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briefing series

 

 

 

MYANMAR/BURMA

 

 

 

Union of Myanmar (Burma)  

Capital: Yangon (Rangoon) 

Head of state: Sen. General Than Shwe  

Border countries: Thailand, Laos, China, 

India, Bangladesh 

 

 

 

Myanmar/Burma

1

 has had a spurt of foreign 

relations controversies ever since it abruptly 

adjourned its controversial 2004 National 

Convention to draft a new constitution.  In 

August 2004, Myanmar/Burma  was hit by 

renewed sanctions from the US, faced being 

banned from the upcoming Asia-Europe Meeting 

(ASEM) and its officials  were barred from the 

28th Olympic Games in Athens for its lack of 

human rights and democracy  – a reminder that 

Myanmar/Burma still remains one of the most 

difficult foreign policy challenges in Asia for the 

international community. 

 

Myanmar/Burma is situated east of the Andaman 

Sea and  strategically buffers the world’s two 

largest populations, China and India.  The 

                                                                

 

1

 Since 1989 the authorities have promoted the name Myanmar instead of Burma as a conventional name for 

their state. The name change is recognised by the UN but not the US. Australia does not seem to have an official 

position on the choice of terminology. Burmese expatriates, including those residing in Australia, continue to use 

the old colonial name.  This paper uses both names, attaching no political significance to either term. 

 

 

         India 

 

 

Bangla- 

China 

desh 

 

 

  

 

Vietnam 

 

Laos

 

                 

Yangon

 

 

 

Thailand

 

 

 

 

Cambodia 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   Malaysia

 

 

 

 

KACHIN 

 

 

                    CHIN 

Mandalay

 

                      SHAN 

    RAKHINE 

 

 

 

KAREN 

 

MON

 

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Myanmar/Burma

 

 

2

 

country is rich in resources and diverse in 

its ethnic demography.  A former pariah 

state in the region and to the world, the 

military government of Myanmar/Burma 

has in recent times opened up the country’s 

economy and attempted to build friendly 

relations with its regional neighbours.  The 

deepening of bilateral relations with China 

and the Association of South East Asian 

Nations (ASEAN) has been particularly 

significant, with China now one of 

Myanmar/Burma’s staunchest political 

defenders and top weapons suppliers.   

 

While Australia presently has very little 

economic interest in Myanmar/Burma 

itself, its interest in promoting human rights 

and good regional relations should in turn 

engage Australia’s foreign policy priorities 

in the country.  With its eyes firmly on the 

Asian economies, Australia also has an 

interest in a politically stable and confident 

region.  As the military government of 

Myanmar/Burma attempts to woo its 

regional neighbours and prepares to take up 

the ASEAN chair in 2006, Australia should 

be keenly interested in the regime’s 

earnestness in delivering democracy and 

human rights to its people, conditions 

which are fundamental for national unity 

and stability and therefore the prosperity of 

the region as a whole. 

 

Historical overview 

Myanmar/Burma’s diverse ethnic mix  – 

with 8 major ethnic groups and  over 100 

spoken dialects  – is a result of a long 

history of migration and conflict along its 

fluid frontiers.  The Burmans are the ruling 

Burmese ethnic group that dominates the 

country’s military and government.

2

  Most 

of Myanmar/Burma’s ethnic minorities 

inhabit areas along the country’s 

mountainous frontiers.  The largest of the 

minority groups are the Karen, who inhabit 

                                                                

 

2

 In this paper, “Burmese” refers to the citizens and 

expatriates of Myanmar/Burma and to the official 

language of Myanmar/Burma.  “Burman” refers to 

the dominant ethnic group in Myanmar/Burma. 

the lower Myanmar/Burma region; the 

Shan, a Thai- related hill people who live s 

along the Thai border; the Mon, who are 

concentrated in the southern part of 

Myanmar/Burma; the Chin, who live side-

by-side with the Mizoram of India; and 

Kachin, a hill tribe people along the 

Chinese border.  Under British colonial rule 

(which conquered and ruled 

Myanmar/Burma for more than a century) 

the diverse ethnic minority groups were 

administered as separate mini-states known 

as “Frontier Areas”. British rule established 

a complex system of differing treatment for 

different ethnic groups, the cons equences of 

which continues to resonate today. 

