Volume 12 Issue 1 2011
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS
58
Finally, in the following years, the West was able to significantly increase its presence in the
Southern Caucasus. Moreover, Georgia directly and Azerbaijan indirectly began to speculate about
joining NATO. It was a time of hope for the local states to resolve their security issues.
So during the years after the Contract of the Century, Russia was forced to gradually retreat from
the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. And Moscow reacted very sensitively to the West’s and Asia’s
advances into these regions. Some experts emphasize that “...to counter this development, one of
Russia’s tactics is to slow down Western advances...”
24
So, in our opinion, the Russo-Georgian war
possibly originated from this strategy. And Moscow’s strategic goals were clear: to stop Russia’s re-
treat, resume the strategic initiative, and ensure Russia’s interests. Unfortunately, Georgian President
Saakashvili’s miscalculations provided an opportunity to shift the balance of power and strengthen
Moscow’s security position in the region.
Finally, there is the second significant shift and the emergence of the region’s new or current
security pattern as a result of the Russo-Georgian war. The war enabled Russia to significantly strengthen
its position and influence. Moreover, Russia showed the global and regional powers that the Southern
Caucasus (like the whole of the CIS) is Russia’s Near Abroad and Moscow has the exclusive right to
use force and manage the situation in accordance with Russia’s interests. The war provided Russia
with a brilliant opportunity to resume the strategic initiative and enforce Moscow’s strategic position
in its immediate neighborhood. And now, Georgia’s and Ukraine’s advances toward NATO member-
ship have been removed from the agenda. Some scholars directly emphasize: “Western actors have in
practice been forced to recognize Russia’s military dominance in the region and act only in areas
approved by Russia and within the limits set by Russia.”
25
As a logical continuation of the current strategic opportunity, Russia (two years later) extended
the lease of its military base in Armenia until 2044.
26
This was Russia’s next significant step to utilize
its advantage after the war with Georgia and thus strengthen its position in the region.
Iran, which is against any Western military presence in the region, did not make any state-
ments against Russia extending lease of its base. So Tehran’s silence means approval of such devel-
opments.
Meanwhile, Russia is accelerating its role in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
27
Obviously Russia is capitalizing on the advantages it gained as the result of the Russo-Georgian war
and is trying to establish its own security order. Finally, we can say that now the pendulum has swung
toward the Tehran-Moscow axis.
However, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s
latest visits to the Southern Caucasus have ensured the United States’ engagement in the ongoing tough
rivalry in this strategic part of the world.
28
Undoubtedly, Russia’s strong position means that neither the U.S. nor NATO will able to de-
ploy military bases close to the Iranian border. The continuation of Russian dominance, therefore,
24
M. de Haas, “Current Geostrategy in the Southern Caucasus,” Eurasianet.org, 6 January, 2007, available at [http://
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp010707.shtml].
25
K. Strachota, cooperation with W. Górecki, “The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia after the Russian-Georgian
War—The Geopolitical Consequences,” Center for Eastern Studies, Poland, 24 September, 2008, available at
[www.osw.waw.pl].
26
See: “Russia Extends Lease on Military Base in Armenia through 2044,” RIA Novosti, 20 August, 2010, availa-
ble at [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100820/160276128.html].
27
See: “Leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia Discuss Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement in Russia,” RT-Russia Today TV
Channel, 27 October, 2010, available at [http://rt.com/Politics/2010-10-27/azerbaijan-armenia-russia-karabakh.html].
28
See: “Clinton’s Caucasus Campaign Gains Tepid Results,” Eurasianet.org, 5 July, 2010, available at [http://www.
eurasianet.org/node/61464]; J. Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S.
Interests,” Congressional Research Service (CRS), 16 September, 2010, available at [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL33453.pdf].
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