
Theory and Empirics by Itay Goldstein, Assaf Razin, and Hui Tong

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Systemic Liquidity and the Composition of Foreign Investment: Theory and Empirical Evidence Theory and Empirics by Itay Goldstein, Assaf Razin, and Hui Tong February 2007
The Efficiency Advantage “ Imagine a large company that has many relatively small shareholders.Then, each shareholder faces the following wellknown freerider problem:if the shareholder does something to improve the quality of management, then the benefits will be enjoyed by all shareholders. Unless the shareholder is altruistic, she will ignore this beneficial effect on other shareholders and so will underinvest in the activity of monitoring or improving management.” Oliver Hart.
Liquidity Shocks and Resale Values
Liquidity Shocks and Resale Values
Liquidity Shocks and Resales
Tradeoff between Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment
Heterogeneous Investors
rational expectations equilibrium Assuming that rational expectations hold in the market, has to be consistent with the equilibrium choice of investors between FDI and FPI. thus, it is given by the following equation:
All firms are acquired by Direct Investors
Interpretation The idea that we are trying to capture with this specification is that individual investors are forced to sell their investments early at times when there are aggregate liquidity problems. In those times, some individual investors have deeper pockets than others, and thus are less exposed to the liquidity issues. Thus, once an aggregate liquidity shock occurs, investors, who have deeper pockets, are less likely to need to sell than investors.
Interpretation
As we can see in the figure, the equilibrium patterns of investment are determined by the parameters A and . As we can see in the figure, the equilibrium patterns of investment are determined by the parameters A and . Since , the value of also determines and thus can be interpreted as a measure for the difference in liquidity needs between the two types of investors. In the figure we can see that there are four thresholds that are important for the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes.
Aggregate Liquidity Shocks There are two states of the world. In one state (which occurs with probability q) there is an aggregate shock that generates liquidity needs as described before. That is, in this state of the world a proportion of one type of investors have to liquidate their investment projects prematurely and a proportion of the other type have to do so as well. In the other state of the world (which occurs with probability 1q) there is no aggregate shock that generates liquidity needs and no foreign investor has to liquidate her investment project prematurely.
probability of an aggregate liquidity shock The intuition is that as the probability of an aggregate liquidity shock increases, agents know that they are more likely to need to sell the investment early, in which case they will get a low price since buyers do not know whether they sell because of an individual liquidity need or because of adverse information on the productivity of the investment. As a result, the attractiveness of FDI decreases.
first empirical prediction Countries with a higher probability of liquidity shocks will be source of a higher ratio of FPI to FDI.
The Role of Opacity The effect of liquidity shocks on the composition of foreign investment between FDI and FPI is driven by lack of transparency about the fundamentals of the direct investment. If the fundamentals of each direct investment were publicly known, then liquidity shocks would not be that costly for direct investors, as the investors would be able to sell the investment at fair price without bearing the consequences of the lemmons problem. Suppose that the source country imposes disclosure rules on its investors that ensure the truthful revelation of investment fundamentals to the public. In such a case, FDI investors will have to reveal the realization of ε once it becomes known to them. Then, since potential buyers know the true value of the investment, direct investors will be able to sell their investment at (((1+ε)²)/(2A)). Thus, whether or not a direct investor sells the investment, he is able to extract the value (((1+ε)²)/(2A)), and so the expected value from investing in FDI is ((E((1+ε)²))/(2A))C. The expected value from investing in FPI is (1/(2A)) as before.
This is because the kind of disclosure requirements we describe here do not affect the value of portfolio investments. These are requirements that are imposed by the source country, and thus apply only for investments that are being controlled by sourcecountry Analyzing the trade off between FDI and FPI under this perfect sourcecountry transparency, we can see two things. First, with transparency, FDI becomes more attractive than before. Second, with transparency, the decision between FDI and FPI ceases to be a function of the probability of a liquidity shock. This is because the kind of disclosure requirements we describe here do not affect the value of portfolio investments. These are requirements that are imposed by the source country, and thus apply only for investments that are being controlled by sourcecountry Analyzing the trade off between FDI and FPI under this perfect sourcecountry transparency, we can see two things. First, with transparency, FDI becomes more attractive than before. Second, with transparency, the decision between FDI and FPI ceases to be a function of the probability of a liquidity shock.
second empirical prediction The effect of the probability of a liquidity shock on the ratio of FPI and FDI increases in the level of opacity in the source country.
