The foregoing rebellions coincided with the five months’
presence of Thomas Muenzer
in the Highland. Though there are no direct proofs of his influence over the outbreak and
the course of the movement, it is, nevertheless, indirectly ascertained. The most outspoken
revolutionaries among the peasants were mostly his disciples, defending his ideas.
The
Twelve Articles
, as well as the Letter of Articles of the Highland peasants, were ascribed to
him by all the contemporaries, although the first was certainly not composed by Muenzer.
Already, on his way back to Thuringia, he issued a decisive revolutionary manifesto to the
insurgent peasants.
Duke Ulrich, who, since 1519, had been
an exile from Wuerttemberg, was now
intriguing to regain his land with the aid of the peasants. Since the beginning of his exile be
had been trying to utilise the revolutionary party, and had supported it continuously. In
most of the local disturbances taking place between 1520 and 1524 in the Black Forest and
in Wuerttemberg, his name appeared. Now he armed himself directly for an attack on
Wuerttemberg to be launched out of his castle, Hohentweil. However, he was only utilised
by the peasants without influencing them, and without enjoying their confidence.
The winter passed without anything decisive happening on either side. The princely
masters were in hiding. The peasant revolt was gaining scope. In January, 1525,
the entire
country between the Danube, the Rhine and the Lech, was in a state of fermentation. In
February, the storm broke. While the Black Forest Hegau troops, under Hans Mueller of
Bulgenbach, were conspiring with Ulrich of Wuerttemberg, partly sharing his futile march
on Stuttgart (February and March, 1525), the peasants arose on February 9 in Ried above
Ulm, assembled in a camp near Baltringen which was protected by marshes, hoisted the red
flag, and formed, under the
leadership of Ulrich Schmid, the Baltringen Troop. They were
10,000 to 12,000 strong.
On February 25, the Upper Allgaeu troops, 7,000 strong, assembled at Schussen,
moved by the rumour that troops were marching against the dissatisfied elements who had
appeared in this locality as everywhere else. The people of Kempten, who had conducted a
fight against their archbishop throughout the winter, assembled on the 26th and joined the
peasants. The cities of Memmingen and Kaufbeuren joined the movement on certain
conditions. The ambiguity of the position of the cities in this movement was already
apparent. On March 7, the twelve Memmingen articles were proclaimed in Memmingen for
all the peasants of Upper Allgaeu.
A message from the Allgaeu peasants brought about the
formation on Lake Constance
of the Lake Troop under Eitel Hans. This troop also grew fast. Its headquarters were in
Bermatingen.
The Peasant War in Germany
– 59 –
The peasants also arose in Lower Allgaeu in the region of Ochsenbausen and
Schellenberg, in the localities of Zeil and Waldburg, and in the estates of Truchsess. The
movement started in the early days of March. This Lower Allgaeu Troop, which consisted
of 7,000 men, camped near Wurzach.
All these troops adopted the Memmingen articles, which, it must be noted, were still
more moderate than the Hegau articles, manifesting, as they did,
a remarkable lack of
determination in points relating to the attitude of the armed troops towards the nobility and
the governments. Such determination, wherever manifested, appeared only in the later
stages of the war, when the peasants learned to know from experience the mode of action
of their enemies.
A sixth troop was formed on the Danube, simultaneously with the others. From the
entire region, Ulm to Donauwoerth, from the valleys of the Iller, Roth and Biber, the
peasants came to Leipheim, and opened camp there.
From fifteen localities, every able-
bodied man had come, while reinforcements were drawn from 117 places. The leader of the
Leipheim Troop was Ulrich Schoen. Its preacher was Jakob Wehe, the priest of Leipheim.
Thus, at the beginning of March, there were between 30,000 and 40,000 insurgent
peasants of Upper Suabia in six camps under arms. The peasant troops were a
heterogeneous lot. Muenzer’s revolutionary party was everywhere in the minority but it
formed the backbone of the peasant camps. The mass of the peasants were always ready to
venture compacts with the masters wherever they were promised those concessions which
they hoped to force upon their enemies by their menacing attitude. Moreover, as the
uprising dragged on and the princes’
armies began to approach, the peasants became weary.
Most of those who still had something to lose, went home. Added to all the difficulties was
the fact that the vagabond masses of the low grade proletariat had joined the troops. This
made discipline more difficult, and demoralised the peasants, as the vagabonds were an
unreliable element, coming and going all the time. This, alone, is sufficient explanation
why, at the beginning, the peasants remained everywhere on the defensive, why they were
becoming demoralised in their camps, and why, aside from tactical shortcomings and the
rarity
of good leaders, they could not match the armies of the princes.
While the troops were assembling, Duke Ulrich invaded Wuerttemberg from
Hohentweil with recruited troops and a number of Hegau peasants. Were the peasants now
to proceed from the other side, from Waldburg against Truchsess’ troops, the Suabian
Union would have been lost. But because of the defensive attitude of the peasant troops,
Truchsess soon succeeded in concluding an armistice with those of Baltringen, Allgaeu,
and the Lake, starting negotiations and fixing a date for terminating the whole undertaking,
The Peasant War in Germany
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