 

The “divide and rule” strategy of the British 

Raj entrenched ethnic nationalist 

sentiments, which became an impediment 

to creating a unified sense of nationhood in 

Myanmar/Burma following independence 

in 1948.  Although there were early 

attempts at creating a federal political 

framework for the newly independent 

Myanmar/Burma, such plans eventually 

gave way to a unitary model.  The new 

central government faced almost immediate 

armed challenges from political faction 

groups and ethnic minorities.  The conflict 

with ethnic groups continued almost 

uninterruptedly until cease- fire processes 

were initiated just over a decade ago.  The 

Karen, demanding greater  autonomy, was 

one of the first minority groups to take up 

arms against the central government.  By 

the mid-1970s, nearly every major ethnic 

group was armed, so that from the birth of 

an independent Myanmar/Burma, the 

military  has been engaged in suppressing an 

ongoing internal rebellion.  The cost has 

been massive with tens of thousands dead, 

hundreds of thousands more displaced, a 

crumbling economy and a thriving narcotics 

trade used to fund the conflict. 

 

The second seed of Myanmar/Burma’s 

present troubles was sowed in 1962 when 

the country’s first prime minister, U Nu, 

was ousted in a military coup led by 

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Myanmar/Burma

 

 

2

 

General Ne Win.  The coup occurred 

shortly after elections that saw the return of 

the U Nu government after 2 years of Ne 

Win’s “caretaker” government.  The 

military feared that a  challenge for 

constitutional  reform by ethnic minority 

groups and U Nu’s sympathy towards their 

concerns could undermine Burman 

influence in the frontier areas and could 

lead to the breakup of the Union.   

 

The Ne Win regime adopted a policy of 

economic and political isolation from the 

international political economy.  This 

policy enabled Ne Win to consolidate his 

political rule and tighten oppression without 

scrutiny from the international community.  

Ne Win dominated the government until he 

was forced to step down in 1988 following 

widespread riots and student-led pro-

democracy demonstrations that grew out of 

the government’s sudden devaluation of the 

national currency.  The military assumed 

power, declared martial law and brutally 

suppressed the demonstrations.  Despite 

this, multiparty elections were held in 1990 

resulting in a decisive victory for the main 

opposition National League for Democracy 

(NLD), led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the 

daughter of independence hero Aung San.  

However, the results were never accepted 

and despite strong international pressure, 

the military junta, now called the State 

Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 

continues its grip on power. 

 

The political and human rights 

situation 

Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD Vice-President 

Tin Oo, and other opposition members have 

had various restrictions placed on their 

activities since 1989.  In 2000 for the 

second time since the election, she was 

placed under house arrest.  There were 

positive signals coming from the regime by 

the end of 2001 however, including the 

restoration in May 2002 of Aung San Suu 

Kyi’s freedom of movement, the continued 

release of political prisoners and the 

relaxation of some of the constraints on the 

lawful political activities of NLD and other 

legal political parties.  These gestures 

followed “confidence-building talks” 

between Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta, 

as the generals attempted to develop greater 

cooperation with neighbouring powers and 

the international community.  Bodies like 

the International Labour Organisation 

(ILO), the United Nations (UN) and 

Amnesty International were granted various 

opportunities to engage the SPDC on its 

democratic and human rights record.  The 

SPDC even permitted the UN Secretary-

General’s Special Envoy to 

Myanmar/Burma, Razali Ismail, and the 

UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 

in Myanmar/Burma, Professor Paulo Sergio 

Pinheiro, to visit the country on numerous 

occasions. 

 

However, these  positive  movements were 

short lived and a year after her release Aung 

San Suu Kyi was rearrested as part of 

another major crackdown on the NLD.  The 

SPDC’s  latest campaign against its main 

opposition followed an  incident on 30 May 

2003  in  which  at least a hundred people 

were killed when a government-affiliated 

group brutally attacked Aung San Suu 

Kyi’s motorcade in Depayin.

