is important to address here in relation to its universalist counterpart. The main concern is ‘making [the EU’s] existing system capable of functioning efficiently’ (Independent July 3, 2000). Like the universalist conception of throughput legitimacy, it is often used with regards to the governability of an enlarged EU. Here both arguments tend to get a more territorial flavour to them, for at times they result in arguments against membership of Turkey. The idea of a common European cultural heritage plays a role in this – ‘Turkey is not European not in its geography, not in its history and not in its culture’ (Figaro January 26, 2005).¹⁰²

In order to answer the hypothesis on multi-level government and governance it is also important to investigate the latter’s role in discourse. The numbers seem to indicate an almost complete lack of awareness and they are spot on! For that matter, if one would exclude accounts in which multi-level governance is used almost by accident or at least the author is unaware of it then the numbers would turn out even lower.¹⁰³

The exception that proves the rule is found in the Dutch discourse. Dutch staatsecretaris¹⁰⁴ of European Affairs Dick Benschop explicitly refers to multi-level governance when he introduces the concept of Network Europe (Volkskrant December 29, 2001). It is meant as a description and defence of the EU, but the concept does not catch on, as the numbers show.

In this regard, the first similarity is interesting as well. Part of Europe’s paradox of being supported in general, but perceived as illegitimate might be the result of this lack of ‘realism’ in discourse. People might want to support the idea of Europe as a peaceful and prosperous community, but cannot make sense of the current political system. They understand its results and uses – a focus on output legitimacy leads the most often to a positive evaluation of all components – and in a sense understand it uniqueness, but seem unable to grasp the big picture, which is different from any political order familiar to them. We will return to this later on in more detail.