Testing Pareto’s Theory
185
From
a humanist standpoint, it might count as a self-actualisation domain, and from
a postmaterialist perspective, conceived with or without humanist assumptions,
it might even make sense as a domain which distinguishes between people upon
the basis of whether they have enjoyed formative security during their early years.
The variables intercorrelated as follows. Innovativeness correlated convincingly
(r=.30, p=.000) with individualism-collectivism, although barely (r=-.10, p=.227)
with locus of control. There was, however, a substantial correlation (r=-.29, p=.001)
between individualism-collectivism and locus of control. It could therefore be
concluded that collectivists appear moderately inclined
either towards internal locus
of
control or towards innovativeness, with both inclinations combining occasionally
in collectivistic individuals.
5.8.4 Dissociation, Aggression and Aloofness
Factor domain 4(a) suggested that MPs who report higher levels of dissociative
experience will also harbour stronger feelings of aggression. Of course, we have
visited this binary cluster before, as it appears amplified within veteran Labour and
Conservative MPs. However, it is particularly interesting that it should appear once
more in factor analysis, this time accompanied by the
political aloofness variable
which taps distrust and detachment. A bold explanation would be that this factor
domain stands for a Machiavellian-psychopathic type; perhaps a ‘hard-charging’
narcissistic or hypomanic MP who excels at role-playing, distrusts party colleagues
and feels aloof from the cut and thrust of party politics. Given its low eigenvalue, it
seemed reasonable to regard this personality configuration as relatively uncommon
amongst MPs. Interestingly though, the correlation between dissociative experience
and aggression in the r matrix was significant (r=.27, p=.001), as was that between
aggression and political aloofness (r=.19, p=.020). Only dissociative experience
and political aloofness failed to correlate, indicating that
aggressiveness will tend to
combine
either with dissociative experience
or with political aloofness.
5.8.5 Do these Clusters form Broader Personality Configurations?
A check was made for how variables forming the aggression-dissociation-aloofness
cluster in factor domain 4(a) correlated with other variables. The results were very
straightforward. The three variables each correlated in different ways with the
remaining personality variables, thus suggesting no links to broader configurations.
As factor domain 2(a) clearly involved conservatism-liberalism and factor domain
1(a) involved innovativeness and
perhaps self-actualisation or freedom from the
harsh superego, it was unsurprising that the r-matrix should now reveal links between
variables loading onto these domains. Firstly, conservatism-liberalism correlated
weakly with individualism-collectivism (r=.16, p=.055), locus of control (r=-.18,
p=.034) and innovativeness (r=.17, p=.038). This highlighted
a general contrast
between (on the one hand) psychologically conservative individuals who incline
towards external locus of control, individualism and low levels of innovativeness,
and (on the other hand) psychologically liberal individuals who incline more towards
internal locus of control, collectivism and higher levels of innovativeness. Weaker
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186
findings appeared upon investigation of whether the correlates of individualism-
collectivism achieved correlations with the correlates of conservatism-liberalism.
Firstly, individualism-collectivism was found to be unrelated to caution-risk and
political aloofness. Innovativeness correlated weakly (r=.14, p=.082) with caution-
risk but not at all with political aloofness. Locus of control failed to correlate with
caution-risk and only correlated very faintly (r=.13, p=.117) with political aloofness.
In
conclusion, therefore, the resonances between these two clusters were weaker
than might have been anticipated, especially given the link between liberalism,
innovation and postmaterialism revealed by the student study. In particular, it was
surprising that the correlation between conservatism-liberalism and caution-risk was
not stronger, given that the longer versions of these scales correlated at r=.37 in
the student study. The correlation between political aloofness and external locus
of control was also fainter than anticipated, given the earlier
hypothesis that these
variables are likely to be closely related. In the final analysis, however, findings
still justified a general contrast between conservative and liberal individuals which
pulls together variance in conservatism-liberalism, locus of control, individualism-
collectivism and innovativeness, to form a single multi-trait continuum.
Next we can consider resonances between the individualism-collectivism cluster
and the cluster which brings conservatism-liberalism together with conviction-
relativism and social anxiety. It has already been established above that individualism-
collectivism correlated weakly with conservatism-liberalism (r=.16, p=.055). It may
now be added that individualism-collectivism correlated similarly (r=.15, p=.086)
with
conviction-relativism, but not at all with social anxiety. To complete the picture,
locus of control correlated with conservatism-liberalism (r=-.18, p=.034), but not
with conviction-relativism or social anxiety. The innovativeness variable also
correlated weakly with conservatism-liberalism but not with conviction relativism
or social anxiety.
Hence the strongest finding was that collectivism and innovativeness cluster
loosely with liberalism and relativism, thereby striking a contrast between the
conservative who inclines towards individualism, firm ideological conviction and
low levels of innovativeness, and the liberal who inclines towards collectivism,
ideological relativism and high levels of innovativeness. This
link between
psychological conservatism and individualism should not be overstated, particularly
in view of the fact that when we look back at the intervals between the parties on
the individualism-collectivism measure, we see only statistically insignificant links
between political conservatism and individualism. Nonetheless, the fact that such
links should have appeared at all may seem both intriguing and counterintuitive.
What’s more, this ‘conservative individualism’, which the earlier contrast between
conservative and liberal forms of individualism has already addressed to some
extent, has importance for the purposes of this book because it alerts us to senses in
which Pareto was wrong to lump together conservatism (his class II ‘persistence of
aggregates’ residues) with collectivism (his class IV residues of sociality). Pareto’s
decision may seem surprising in view of Charles Powers’ observation that Pareto
himself displayed that curious combination of being traditionally conservative and
yet fiercely defensive of individual liberty (Powers 1987, 19). Hence we will now
explore this combination further.