3

  The 

interna tional community including ASEAN 

members swiftly condemned the human 

rights violations.  Other countries took 

punitive measures.  The EU and US 

renewed sanctions, including arms 

embargo, trade sanctions, and travel 

restrictions on senior junta officials.  Japan 

– Myanmar/Burma’s largest aid donor  – 

suspended new economic aid, while 

                                                                

 

3

 The Burmese opposition refers to this incident as 

the “Depayin Massacre” or “Black Friday”.  The Ad 

Hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre convened by 

the National Council of Union of Burma (NCUB) 

estimated the number killed could be as high as 282.  

Affidavits collected for the Commission hinted at 

the premeditated and well-organised nature of the 

attack.  “It appeared that the attackers were 

systematically trained”, one witness observed. “They 

mainly aimed and struck on the head.  Even when I 

was at a hundred yards, I heard with anguishing 

pain, the popping sounds of heads being broken by 

savage blows.” 

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Myanmar/Burma

 

 

3

 

Australia shelved its human rights 

workshops for middle-ranking Burmese 

officials. 

 

Despite the international community’s 

reactions, the SPDC remained defiant, 

perhaps keen to show Western nations that 

the leadership had not been affected by 

criticisms or punishment.  Unwilling to 

restore Aung San Suu Kyi’s freedom, the 

SPDC instead responded to international 

and regional pressure with the appointment 

of General Khin Nyunt, the head of 

intelligence who is considered a moderate, 

as Prime Minister.  Within days the new 

Prime Minister flagged a seven-step “road 

map” towards democracy, which includes 

reconvening its “National Convention” to 

discuss a new constitution for 

Myanmar/Burma, the adoption of the 

constitution through a national referendum, 

the holding of elections for legislative 

bodies, and the convening of legislative 

bodies under the new constitution.  The 

Convention was eventually convened but 

abruptly adjourned, without the 

participation of the NLD, while Aung San 

Suu Kyi remained under house arrest.  The 

SPDC continue to ignore its major domestic 

opponents and international calls for Aung 

San Suu Kyi’s release and genuine dialogue 

with her party. 

 

The 2004 National Convent ion represents 

the third attempt by the junta to draft a new 

constitution to replace the 1974 constitution 

suspended since 1988.  The National 

Convention began on 17 May 2004 with the 

participation of delegates handpicked by the 

junta and a few representatives from those 

ethnic groups that had entered into cease-

fire agreements with the junta.  The junta 

left little doubt about its intentions to 

remain in national politics.

4

  One of the six 

objectives of the Convention is “for the 

Tatmadaw  [the military] to be able to 

participate in the national political 

                                                                

 

4

 “A milestone leading the nation to a new age,” The 

New light of Myanmar, 11 July 2004, 

http://www.myanmar.com/nlm/article/July11.htm 

leadership role of the state”.

5

  The 

Convention was adjourned at a time when 

opposition to the Convention had been 

growing, domestically and internationally. 

 

As the overall political situation in 

Myanmar/Burma worsened after the 

Depayin incident, so too did its human 

rights standing.  For the military regime, 

stability and development have been its 

primary obsession.  The regime justifies its 

security measures and its role in national 

politics as necessary  to maintain national 

unity and internal order.  The generals are 

also morally content to draw on remnants of 

“Asian values”  – the idea that supposed 

East Asian cultural values prioritise the 

interests of the community over the 

individual.  One of the junta’s 

Memorandums to the 2003 UN 

Commission on Human Rights notes that, 

“The most fundamental and essential 

requirement for a country like 

Myanmar/Burma is to fulfil [the] basic 

needs of the people … and also to raise 

their standard of living.  Other aspects  of 

human rights cannot be effectively 

implemented without fulfilling these basic 

rights.”

6

 

 

Asian values arguments are habitually 

delivered as a catchall defence for actual 

past or present violations of civil and 

political rights.  Myanmar/Burma continues 

to be the focus of scrutiny by the 

international community for a number of 

human rights violations associated with the 

unruly behaviour of the security forces and 

the junta’s reluctance to reform.  In the 

2004 resolution on Myanmar/Burma’s 

human rights records, the UN Commission 

on Human Rights expressed its grave 

concern at “the ongoing systematic 

violation of human rights” and listed, 

                                                                

 

5

 Ibid. 

