War and Peace: What can Game Theory Teach us? Robert Aumann

War and Peace: What can Game Theory Teach us?

• Robert Aumann

• Center for the Study of Rationality

• The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Based on:

• Based on:

• “War and Peace”

• http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/

• economics/laureates/2005/

• aumannlecture.pdf

“Wars and other conflicts are among the main sources of human misery.”

• “Wars and other conflicts are among the main sources of human misery.”

• Most attempts to bring about peace have been on a piecemeal, case-by-case basis.

• Suggestion: First try to understand the root causes: WHY do people go to war?

• Like one studies disease.

Rationality

• Definition:

• We call a person’s behavior rational if it best

• promotes his goals, given his information.

• Can war be rational?

• Can strikes be rational?

• Can racial or gender discrimination be rational?

Yes – they CAN be!

• We take all the ills of the world, and dismiss

• them by calling them irrational. If they are

• rational, once we understand that they are,

• we can try to address the problem. If we

• dismiss them as irrational, we can’t address

• the problem.

Economics (and Game Theory) in one word:

• Incentives

• Example: Taxes

• Example: Market Economies

• Example: Repeated Games –

• “Repetition enables cooperation”

Incentives for Peace

• Concessions?

• Munich 1938: “Peace in our time”

• Disarmament?

• The Cold War

• The Pax Romana:

• “If you want peace, prepare for war.”

• Barack Obama:

• The belief that peace is desirable

• is rarely enough to achieve it.

• -- Nobel Peace Prize Lecture,

• Oslo, 10 December 2009

Repeated (or Ongoing) Games

• Repetition Enables Cooperation

Example: Mutual Generosity Game

• Example: Mutual Generosity Game

• Two players, Alfonso and Bob.

• Each one must choose between

• getting $1,000 for himself (Egoism)

• and

• the other getting $3,000 (Cooperation)

Real-Life Examples

• Acreage restrictions

• Fisheries

• Competition

How to achieve cooperation?

• Agree to cooperate!

• But why will the players play as agreed? What’s “in it” for them? Why is it worthwhile?

• Mechanism for enforcing agreements

• Like a law court

• “Pray for the government’s welfare, for

• without its authority, man would swallow

• man alive.” (Talmud)

But what if there are no courts?

• But what if there are no courts?

• Like in the international arena.

• Then Repetition can provide an enforcement mechanism,

• And so, enables cooperation.

• How?

• With an implicit punishment strategy.

• Conclusion: Patience – a long horizon – is essential.

Additional Incentives for Peace

• Clear signals

• Credible signals

• Carrot and Stick

• Incentives must apply directly to policy architects

“It shall come to pass that many people will say, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and He will teach us His ways … And He will judge among nations, and they will beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation will not lift up sword against nation, nor shall they learn war any more.” (Isaiah 2, 2-4)

• “It shall come to pass that many people will say, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and He will teach us His ways … And He will judge among nations, and they will beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation will not lift up sword against nation, nor shall they learn war any more.” (Isaiah 2, 2-4)

Based on:

• Based on:

• “War and Peace”

• http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/

• economics/laureates/2005/

• aumannlecture.pdf

• Thank You!