Ratio of FPI and FDI
Probit
Dynamic Version
Transparency
Data The theory is geared toward explaining the allocation of the shock of foreign capital between portfolio and direct foreign investors. Now we confront this hypothesis with the data. The latter consist of stocks of FPI and FDI in market value, that are compiled by Lane and MilesiFerretti (2006).See Summary Statistics.
Probit
Ratio of FPI and FDI
Levels of FPI and FDI
Effect of Transparency on Ratio of FPI and FDI
Probit
Ratio of FPI and FDI
Interpretation
Aggregate Liquidity Shocks Suppose now that an aggregate liquidity shock occurs in period 1 with probability q. Once it occurs, it becomes common knowledge. Conditional on the realization of the aggregate liquidity shock, individual investors may be subject to a need to sell their investment at period 1 with probabilities as in the previous section. Conditional on the realization of an aggregate liquidity shock, the realizations of individual liquidity needs are independent of each other.
If an aggregate liquidity shock does not occur, then it is known that no investor needs to sell in period 1 due to liquidity needs. This implies that the only reason to sell at that time is adverse information on the profitability of the project. As a result, the market breaks down due to the wellknown lemons problem (see Akerlof (1970)). On the other hand, if a liquidity shock does happen, the expected payoffs from FDI and FPI are exactly the same as in case of idiosyncratic shocks section. If an aggregate liquidity shock does not occur, then it is known that no investor needs to sell in period 1 due to liquidity needs. This implies that the only reason to sell at that time is adverse information on the profitability of the project. As a result, the market breaks down due to the wellknown lemons problem (see Akerlof (1970)). On the other hand, if a liquidity shock does happen, the expected payoffs from FDI and FPI are exactly the same as in case of idiosyncratic shocks section.
Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Shocks The model discussed in the preceding section assumed effectively that q = 1. We now extend the model to allow q to be anywhere between one and zero, inclusive. Figure 2.1 was drawn for the case q = 1. When q is below 1, the lines and shift upward; see Goldstein, Razin and Tong (2007). As expected, there is less FPI in each equilibrium and the number of configurations in which there is no FPI rises. In the extreme case where q = 0, no foreign investor will choose to make FPI, because there is no longer any liquidity cost associated with FDI, and there remains only the efficiency advantage of the latter .
With the predicted probability of liquidity shocks, we can now estimate the regression equation. The results are presented in Table 3.3. Column (b) differs from column (a) in that it does not include the market capitalization variable, as the latter is not available in all of our observations. As our theory predicts, indeed a higher probability of an aggregate liquidity shock (the parameter q of the preceding chapter) increases the share of FPI, relative to FDI. The interaction term between the probability of an aggregate liquidity shock and GDP per capita is significant. This is indicative for a nonlinear effect of the aggregate liquidity shock and/or the GDP per capita on the ratio of FPI to FDI. With the predicted probability of liquidity shocks, we can now estimate the regression equation. The results are presented in Table 3.3. Column (b) differs from column (a) in that it does not include the market capitalization variable, as the latter is not available in all of our observations. As our theory predicts, indeed a higher probability of an aggregate liquidity shock (the parameter q of the preceding chapter) increases the share of FPI, relative to FDI. The interaction term between the probability of an aggregate liquidity shock and GDP per capita is significant. This is indicative for a nonlinear effect of the aggregate liquidity shock and/or the GDP per capita on the ratio of FPI to FDI.
liquidity crisis We define the liquidity crisis as episodes of negative purchase of external assets. The flow data on external assets is from the International Financial Statistics's Balance of Payments, where assets include foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio investment, other investments and foreign reserves. We thus define the liquidity crisis episodes as sales of external assets, which has a frequency of 13% in our sample of 140 countries from 1985 to 2004.
Regression
Probit To estimate the probability of a 10% or more hike of the real interest rate, we apply the following Probit model, similar to Razin and Rubinstein (2006).
Table 1: Summary Statistics of ln(FPI/FDI) from 1990 –2004
Table 3: Determinants of FPI/FDI
Table 4a. Probit Estimation of Liquidity Shock
Table 4b. Determinants of FPI/FDI (With Predicted Liquidity Shock)
Results Probit Estimation We use pooled specification to predict the liquidity crisis, in that fixedeffect Probit regressions are not identified due to incidental parameters problem. Table 3 presents the Probit estimation for all countries from 1970 to 2004, subject to data availability. As we expected, higher US interest rate has a strong spillover effect on the domestic interest rate. Lower sovereign rating raises the chance of liquidity crisis, as risky countries need to raise interest rates to attract capital flows. Higher M3/GDP weakly reduces the likelihood of an aggregated shock, as abundant money supply tends to increase inflation rate while lowering the nominal interest rate. Since both sovereign rating and U.S. interest rate are significant in the Probit estimation, we can then identify the effect of liquidity shock on FPI/FDI through functional form as well as exclusion restrictions. According to Table 3, the predicted probability of liquidity crises in the sample lies between 0.003 and 0.38.
