Vilfredo Pareto’s Sociology
168
Scores on measures of conservatism-liberalism, conviction-relativism, caution-risk,
innovation, individualism-collectivism, dissociative experience and aggression
all
rise together, firstly in intervals between Conservative and Labour subpopulations, and
then once more in intervals between Labour and Liberal Democrat subpopulations.
Moreover, relatively large intervals between Conservative
and Labour MPs are all
Table 5.6(a) Differences between the parliamentary parties on all measures
Variable
Name
Lowest
position
(mean Score
on measure)
Interval
between
low/middle
positions
(SD units)
Middle
position
(mean score
on measure)
Interval
between
middle/
high
positions
(SD units)
Highest
position
(mean score
on measure)
Age
Lib (1.87)
.58***
Lab (2.20)
.32***
Con (2.38)
Years as MP
Lib (3.54)
.33***
Lab (6.47)
.68***
Con (12.45)
Con-Lib
Con (-2.57)
1.1***
Lab (1.32)
.21
Lib (2.09)
Conv-Rel
Con (-8.47)
.59***
Lab (-7.05)
<.00
Lib (-7.04)
Caution-risk
Con (2.07)
.41***
Lab (2.97)
.07
Lib (3.13)
Innovation
Con (-.85)
.19*
Lab (-.39)
.04
Lib (-.29)
Indiv-Collect Con (-.10)
.12
Lab (.16)
.09
Lib (.35)
Dissociation
Con (12.12)
.09
Lab (12.34)
.03
Lib (12.42)
Aggression
Con (9.85)
.06
Lab (9.99)
.02
Lib (1.04)
Fem Gender
Lib (1.04)
.15
Con (1.10)
.41***
Lab (1.26)
Loc Control
Lab (-2.46)
.26***
Con (-1.76)
.37***
Lib (-.77)
Aloofness
Lab (13.44)
.08
Con (13.69)
.35***
Lib (14.77)
Class
Lab (1.76)
.34***
Lib (2.00)
.14
Con (2.10)
Seniority
Lab (3.11)
N/A
N/A
.70***
Con (5.17)
Soc Anxiety
Con (-3.71)
.09
Lib (-3.46)
.24*
Lab (-2.76)
Probability ratings calculated by two tailed T-test
Intervals between Labour and Conservative mean scores become significant at the p<.05
level if greater than .19 SDs. They become significant at the p<.02 level if greater then .23
SDs, and they become significant at the p<.01 level if greater than .26 SDs.
Intervals between Labour and Liberal Democrat mean scores become significant at the
p<.05 level if greater than .22 SDs. They become significant at the p<.02 level if greater
than .25 SDs, and they become significant at the p<.01 level if greater than .28 SDs.
Intervals between Conservative and Liberal Democrat mean scores become significant at
the p<.05 level if greater than .25 SDs. They become significant at the p<.02 level if greater
than .28 SDs, and they become significant at the p<.01 level if greater than .30 SDs.
*** Three asterisks indicate an interval which is significant at the p<.01 level.
** Two asterisks indicate an interval which is significant at the p<.02 level
* One asterisk indicates an interval which is significant at the p<.05 level.
Testing Pareto’s Theory
169
followed by much smaller intervals between Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs.
Although not all of these intervals are statistically significant,
Labour elevations
over Conservative mean scores on conservatism-liberalism, conviction-relativism
and caution-risk are all significant at the p<.01 level. The Labour elevation above the
Conservatives on the innovativeness scale is significant at the p<.05 level.
It immediately became intriguing to suppose that these findings represented axes
of difference between the
social personalities of the three main Parliamentary parties.
This may itself mean a number of things. One reasonable
inference would be that the
personality measures succeeded in tapping deep and enduring personality structures,
in which case the above pattern can be regarded as highlighting ways in which the
parliamentary parties are composed of different sorts of people. However, it is equally
conceivable that findings will to some extent reflect the different ideological scripts
which MPs have internalised, as part of their identity work, to cement affiliations
with in-groups, to establish
boundaries against out-groups, and the like. Dissonance
effects are likely to be important here. In particular, it is worth recalling Charles
Osgood’s (1978) observation that politicians internalise their public pronouncements
over time. Of course, there is no need to choose between these interpretations. The
term ‘social personality’ is used here inclusively to assume resonances spanning
multiple levels of personality structure and internalised ideology.
An important related issue is how enduring these differences of social personality
are likely to be. When we consider the plasticity of ideological
scripts against the
more enduring nature of personality structure, it becomes clear that the more we
stress deep personality structure in the interpretation of findings, the more we can
then regard any patterned ordering of the parties as likely to endure. Of course, the
more enduring these differences are likely to be, the more significant they become
for social science. Working from the assumption that findings do reveal enduring
party
differences, we might then speculate, for example, that the relative proximity
of Labour to Liberal Democrat subpopulations means that,
ceteris paribus, prospects
for political coalition-building between these two parties will be greater than for any
other combination of the three parties.
Alternatively, we might regard differences between the parties on the personality
measures as having perhaps changed since the study was conducted.
Such arguments
might be based upon cultural differences between generations, or they may cite other
changing demographics such as the rising number of women MPs (a phenomenon
which is discussed shortly). In addition, such arguments might plausibly draw upon
the classic Downsian model of party competition which says that because politicians
seek political office more than anything else, they will
continually change their
policies to accord with those favoured by the fickle and ever more volatile ‘median
voter’. Hence the ideological scripts which mark out the boundaries between the
parties must remain forever in flux.
However, grounds for interpreting findings as standing for enduring differences
between the parties have been set out in chapter three. And these grounds apply
irrespective of whether we regard social personalities as consisting more of shared
personality structures, or more of shared ideological scripts. The collective personality
of a political party was depicted there as a set of unwritten heuristic principles
which persist through time by guiding parties to respond
in relatively consistent