6

 UN, “Memorandum of the Situation of Human 

Rights in Myanmar,” Note verbale from the 

Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the UN Office at 

Geneva, 21 March 2003, UN Doc 

E/CN.4/2003/G/47, para.92. 

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4

 

among other things, the crackdown on the 

NLD and other political arrests and 

detention, extrajudicial killings and sexual 

violence against women, the use of forced 

labour including child labour, and 

violations against religious and ethnic 

minorities, especially in areas not under 

cease-fire agreements.

7

 

Suppressing dissent 

The issue of political prisoners tops the list 

of criticisms against Myanmar/Burma.  

Before the Depayin incident, the Home 

Minister reported that there remained only a 

hundred political prisoners but this draws 

on a limited definition of political prisoners 

as those who are members of a political 

party.  However as Pinheiro points out, the 

majority of them are students, 

professionals and other individual 

dissidents arrested 

arbitrarily under 

security laws and subjected to unfair trials 

and due process.  Human rights groups 

continue to estimate the number of such 

persons to be between 1200-1300 with 

continued arrests and incidents of 

intimidation, particularly following the 

events at  Depayin.   The latest figures from 

the government list 153 people arrested 

following the Depayin incident, including 

Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders, 

in connection with the Depayin incident.

8

  

Pinheiro, however, believes that the real 

figure could be much higher. 

 

Another consequence of the Depayin 

incident has been increased censorship in an 

already heavily controlled media 

environment.  Myanmar/Burma continues 

to be one of the few countries in the world 

that censors every publication through  the 

Literary Works Scrutinising Committee 

(LWSC).  For added measure, the penalties 

for accessing unauthorised information are 

also severe.  According to the International 

                                                                

 

7

 UN HRC, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, 

Resolution E/CN.4/2004/L.34, 9 April 2004. 

8

 Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Statement to the 16th 

session of the Commission on Human Rights, 

Geneva, 26 March 2004. 

Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 

Development (ICHRDD), ownership of fax 

machines and computers as well as access 

to the internet without government approval 

is punishable by a prison term of 7 to 15 

years.

9

  The SPDC’s vigilance has made 

Myanmar/Burma third only to communist 

North Korea and Cuba in the number of 

journalists it holds behind bars.

10

 

Conflict with ethnic minorities 

While the international community remains 

focused on the conflict between the 

government and its opposition over the 

1990 election, the problem of ethnic 

separatism represents an equally pressing 

challenge for Myanmar/Burma’s move 

towards democracy and respect of human 

rights.

11

  While a series of cease- fire 

agreements have brought some relief to the 

junta, fighting still continues.  The need to 

unify the country remains a powerful 

argument for the generals in their hold on 

power, while armed conflict between the 

junta and ethnic rebels remains a principle 

cause of human rights abuse in 

Myanmar/Burma. 

 

Most human rights NGOs continue to 

report violations and widespread 

discriminatory practices in the context of 

the Tatmadaw’s counter- insurgency 

activities directed against ethnic and 

religious minorities.  Pinheiro’s report in 

2003 notes, “Serious human rights 

violations have undoubtedly occurred and 

continue to occur in the areas where armed 

groups operate.”  One of the most serious 

reports,  License to Rape released in May 

2002 by the Shan Human Rights 

Foundation (SHRF) and the Shan Women’s 

                                                                

 

9

 ICHRDD, Submission to the 58th session of the 

UN Human Rights Commission, Item 9, 

http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/prog/intHRadvocacy/5

8CommissionMyanmarEng.html. 

10

 Reporters Without Borders, Second World Press 

Freedom Ranking, 2003, 

http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/World_press_ranking.p

df. 

11

 ICG, “Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority 

Politics”, Asia Report No.52, 7 May 2003. 

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Myanmar/Burma

 

 

5

 

Action Network (SWAN), alleges 

systematic and widespread use by the 

Tatmadaw of rape and sexual violence as a 

weapon against the Shan ethnic minority.  