FDI/FPI Determination With the predicted probability of liquidity crises, we can now estimate equation (15). We take the log of the FPI/FDI ratio as our dependent variable, to reduce the impact of extreme values.
Table 4: Case 1 Table 4 reports the results with country and time fixed effects. As our theory predicts, a higher probability of an aggregated liquidity shock significantly increases the share of FPI, relative to FDI. Moreover, stock market capitalization increases FPI, while trade openness complements FDI.
lagged FPI/FDI One might be concerned that lagged FPI/FDI could also affect current FPI/FDI. Hence we estimate, alternatively, the following dynamic panel regression. we use the ArellanoBond dynamic GMM approach to estimate equation (17), which corrects the endogeneity problem.
Case 2 in Table 4 Case 2 in Table 4 reports the dynamic panel estimation. Dynamic estimation reduces the sample size, but reassuringly, results from fixed effect estimation still carry through. We find that higher probability of aggregated liquidity shocks increases FPI relative to FDI. Stock market capitalization and trade openness keep their signs and significance level. We also find that the oneyear lagged FPI/FDI ratio is associated with current FPI/FDI ratio. But the estimated coefficient of the lagged FPI/FDI is around 0.50, which suggests that there is no panel unit root process for FPI/FDI. Additional ArellanoBond tests strongly reject the hypothesis of no firstorder autocorrelation in residuals, but fail to reject the hypothesis of no secondorder autocorrelation. Hence, the estimations in Table 4 are valid and provide strong empirical support for our theory.
Robustness Checks We add dummies for semi decades into out Probit estimation for interest rate hike. This helps capture unobservable global factors that may affect interest rate hike. We find that explanatory variables maintain their signs and significances in the Probit model. Then we plug this newly estimated probability into the pure fixed effect FPI/FDI model as well as the dynamic one. We find that the estimated probability still has significant explanatory powers in both models. For example, in the dynamic model, it has an estimated coefficient of 2.97 and a pvalue of 0.000. Note that we cannot include in the Probit model time effects for every year, which would then perfectly predict U.S. annual interest rate.
Alternative Indicator of Liquidity Crises An alternative Indicator of Liquidity Crises: the depreciation of real exchange rate as an alternative measurement of liquidity crisis. The depreciation shrinks the purchasing power of domestic currency and thus decreases the ability of domestic firms to invest abroad. We use the real exchange rate vs. U.S. dollar, instead of the tradeweighted real effective exchange rate. One can collect the data for the latter from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, but will miss quite a few countries such as Brazil and Thailand. That is why we use the real exchange rate vs. dollar. We define currency crisis as the depreciation of more than 15% a year. This amounts to top 5% of the depreciation. Table 5 presents the frequency of currency crisis for the period from 1970 to 2004.
We first apply Probit model to predict the oneyear ahead currency crisis. Based on the literature on currency crisis, we use the following explanatory variables: country population size, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, money stock, U.S. interest rate, trade openness, and foreign reserves over imports. We do not include Standard and Poor’s country rating here, because it shrinks sample size while having no explanatory power on currency crisis. Table 6 reports the Probit estimation from 140 countries from 1970 to 2004. We can see that higher GDP per capita, higher economic growth, higher reserves over imports and trade openness all contribute to the reduction of currency crises. U.S. interest rate, on the contrary, significantly increases the likelihood of currency crises. All these are intuitive and consistent with previous literature. We first apply Probit model to predict the oneyear ahead currency crisis. Based on the literature on currency crisis, we use the following explanatory variables: country population size, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, money stock, U.S. interest rate, trade openness, and foreign reserves over imports. We do not include Standard and Poor’s country rating here, because it shrinks sample size while having no explanatory power on currency crisis. Table 6 reports the Probit estimation from 140 countries from 1970 to 2004. We can see that higher GDP per capita, higher economic growth, higher reserves over imports and trade openness all contribute to the reduction of currency crises. U.S. interest rate, on the contrary, significantly increases the likelihood of currency crises. All these are intuitive and consistent with previous literature.
