Vilfredo Pareto's Sociology : a Framework for Political Psychology

Testing Pareto’s Theory
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reflect that impulsive mode of instinctual discharge which we associate with 
psychopathy and psychoticism; 
(5)  To cap it all, the presence of external locus of control may well reflect 
the Machiavellian-psychopath’s belief in a chaotic, unpredictable and 
uncontrollable environment; a view of the ‘world as a jungle’ where 
manipulation is necessary if one is to survive and prosper, as we might relate 
once more to the narcissistic fear of power. 
Further evidence linked this phenomenon to a richer pattern within the Parliamentary 
Conservative Party. The r-matrix run for the Conservative subpopulation revealed a 
strong positive correlation (r=.52, p=.001) between social class origin and conviction-
relativism. Correlations between class and conservatism-liberalism, and between 
class and caution-risk were weaker (r=.22, p=.161; r=.27, p=.087) but nonetheless 
perceptible within this small subpopulation. A considerably weaker correlation 
(r=.17, p=.282) also related class to political aloofness. These links between 
higher class origin and increased liberalism, tolerance of risk, aloofness and (most 
saliently) ideological relativism, were not reflected in the r-matrix run for Labour 
MPs. They afford a fascinating insight into the relationship between social class 
origin and personality within the Parliamentary Conservative Party, by suggesting 
a distinct political type who possesses several Machiavellian traits and who also 
tends to be of higher class origin, and, by the same token, a type of MP from lower 
or middle class backgrounds who possesses a range of conservative (and perhaps 
compulsive) traits. It is important to mind, however, that this distinction only related 
faintly to differing levels of parliamentary seniority. What findings did not indicate, 
to be clear, is a direct relationship between class origin and level of seniority within 
the Parliamentary Conservative Party. Political seniority and class origin did not 
correlate at all (r=-.02) for this subpopulation.
No firm conclusions can be drawn from these Machiavellian patterns displayed 
by the Conservative subpopulation, but they can at least inspire further theorising. 
An interesting question is to ask why individuals with Machiavellian-psychopathic 
leanings from upper class backgrounds, and compulsives from lower or middle class 
backgrounds, should separately seek political careers in the Conservative Party. It 
is well known that Machiavellians are power hungry, and that they will therefore be 
drawn to powerful institutions. We also know, particularly in the light of dark triad 
research which connects Machiavellianism, psychopathy and narcissism, that they 
often project charisma, gathering admiring followers around them so they may satisfy 
narcissistic needs. It therefore makes good sense to suppose that such individuals 
will often be drawn, not just to political institutions which grant access to positions 
of power, but also to institutions replete with followers who are likely to defer to 
strong and charismatic leaders. The particular appeal of the Conservative Party for 
such individuals may well be that it meets both criteria splendidly, as it has held 
office for most of the twentieth century, and it is set apart by its cult of loyalty and 
deference. Although these factors might pertain to individuals with Machiavellian 
leanings from all class backgrounds, it is likely that they will pertain to individuals 
from upper class backgrounds in particular, given that such backgrounds are likely to 
create advantages for winning power and prestige in the Conservative Party.

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Vilfredo Pareto’s Sociology
182
Grounds for regarding individuals from lower or middle class backgrounds to 
gravitate towards Conservative Party politics when they possess the very different 
personality structure of the compulsive are as follows. Compulsives possess 
traits spanning conformity, submissiveness, dependence and pliability, which can 
all plausibly be explained in terms of some combination of low self esteem and 
harsh parental discipline during early childhood. Psychoanalytically speaking, we 
might think here of the compulsive’s experience of forced compliance to parental 
authority during the anal phase, and of their conditioned reliance upon the defensive 
strategy of ‘identifying with aggressors’ which originates during the phallic phase. 
Compulsives may also submit to external authority because, as a source of moral 
proscription, it assists the superego to keep the contents of the id at bay, which 
helps them manage those conflicts which dominate their inner lives (hence the 
familiar conservative argument that individuals need institutions to ‘save them from 
themselves’). Finally, the last chapter has explained why compulsives should be 
drawn to strong, charismatic leaders. It was argued there that fear, paranoia and anti-
intraception combine within compulsives to create attractions to political leaders 
who display a gritty determination to ‘get things done’. Of course, these arguments 
can be used to explain why compulsives from all class backgrounds should feel the 
lure of Conservative Party Politics. However, it can be argued that they are most 
readily applicable to compulsives from lower or petit bourgeois class backgrounds 
because from these class perspectives followers are often separated from their 
leaders by expanses of social distance which permit leadership to be contemplated 
as something magical and exotic. Social distance permits this because it ensures 
leadership is not experienced as a part of mundane reality; hence feelings of envy 
and jealousy, which are well know to pass most intensely between those of similar 
social status, are kept at bay. This helps qualify political leaders as suitable objects 
onto which the superego can be projected.
What the above arguments suggest, then, is that whilst upper class Machiavellian 
individuals might often be drawn to Conservative Party politics as a practical means 
to allow them to satisfy what might be termed their psychic needs of leadership, the 
lower class compulsive route to Conservative Party politics might often be bound 
up with what we might term the very different psychic needs of followership. The 
failure of previous commentators to take account of this distinction would certainly 
explain why they should typically have found the business of describing the social 
personality (or rather the ‘central tradition’) of the Conservative Party so problematic. 
The problem is summed up by Anthony Seldon:
The Tories have often been seen as a party of consistent ideology and as defenders of 
core principles and interests. I am never convinced by this argument. What is remarkable 
about the Conservatives is not their ideological or interest tenacity but their willingness 
to jettison positions which no longer appeal: laissez faire, the House of Lords, the Union 
with all Ireland, the empire, have all been abandoned when it suited the party, as to some 
extent have been the monarchy, the Church of England and the agricultural interest 
(Seldon 1996, 18).
What the above analysis of findings provides, then, is a tentative means to unconfound 
the two views of conservatism which commentators have struggled with. We 

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