The central government continues to deny 

such allegations as fabrications but 

concedes that out of the 173 allegations 

raised in the report, 5 were found to be 

true.

12

  Pinheiro had previously questioned 

the objectivity and methodology by which 

the junta had investigated the allegations. 

The use of child soldiers 

In the military campaign between the 

government and ethnic rebels, both sides 

are reportedly recruiting child soldiers.  The 

SPDC strongly denies the use of child 

soldiers.  Its statement at the 2004 UN 

Commission on Human Rights claimed 

that: “Myanmar armed forces is an all-

volunteer force, and those entering military 

service do so of their own free will.  A 

person can enlist in the armed forces only 

on attainment of the age of 18.”

13

  The 

junta’s sensitivities came in light of the 

Human Rights Watch (HRW)’s 2002 

report,

14

 which alleges that 

Myanmar/Burma’s  Tatmadaw has more 

child soldiers than any other country in the 

world with as many as 70,000 soldiers 

under the age of 18.  HRW’s investigation 

found that the overwhelming majority of 

Myanmar/Burma’s child soldiers are in the 

national army, the Tatmadaw Kyi, which 

forcibly recruits children as young as 

eleven.  Once deployed, they are expected 

to “engage in combat, participate in human 

rights abuses against civilians, and are 

frequently beaten and abused by their 

commanders.”

15

  Children are also found in 

rebel groups, although in far smaller 

                                                                

 

12

 Myanmar, Statement by the Myanmar Observer 

Delegation to the 16th session of the Commission on 

Human Rights on Agenda item 12(a) “Violence 

against Women”, Geneva, 5 April 2004. 

13

 UN, Statement by the Myanmar Observer 

Delegation to the sixt ieth session of the Commission 

on Human Rights, agenda 13, 7 April 2004. 

14

 HRW, My Gun was as Tall as Me, New York, 

2002, http://hrw.org/reports/2002/burma. 

15

 Ibid. 

numbers.  While some children were 

forcibly conscripted, others joined rebel 

groups to avenge past abuses by the 

government against members of their 

families or community. 

 

In a report to the Security Council made 

under resolution 1379, the UN Secretary-

General notes that “testimonies received by 

UNICEF [UN Children’s Fund] confirm 

[HRW’s allegations].

16

  Pinheiro similarly 

reports that he was able to collect some 

information during the 2002 mission 

“reflecting the existence of child soldiers in 

Myanmar” but was hesitant to speculate on 

the extent of the problem. 

The use of forced labour 

In 1930 the ILO established the  Forced 

Labour Convention (ILO Convention 29).  

In 1957 this convention was reinforced with 

Convention 109,  the  Abolition of Forced 

Labour Convention.  Myanmar/Burma is a 

signatory to this convention.  An enquiry 

carried out by the ILO released in early July 

1998 found “abundant evidence” of 

pervasive use of forced civilian labour for 

portering, logging, agriculture and 

construction and other work in support of 

the military.

17

  The ILO report also notes 

that the Towns Act (1907) and Villages Act 

(1908) introduced under British colonial 

rule made it legal for the army and police to 

force people to work.  As a result of 

international pressures however, Order 

No.1/99 was issued under the directive of 

the SPDC banning forced labour.

18

   

                                                                

 

16

 UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Children 

and Armed Conflict to the Security Council, UN 

Doc S/2002/1299, 26 November 2002. 

17

 ILO, Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma), Report 

of the Commission of Inquiry to examine the 

observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour 

Convention, 1930 (No. 29), 2 July 1998, 

http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/

docs/gb273/myanmar.htm. 

18

 See UN, “Memorandum of the Situation of 

Human Rights in Myanmar,” Note verbale from the 

Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the UN Office at 

Geneva, 57th session of the UN Commission on 

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6

 

In November 2000 the ILO issued a 

sanction on Myanmar  – the first time the 

international body had done so under 

provisions in its constitution.  Bowing again 

to international pressure, the junta agreed in 

May 2003 on a joint “plan of action” with 

the ILO to eliminate forced labour.  That 

initiative, which was to have commenced 

the following month, was aborted following 

the Depayin incident.  The ILO had 

repeatedly warned the junta over its 

tardiness in delivering on the pledge to stop 

using, what the ILO estimates, more than 

800,000 conscripted labour.  The ILO gave 

the junta “a final opportunity to give 

practical effect to [their] assurances” before 

considering renewed sanctions.

