The Peasant War in Germany

On April 29, Feuerbacher with all his men marched against the Gaildorf troops, which
had  entered  the  Wuerttemberg  region  at  Schorndorf.  He  drew  the  entire  region  into  his
alliance and thus persuaded the Gaildorf troops to withdraw. In this way, he prevented the
revolutionary  elements  of  his  men  under  Rohrbach  from  combining  with  the  reckless
troops of Gaildorf and thus receiving a dangerous reinforcement. Having been informed of
Truchsess’  approach,  he  left  Schorndorf  to  meet  him,  and  on  May  1  encamped  near
Kerchief under Teck.
We have thus traced the origin and the development of the insurrection in that portion
of  Germany  which  must  be  considered  the  territory  of  the  first  group  of  peasant  armies.
Before we proceed to the other groups (Thuringia and Hesse, Alsace, Austria and the Alps)
we must give an account of the military operations of Truchsess, in which he, alone at the
beginning,  later  supported  by  various  princes  and  cities,  annihilated  the  first  group  of
insurgents. We left Truchsess near Ulm, where he came by the end of March, having left an
observation  corps  under  Teck,  under  the  command  of  Dietrich  Spaet.  Truchsess’  corps
which together with the Union reinforcements concentrated in Ulm counted hardly 10,000,
among them 7,200 infantrymen, was the only army at his disposal capable of an offensive
against  the  peasants.  Reinforcements  came  to  Ulm  very  slowly,  due  in  part  to  the
difficulties of recruiting in insurgent localities, in part to the lack of money in the hands of
the  government,  and  also  to  the  fact  that  the  few  available  troops  were  everywhere
indispensable for garrisoning the fortresses and the castles. We have already observed what
a small number of troops were at the disposal of the princes and cities that did not belong
to  the  Suabian  Union.  Everything  depended  upon  the  successes  which  Georg  Truchsess
with his union army would score.
Truchsess turned first against the Baltringen troops which, in the meantime, had begun
to  destroy  castles  and  monasteries  in  the  vicinity  of  Ried.  The  peasants  who,  with  the
approach  of  the  Union  troops  withdrew  into  Ried,  were  driven  out  of  the  marshes  by  an
enveloping  movement,  crossed  the  Danube  and  ran  into  the  ravines  and  forests  of  the
Suabian Alps. In this region, where cannon and cavalry, the main source of strength of the
Union army, were of little avail, Truchsess did not pursue them further. He marched instead
against  the  Leipheim  troops  which  numbered  5,000  men  stationed  at  Leipheim,  4,000  in
the  valley  of  Mindel,  and  6,000  at  Illertissen,  and  was  arousing  the  entire  region,
destroying  monasteries  and  castles,  and  preparing  to  march  against  Ulm  with  its  three
columns.  It  seems  that  a  certain  demoralisation  had  set  in  among  the  peasants  of  this
division,  which  had  undermined  their  military  morale,  for  Jakob  Wehe  tried  at  the  very
beginning  to  negotiate  with  Truchsess.  The  latter,  however,  now  backed  by  sufficient
military power, declined negotiations, and on April 4 attacked the main troops at Leipheim
The Peasant War in Germany
– 67 –

---

and  entirely  disrupted  them.  Jakob  Wehe  and  Ulrich  Schoen,  together  with  two  other
peasant  leaders,  were  captured  and  beheaded.  Leipheim  capitulated,  and  after  a  few
marches through the surrounding country, the entire region was subdued.
A  new  rebellion  of  the  Lansquenets,  caused  by  a  demand  for  plunder  and  additional
remuneration,  again  stopped  Truchsess’  activities  until  April  10,  when  he  marched
southwest  against  the  Baltringen  Troop  which  in  the  meantime  had  invaded  his  estates,
Waldburg,  Zeil  and  Wolfegg,  and  besieged  his  castles.  Here,  also,  he  found  the  peasants
disunited, and defeated them, on April 11 and 12, one after the other, in various encounters
which  completely  disrupted  the  Baltringen  troops.  Its  remnants  withdrew  under  the
command of the priest Florian, and joined the Lake troops. Truchsess now turned against
the latter. The Lake troops which in the meantime had made not only military marches but
had also drawn the cities Buchhorn (Friedrichshafen) and Wollmatingen into the fraternity,
held, on April 13, a big military council in the monastery of Salem, and decided to move
against  Truchsess.  Alarm  bells  were  sounded  and  10,000  men,  joined  by  the  defeated
remnants  of  the  Baltringen  troops,  assembled  in  the  camp  of  Bermatingen.  On  April  15
they  stood  their  own  in  a  combat  with  Truchsess,  who  did  not  wish  to  risk  his  army  in  a
decisive battle, preferring to negotiate, the more so since he received news of the approach
of the Allgaeu and Hegau troops. On April 17, in Weingarten, he concluded an agreement
with the Lake and Baltringen peasants which seemed quite favourable to them, and which
they  accepted  without  suspicion.  He  also  induced  the  delegates  of  the  Upper  and  Lower
Allgaeu peasants to accept the agreement, and then moved towards Wuerttemberg.
Truchsess’ cunning saved him here from certain ruin. Had he not succeeded in fooling
the weak, limited, for the most part demoralised peasants and their usually incapable, timid
and venal leaders, he would have been closed in with his small army between four columns
numbering  at  least  from  25,000  to  30,000  men,  and  would  have  perished.  It  was  the
narrow-mindedness of his enemies, always inevitable among the peasant masses, that made
it possible for him to dispose of them at the very moment when, with one blow, they could
have  ended  the  entire  war,  at  least  as  far  as  Suabia  and  Franconia  were  concerned.  The
Lake  peasants  adhered  to  the  agreement,  which  finally  turned  out  to  be  their  undoing,  so
rigidly that they later took up arms against their allies, the Hegau peasants. And although
the  Allgaeu  peasants,  involved  in  the  betrayal  by  their  leaders,  soon  renounced  the
agreement, Truchsess was then out danger.
The  Hegau  peasants,  though  not  included  in  the  Weingarten  agreement,  gave  a  new
example of the appalling narrow-mindedness and the stubborn provincialism which ruined
the entire Peasant War. When, after unsuccessful negotiations with them, Truchsess, moved
towards  Wuerttemberg,  they  followed  him,  continually  pressing  his  flank,  but  it  did  not
The Peasant War in Germany
– 68 –

---