References
Bunn, Matthew. Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security.
Washington, DC: Arms Control Association.
Newhouse, John. Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win-
ston, 1973.
Smith, Gerard. Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I by the Chief American Negotiator. New
York: Doubleday, 1980.
Willrich, Mason, and John Rhinelander, eds. SALT I: The Moscow Agreements and
Beyond. New York: Free Press, 1974.
See Missiles, Antiballistic
Anticolonialism is defined as hostility toward the domination of one nation
or territory by another, usually for exploitative purposes. The Cold War era,
particularly from the mid-1950s on, witnessed an explosion of anticolonial-
ism, resulting in the creation of a host of new and independent states, espe-
cially in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. As many nations struggled to gain
independence from European control during the Cold War, the two super-
powers competed for their loyalty by proclaiming dedication to anticolonial
principles. In practice, however, the superpowers often compromised their
alleged principles by replacing European colonialism with new types of exter-
nal control that limited the ability of developing-world nations to exercise
self-determination.
Resistance to foreign rule by colonized peoples runs as far back as ancient
history. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, anticolonialism
began to take shape as an element of Western political discourse. Enlighten-
ment thought, with its emphasis on self-determination and mutual obliga-
tions between the government and the governed, gave rise to a liberal strand
of anticolonialism that underpinned the American Revolution. In later years,
Marxism inspired a more radical form of anticolonialism. The Russian
Vladimir I. Lenin gave that view its fullest articulation in the early twentieth
century, describing colonialism as a by-product of capitalism and calling for
its destruction through communist revolution.
Both the liberal and radical variants gained strength following World War
I. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson made self-determination a central part of
his plan to establish a new global order rooted in democracy, free trade, and
collective security. Meanwhile, nationalist leaders of colonial territories, frus-
trated by the unwillingness of the European powers to cede control, increas-
ingly concluded that they could achieve their liberation only through protest,
confrontation, and war. Anticolonial agitation gained considerable momentum
Anticolonialism
141
Antiballistic Missiles
Anticolonialism
during the interwar years even as European empires reached their greatest
geographical extent.
World War II marked a major turning point by opening new opportuni-
ties for the expression of anticolonialism. In part, the war itself played a role
by severely weakening the European colonial powers. German victories over
France and the Netherlands, combined with Japanese occupation of French,
Dutch, and British territories in the Far East, disrupted or destroyed colonial
administrations and emboldened nationalists by crushing the myth of colo-
nial invincibility. Nationalists stepped into the vacuum and asserted them-
selves with unprecedented power and conviction.
In part, too, World War II sparked a surge of anticolonialism by pulling
the United States into the forefront of international politics. Even before it
joined the fighting, Washington revived old Wilsonian rhetoric and placed
decolonization high among Allied war aims. At their meeting at Placentia Bay,
Newfoundland, in August 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt convinced
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to sign the Atlantic Charter, which
pledged respect for “the right of all peoples to choose the form of govern-
ment under which they will live.” During the war, Roosevelt demanded steps
toward the gradual dissolution of European empires, especially in South and
Southeast Asia, and the establishment of a new world system based on self-
determination and free trade.
Following the war, U.S. policymakers recognized powerful incentives
to stick to the course of gradual anticolonialism charted by Roosevelt. Given
the apparent inevitability of decolonization around the globe, it made good
sense to position the United States on the side of nationalists who would one
day control vast resources crucial to the U.S. economy. The emergence of the
Soviet Union as a rival beyond the European theater only heightened Wash-
ington’s concern about maintaining friendly relations with nationalists in the
developing world.
These anxieties were offset, however, by another dynamic that led the
United States to back away from its avowed anticolonial principles in the first
decade of the Cold War. While American leaders understood the desirability
of cultivating partnerships in the developing world, they set a higher priority
on the need to form robust coalitions among industrial nations to resist
Soviet aggression. In this effort, Washington’s partners were precisely those
countries that controlled colonial empires. Anxious to bolster Britain, France,
and other colonial powers as alliance partners, the United States soft-pedaled
its anticolonial agenda, advocating compromise solutions that stopped short of
full independence for colonial territories. Such halfway solutions disappointed
nationalist leaders, who often came to view the United States as a force of
repression more than one of liberation.
Historians have suggested other reasons for America’s failure to translate
anticolonial ideals into support for developing-world nationalism during the
Cold War. Diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams argued that U.S.
declarations of anticolonialism masked Americans’ own ambitions to control
the destiny of other parts of the world in order to serve American interests.
Since the nineteenth century, Williams argued, the United States had sought
142
Anticolonialism