19

 

 

Myanmar/Burma and Australia’s 

strategy 

The human rights and political situation in 

Myanmar/Burma continues to fall well 

short of international law and norms.  Many 

of the domestic laws and directives 

criminalise the exercise of certain human 

rights.  On the other hand the government 

continues to participate in, or condone, or is 

unwilling or unable to guard against the 

contravention of certain basic human rights 

norms, particularly in relation to its 

campaign against ethnic insurgencies.  The 

latest crackdown on the NLD further eroded 

Myanmar/Burma’s human rights record.  

While the SPDC promised a seven-step 

“roadmap” towards democracy, there are 

few reasons for the international 

community and opposition forces to believe 

that the junta is serious about implementing 

even its own roadmap so long as Aung San 

Suu Kyi and other dissidents remain under 

detention.   

 

                                                                                               

 

Human Rights, 21 March 2001, UN Doc 

E/CN.4/2001/140. 

19

 ILO, Conclusions on Myanmar Regarding Forced 

Labour, 18 June 2004, 

http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangk

ok/public/releases/yr2004/pr04_19.htm 

There is international consensus that the 

junta needs to seriously engage with the 

domestic opposition and also discipline the 

behaviours of the Tatmadaw  Kyi in its 

counter- insurgency activities.  However, the 

junta appears to be dragging its feet in 

addressing both  of these  issues.  In the 

context of Myanmar/Burma’s political 

stalemate and human rights problems, the 

international community has devoted a 

great deal of energy and resources towards 

promoting change but with very little 

success.  The junta has shown that  it is 

remarkably resilient,  even if it is not 

impenetrable by outside pressure.  

Commentators often agree that one of the 

main reasons for the international 

community’s weakness is the lack of 

coordinated and concerted action.  

Currently, international strategies are 

divided and inconsistent. 

 

Western nations, particularly the US and 

EU, advocate sanctions against the junta’s 

human rights and democratic failures, as a 

way of delegitimising and, to a lesser 

extent, destabilising the regime.  In 

contrast, China, India and ASEAN nations 

advocate a policy of “constructive 

engagement” through increased trade, 

diplomacy, and foreign linkages in the form 

of investment and humanitarian aid, which 

they argue will gradually encourage the 

generals towards the path of democracy.  

These strategies reflect the geopolitical 

differences of Western countries that have 

very  little interest in Myanmar/Burma, and 

Asian countries harbouring postcolonial 

sensitivities  over national sovereignty and 

geostrategic and economic ambitions  in the 

resource-rich and underdeveloped country. 

 

In contrast, Australia seems confused over 

where it stands in relations to 

Myanmar/Burma.  Like other Western 

nations, Australia has often protested loudly 

about the human rights and political 

situation in Myanmar/Burma.  However, 

unlike other Western nations, Australia is 

unwilling to take any real  action against the 

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VIEW ON ASIA 

  

Myanmar/Burma

 

 

7

 

junta when it fails in its responsibility to 

protect its citizens from human rights 

violations.  Described as a “wait and see” 

attitude by Myint Cho,

20

 director of the 

Burmese Members of Parliament Union 

(MPU), Australia does not impose 

economic or diplomatic sanctions on 

Myanmar/Burma and has taken a position 

of neither encouraging nor discouraging 

trade and investment there.

21

  Australia’s 

self-styled “distinctive foreign policy” on 

Myanmar/Burma reflects little more than 

Asian constructive engagement flavoured 

with Western rhetoric. 

 

Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander 

Downer once pointed out that sanctions 

would not work without the support of 

Myanmar/Burma’s Asian neighbours.  It 

has also been argued that the lack of 

regional support for sanctions is what 

distinguishes Myanmar/Burma from the 

anti-apartheid sanction experience in South 

Africa.  While the imposition of sanctions 

may have limits in Myanmar/Burma’s case, 

there is still no evidence to support the 

conclusion that constructive engagement is 

achieving more.  The China/ASEAN 

approach has  similarly  been tried for years 

without substantive success.  Events since 

Depayin have  now  stalled any progress this 

strategy had hoped to achieve.   

