2015, Vol. 13 No. 1, 200-218 doi: 10. 1093/icon/mov003

202
I•CON
13 (2015), 200–218
2. Judicialization in post-Soviet polities: empowered 
disempowered courts
One important question pertaining to the definition of “judicialization” in young 
democracies is whether formal judicial empowerment is a sufficient indicator of judi-
cialization. It is necessary to ask this question if we are to attempt assessing the quality 
and the status of judicialization in political environments where the law on paper sig-
nificantly differs from actual practice. This distinction has not been visible in the rich 
literature on the global expansion of judicial power, which has often taken for granted 
the facts of formal empowerment, as well as inconsistent, single incidents of judicial 
intervention into politics in non-consolidated democracies or non-democracies, in an 
effort to strengthen the impression of a worldwide spread of judicialization.
Judicial politics in post-Soviet countries present an exemplary case study for the 
inquiries suggested above.
4
Here, the line between formal and genuine empowerment 
is so salient that the failure to take it into account may essentially pervert the mean-
ing of our statements on the judiciary’s political significance or the role of courts in 
society in general. In fact, the region champions probably the most paradoxical tale of
judicial empowerment. Contrary to the widely held intuitions and theories, empow-
erment of constitutional tribunals, which were designated as guardians of limited 
power, almost everywhere coexisted with a governance style of limitless power. In an 
anecdotal way, this reality challenges Ginsburg’s famous argument that constitution-
making politicians choose strong courts if they do not expect to stay in power for a 
long time.
5
It turns out, in fact, that post-Soviet leaders chose strong courts for exactly 
the opposite considerations: that is, expecting that they would never give up their 
power. This apparently puzzling proposition is supported by empirical evidence show-
ing that strongly empowered judicial review emerged not only in countries which 
proved to be among the least democratic in the region, but it also proliferated in the 
most entrenched autocratic regimes at sub-federal level in Russia.
6
As political regimes and patterns revealed themselves over time, the paradox of judi-
cial empowerment has waned, as it seems only the students of the genesis of judicial 
review still maintain interest in the matter. As far as the apparently paradoxical mis-
match between formal and genuine empowerment of contemporary constitutional 
courts is concerned, this reality, once puzzling, is no longer of strong interest for 
students, albeit it may still be an exciting subject as a typical pattern of what can be 
branded as “constitutionalism with adjectives,”
7
where such adjectives as notorious as 
4
For the purposes of this article, the term “post-Soviet region” or equivalent terms (“post-Soviet coun-
tries,” etc.) include all former republics of the Soviet Union except Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. These 
are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
5
Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts, 3(1) 
t
heoRetIcal
I
nquIRIeS
In
l
aw
3.
6
Alexei Trochev, 
Less Democracy, More Courts: A Puzzle of Judicial Review in Russia
, 38(3) 
l
aw
& S
ocIety
R
evIew
513 (2004).
7
In the spirit of “Democracy with Adjectives,” 
see
David Collier & Steven Levitsky, 
Democracy with Adjectives: 
Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research
, 49(3) 
w
oRld
P
olItIcS
430 (1997).
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Judicialization of politics: The post-Soviet way
203
“façade,” “pseudo,” and “sham,” are often applied to define the constitutional status 
of the respective countries.
8