Based on Table 6, we construct the probability of currency crisis, and then examine its impact on FPI/FDI for the period from 1990 to 2004. Results are reported in Table 7 . Note that Table 7 covers more countries than Table 4, in that we do not include S&P’s country rating as an predictor of currency crises. Case 1 is for the pure fixed effect model. We see that the higher the probability of currency crisis, the higher the ratio of FPI relative to FDI. Case 2 is for the dynamic panel model. Again, we can see that the past movement of FPI/FDI explains the current variation of FPI/FDI. Higher GDP per capita (proxy for labor cost) and trade openness decrease the share of FPI relative to FDI. Our key variable, the probability of currency crisis, still explains the choice between FDI and FPI, consistent with our theory as well as earlier results in Table 4. Based on Table 6, we construct the probability of currency crisis, and then examine its impact on FPI/FDI for the period from 1990 to 2004. Results are reported in Table 7 . Note that Table 7 covers more countries than Table 4, in that we do not include S&P’s country rating as an predictor of currency crises. Case 1 is for the pure fixed effect model. We see that the higher the probability of currency crisis, the higher the ratio of FPI relative to FDI. Case 2 is for the dynamic panel model. Again, we can see that the past movement of FPI/FDI explains the current variation of FPI/FDI. Higher GDP per capita (proxy for labor cost) and trade openness decrease the share of FPI relative to FDI. Our key variable, the probability of currency crisis, still explains the choice between FDI and FPI, consistent with our theory as well as earlier results in Table 4.
Both case1 and 2 include year dummies to capture unobservable global factors as well as potential global trends. In both cases, there seems to be a trend of growing FPI relative to FDI, judging from point estimates. The inclusion of year dummies, however, could potentially bias down our estimation, because they also capture global liquidity shock caused by higher U.S. interest rate. Hence, we use a time trend variable instead of year fixed effects in the dynamic model (Case 3). We can see that there is indeed a significant time trend. Moreover, the coefficient of crisis probability now rises to 5.8. This confirms our argument that time fixed effects bias down the effect of currency crisis. Both case1 and 2 include year dummies to capture unobservable global factors as well as potential global trends. In both cases, there seems to be a trend of growing FPI relative to FDI, judging from point estimates. The inclusion of year dummies, however, could potentially bias down our estimation, because they also capture global liquidity shock caused by higher U.S. interest rate. Hence, we use a time trend variable instead of year fixed effects in the dynamic model (Case 3). We can see that there is indeed a significant time trend. Moreover, the coefficient of crisis probability now rises to 5.8. This confirms our argument that time fixed effects bias down the effect of currency crisis.
Conclusion Theory In this paper, we examine how the liquidity shock guides international investors in choosing between FPI and FDI. According to Goldstein and Razin (2006), FDI investors control the management of the firms; whereas FPI investors delegate decisions to managers. Consequently, direct investors are more informed than portfolio investors about the prospect of projects. This information enables them to manage their projects more efficiently. However, if investors need to sell their investments before maturity because of liquidity shocks, the price they can get will be lower when buyers know that they have more information on investment projects. We extend the Goldstein and Razin (2006) model by making the assumption that liquidity shocks to individual investors are triggered by some aggregate liquidity shock. A key prediction then is that countries that have a high probability of an aggregate liquidity crisis will be the source of more FPI and less FDI.
To test this hypothesis, we therefore apply a dynamic panel model to examine the variation of FPI relative to FDI for 140 source countries from 1990 to 2004. We use real interest rate hikes as a proxy for liquidity crises. Using a Probit specification, we estimate the probability of liquidity crises for each country and in every year of our sample. Then, we test the effect of this probability on the ratio between FPI and FDI generated by the source country. We find strong support for our model: a higher probability of a liquidity crisis, measured by the probability of an interest rate hike, has a significant positive effect on the ratio between FDI and FPI. We repeat this analysis using real exchange rate depreciation as an alternative indicator of a liquidity crisis, and get similar results. Hence, liquidity shocks do have strong effects on the composition of foreign investment, as predicted by our model. To test this hypothesis, we therefore apply a dynamic panel model to examine the variation of FPI relative to FDI for 140 source countries from 1990 to 2004. We use real interest rate hikes as a proxy for liquidity crises. Using a Probit specification, we estimate the probability of liquidity crises for each country and in every year of our sample. Then, we test the effect of this probability on the ratio between FPI and FDI generated by the source country. We find strong support for our model: a higher probability of a liquidity crisis, measured by the probability of an interest rate hike, has a significant positive effect on the ratio between FDI and FPI. We repeat this analysis using real exchange rate depreciation as an alternative indicator of a liquidity crisis, and get similar results. Hence, liquidity shocks do have strong effects on the composition of foreign investment, as predicted by our model.
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