 

Experts generally agree that  there is no 

simple, risk- free solution to the political 

and human rights problems in 

Myanmar/Burma.

22

  As  David Baldwin, a 

Columbia University  academic puts it, 

“there is no all-purpose instrument that 

works better in all situations”.

23

  What is 

                                                                

 

20

 Myint Cho, personal communication to the author. 

21

 Frank Frost, “ASEAN at 30: Enlargement, 

Consolidation and the Problems of Cambodia”, 25 

August 1997, 

http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/1997-

98/98cib02.htm 

22

 Min Zin, “Sanctions Revisited” Irrawaddy 

Magazine, May 2001. 

23

 David Baldwin, “Sanctions have gotten a bum rap : 

Pundits despise them, but they can be effective in 

sure is that the debate over sanctions has 

become a distraction from the real issue.  

What is more important than taking sides in 

this debate or embarking on unilateral 

foreign policy projects, is to pursue a 

strategy  that is consistent  and coordinated 

within a multilateral framework.  “It is not 

that either sanctions or engagement is a 

more effective policy than the other”,  Aung 

San Suu Kyi is reported to have said. “What 

we  need is concerted effort from the 

international community to synergise both 

strategies to have maximum influence on 

changes in Burma.”

24

 

 

No matter what strategy Australia adopts, it 

could be more proactive in pursuing reform 

in Myanmar/Burma in cooperation with the 

EU, US and regional partners.  As 

negotiations for free trade agreements with 

China and ASEAN looms over Australia’s 

horizon, both Australia and its near 

neighbours need to be reminded that 

regional stability and prosperity are held at 

stake by the political impasse and human 

rights abuses in Myanmar/Burma. As 

demonstrated by the recent row between the 

ASEAN and the EU over 

Myanmar/Burma’s participation in the 

October 2004 Europe-Asia summit in 

Vietnam, instability and the lack of reform 

in one country could potentially hurt the 

entire region. 

 

 

 

 

View on Asia is a publication of the Uniya Jesuit Social 

Justice Centre, a research centre based in Sydney’s Kings 

Cross, Australia.  The views expressed in this report are 

those of the author.  Thanks to Myint Cho and Jesuit 

ministries staff for their helpful comments.  Please email 

comments or corrections to [e-mail]. 

Download more country reports at: www.uniya.org. 

 

                                                                                               

 

Myanmar and elsewhere” Los Angeles Times, 18 

August 2004. 

24

 Quoted in ibid. 

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8

 

 

Internet resources 

 

Amnesty, Amnesty Annual International Report, http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport 

 

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Burma Brief, August 2004, 

http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/burma/burma_brief.html 

 

AusAID, Burma Program Details, 14 July 2004, 

http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/cbrief.cfm?DCon=7603_3421_1124_2053_2981&

CountryId=8493641 

 

BBC, Country Profile: Burma, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-

pacific/country_profiles/1300003.stm 

 

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Burma, 

http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bm.html 

 

HRW, World Report 2003, http://hrw.org/wr2k3/asia2.html 

 

ILO, Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma), Report of the Commission of Inquiry to examine 

the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), 2 July 

1998, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm 

 

Irrawaddy Publishing Group, The Irrawaddy Online Edition, http://www.irrawaddy.org

 

 

Mizzima.com: Burma Related News and Issues, http://www.mizzima.com 

 

Myanmar Information Committee, http://www.myanmar- information.net 

 

Myanmar Embassy Canberra, http://www.myanmarembassycanberra.com 

 

New Light of Myanmar, http://www.myanmar.com/nlm 

 

Online Burma/Myanmar Library, http://www.ibiblio.org/obl 

 

Web Monitoring and Documentation of the 60th Session of the UN Commission on Human 

Rights, http://www.unchr.info 

 

UNHCHR, Status of Ratifications of Principal Human Rights Treaties, 

http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf