A history of the secularization issue

The intellectual revolution in the CISR (1959-1983)
As has been shown in chapter 3, the CISR is the organization which constitutes the main institutional framework for the scholarly community that vindicates the secularization paradigm. The history of the CISR represents a crucial test for the model I propose: If secularization can really be understood as a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense, then it must be linked to an intellectual revolution (see chap. 1). This notion does not imply so much a change in thinking as the replacement of one generation by the next, which brings with it a new way of thinking. And, it must be added, in order to fully warrant the use of the term "revolution", this change of personnel must be determined in part by the use of specifically political means: persuasion, manipulation, and even force. To what extent does the history of the CISR bear out this scheme?
First criticisms of the sociographic approach
The first criticisms against sociography in the CISR must be understood against the background of the conflict between sociologists and clerics mentioned above. In order to gain a better understanding of the issues at stake in the debate between Catholic and lay sociology, it is best to first turn to Thomas Luckmann, who is sometimes referred to as the single most important and cogent critic of "religious sociology". (Throughout my work, I am using indifferently the phrases "religious sociology", "sociographic approach" and "church-oriented religion" to refer to the approach dominant in the 40s and 50s among European Catholic sociologists.) Luckmann's acid remarks were widely diffused through his 1967 Invisible Religion, but they had already been put forward in almost exactly the same form in the German edition of his book (1963) and, before that, in a 1960 article in the Kölner Zeitschrift. In this article, Luckmann describes religious sociology in terms which all implied serious shortcomings: "A narrowly positivistic methodology and a sociologically insufficient exploitation of the enthusiastically collected sociographic material. [...] An implicit axiomatic which identifies religiosity with religious 'practice'. [...] An insufficient embedment in general sociological theory" (1960, p. 316). As a result of these shortcomings, Luckmann observes, these studies are "not really sociological" (Luckmann 1960, p. 318). But Luckmann was not alone in putting forward these criticisms. In 1965, at the 5^th Colloquium on the Sociology of Protestantism, Friedrich Fürstenberg lamented that "many research projects focusing upon the parish do not deal at all with problems within the scope of a proper sociology of religion. Instead they offer data and explanations which belong rather to the area of voluntary associations, of leisure time activities, etc." (Fürstenberg 1966, p. 305). He went on to denounce "the lack of methodological skill of the persons doing research in the sociology of the parish, especially if they have mainly a theological background. People trained in high level discussion and in tracing abstract ideas quite often think that sociological methods are just a banality, e.g. that interviews are nothing more than a kind of sophisticated talk" (1966, p. 307).

For many sociologists, for instance Leo Laeyendecker¹⁵⁹ and Karel Dobbelaere, these outbursts - and particularly Luckmann's¹⁶⁰ - were important. Dobbelaere himself repeatedly advocated that sociologists of religion heed Luckmann's advice, for example in the conclusion to his 1968 trend report: "I would like to plead again for a sound theoretical and methodological foundation for the sociology of religion [...]. One of the ways of effectuating this would be to employ the classical studies of Weber and Durkheim. For this reason the recent attempts by Berger and Luckmann are welcomed" (Dobbelaere 1968, p. 355). More generally, the influence of American functionalism made itself felt and, for many sociologists of the new generation¹⁶¹, this discovery was a revelation. The American influence in France was mediated mainly by the Groupe de sociologie des religions (GSR)¹⁶², a research institute attached to the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS). Members of the GSR were very familiar with the American literature¹⁶³, and took steps to see that some of the authors of the new generation were translated into French¹⁶⁴. These writings - especially Berger and Luckmann's sociology of knowledge approach - were welcomed by some young sociologists as a "gust of fresh air"¹⁶⁵. The American influence made itself felt even among Catholic sociologists. Some of the younger Catholic researchers who had been educated in America tried to convince their coreligionists that a sound theoretical framework was a basic prerequisite for the study of religion. Thus for instance, the Franciscan Goddijn summed up the fundamental methodological presuppositions of modern sociology in an article whose very didactic style makes it clear that his aim was to convince practitioners ignorant of the most fundamental methodological rules (Goddijn 1958-59).

How was this debate reflected inside of the CISR? Since the foundation of the organization, there had been tensions between professional sociologists and amateur Catholic sociologists. In the interviews, Poulat and Dobbelaere both stressed that, in the 50s, the organization included a great many incompetent researchers. In 1962, this situation led the executive Committee to request that "steps be taken in order to totally eliminate [the incompetent]" (cited in Poulat 1990, p. 27).

Criticisms against the narrowness of religious sociology had been expressed since the very first conferences of the CISR¹⁶⁶. But they were generally only implicit, and presented in a programmatic form: Instead of condemning the present or the past orientation, authors looked to the future, and expressed wishes for improvements. The first to express these views in the very first pages of the first conference to be published was not an amateur; he was the man who stood at the origin of the development of religious sociography in Europe, Gabriel Le Bras¹⁶⁷: "Among all the objects of research, practice is the most accessible because it is the most superficial. We should like to see explorations of the soul revealing to us the regions of faith, of conscience, of religious sentiment"¹⁶⁸ (CISR 1951, p. 42). Other authors expressed the same wishes: "An aspiration toward a broadening of the scope of the investigation is being felt: what is the use of measuring practice if one does not understand the meaning which is attached to it?"¹⁶⁹ (F-A. Isambert, CISR 1958, p. 46). And harsher critiques were expressed in the debates following the presentation of the papers¹⁷⁰.

As a matter of fact, with these criticisms, religious sociology was caught between two fires. Strictures against sociography came from "sociologists" who were demanding a sounder theoretical perspective and a more scientific approach on one hand, and from "churchmen" who were calling for an explanation which stood closer to the teachings of the Bible on the other hand. The "sociologists" criticized sociography because there was "too little" science in it, whereas the churchmen criticized it because it contained "too much" science. The sociologists warned: "We must, if we want our task to be scientific, respect, in research, the rules of observation. To hasten to the results, to let oneself be carried away by apostolic enthusiasm, is to compromise the objectivity of the enquiry"¹⁷¹ (Georges Delcuve, CISR 1951, p. 376). Examples of the opposite approach¹⁷² were more common; they represented the viewpoint of the majority: "All of us who are present here refuse, for reasons related to our beliefs, but also to our scientific convictions, this 'sociology of religion' which pretended to explain the origins of religious phenomena [...]. Religious facts constitute original evidence, which cannot be reduced to other aspects of the social universe. We also contend that Christianity cannot be interpreted by sociological explanation"¹⁷³ (Jean Labbens, CISR 1958, p. 31).

Thus, although many participants to the early conferences were agreed that the discipline suffered from serious shortcomings and that a revision was necessary, they disagreed as to the direction this change should take. Psychology apparently constituted a middle ground between these opposing tendencies, and was backed by Le Bras' authority: "Statistics only yield quantities: psychology reveals us the qualitative aspect. [...] It is the task of psychology to explore these depths. I have never ceased to request its active cooperation" (CISR 1953, p. 12). The psychological approach presented the double advantage of being scientific and (apparently) less reductive than the sociological approach. It allowed an approach which was (apparently) closer to the spiritual, whereas sociology was perceived as subordinating the spiritual element to the social factors. Thus, in spite of the criticisms, the CISR was far from moving in the direction it was to take later on. The fundamental revisions were yet to come.

The subsequent evolution of the CISR: revision and revolution
A content analysis of the Acts of the CISR shows that the history of the organization can be divided into three periods. The first - which was centered on church-oriented religion - lasted from the foundation of the Conference to the first attempts at reform in 1959. The second - the reformist period, which was characterized by instability - lasted from these first attempts to the 1971 Opatija conference, in Yugoslavia, where the new generation almost completely took over. The third, "paradigmatic period" was marked by a return to stability, on a new basis, very different from that of the first period. Thus, the growing malaise which was apparent in the first period did not directly lead to the outburst of the revolution. This revolution was preceded by attempts at reform from within.

These attempts are apparent mainly in the 1959 conference. For the first time, the theme of the meeting was oriented to a theoretical issue: religion and social integration. This change was the consequence of new options deliberately chosen by the organizers of the Conference, the proceedings of which were this year for the first time published by Social Compass¹⁷⁴. But this move did not entail an abandonment of the Catholic framework. Both emphases - the "scientific" and the "theological" - are apparent in the Editor's introductory note to the new formula of Social Compass inaugurated in this same issue: "The planners of the new program envisaged in the review 'Social Compass' wish to stress the scientific aspect of their work. Does this mean a deemphasis on pastoral questions? By no means [...]. God speaks through events. A better knowledge of the events to come will help show us His will. May He bless our efforts" (CISR 1960, pp. 3-4). This orientation was shared by Jean Labbens, the president of the CISR: "FERES [International Federation of Institutions for Socio-religious and Social Research] has assured us that it will devote a large part of the study which it organizes or patronizes, to fundamental research. Thus FERES covers both the preoccupations of the Conference and the orientations decided upon during our recent meetings" (CISR 1960, p. 8).

The contents of the papers of the 1959 conference as they appeared in Social Compass in 1960 were true to the new emphasis on "science" and theory included in this new orientation: Eight of the twelve published papers clearly had a theoretical orientation¹⁷⁵. As the CISR opened up, the influence of the broader sociological tradition made itself felt at once. The functional perspective almost totally dominated the conference. In an article called "Functional analysis in the sociology of religion", Father Tufari¹⁷⁶ presented the different possible approaches from a structural-functional standpoint. His presentation was very Parsonian: he explained that religion could be analyzed as a system, in relation to its own functional prerequisites on the one hand, and as a subsystem, in relation to the role it plays for the other systems (individual, cultural and social) on the other hand. The functional perspective also informed the approach of Houtart¹⁷⁷, who analyzed the role of religion for social integration from a very general point of view, and of Goddijn¹⁷⁸, who analyzed religious minorities as a social group in their relation to the rest of society. In contrast to the usage prevalent in the CISR, the concepts used by Goddijn (for example the concept of "minority") were carefully defined and discussed.

This conference opened a new period in the life of the CISR, a period which can be called the "reformist period". This period, which lasted from 1959 to 1969, is very interesting for our purposes. It was dominated by a number of figures who had been trained in or converted to a sociological approach at variance with traditional religious sociology. And yet, these sociologists were not really part of the new generation: they remained priests loyal to the Catholic hierarchy. Thus, the new approach they proposed did not have a very powerful effect on the orientation of the CISR. The only effect it had was a destabilizing one - which explains the irregular aspect of the contents of the conferences during this period: Old themes and approaches intermingled with new ones; conferences almost exclusively centered on "church-oriented religion" (in 1962 and in 1967) alternated with conferences where this preoccupation was less present; conferences with a strong empirical content (in 1967 and in 1969) followed meetings where this preoccupation was practically absent. New approaches which were to become predominant later on made their first appearance: sociological theory and social change (in 1959), analyses making frequent use of the word "secularization" (in 1967), and discussions of the implications of religion in everyday life and in politics (in 1969).

In the third period, from 1971 onwards, we find an even balance between empirical research, church-oriented religion, social change, secularization and sociological theory in every conference. This pattern contrasts sharply with the emphasis on church-oriented religion in the first period, and with the instability of the second period. As a matter of fact, after 1971, church-oriented religion never appeared again as the general theme of a conference. Instead, the main themes revolved around three topics, all of which were very rarely found in the previous conferences: secularization and social change; religion and politics; religious symbols, values, and everyday life. The 1971 conference was also the first in which the word "secularization" was widely used - appearing in the title of several papers. This third period was inaugurated by the adoption of the new statutes of the CISR, and was the first to be held under the direction of a new team: Jacques Verscheure as Secretary General, and Sabino Acquaviva as President. And, as will be shown later on, it was marked by the arrival of a new generation of scholars.

Let us now take a more systematic look at the social, or political, aspect of this intellectual revolution. The succession of three phases with regard to the contents of the Acts is paralleled by a succession of three generations of scholars, as can be shown by an analysis of the list of authors¹⁷⁹. Among the three generations which emerge from this analysis, the most important numerically is the third. This new generation - which formed the substratum of the scholarly community - appeared in 1971, at the very moment the CISR entered into the "paradigmatic period"¹⁸⁰.

The evolution in the membership of the CISR can also be documented in a number of other ways. Thus for instance, the CISR progressively lost some of its confessional character, as is apparent from the fact that the titles accompanying the author's names (révérend, père, or an indication of the order to which the author belonged: s.j.; o.f.m.; etc.) slowly disappeared¹⁸¹. A third evolution in the same direction can be noticed with regard to the institutional ties of the authors. Authors can be classified according to the type of institution to which they belong¹⁸². I have distinguished five types of institutions, classified roughly according to their degree of proximity to the Church: 1) university departments not specialized in religion and situated in lay universities or academic institutes (ex.: Faculté de Droit de Split - Yougoslavie); 2) departments specialized in religion situated in lay academic institutions (ex.: CNRS; Groupe de Sociologie des Religions); 3) confessional universities (ex.: Université pontificale de Rome); 4) ecclesiastical research institutes (ex.: Research Institute of the Lutheran Church - Tampere - Finland); 5) Church (ex.: Centre pastoral des Missions à l'Intérieur). According to my data, overall, more than half of the articles were written by authors attached to institutions of the first type. Only 15 authors (5%) were directly attached to a Church. The Acts of the CISR are clearly divided into two periods with regard to the institutional attaches of the authors, with the 1962 conference constituting a very clear dividing line:
Proportion Proportion

of authors of authors

attached attached

to an institution to an institution

of the first type of the fourth type
3rd to 7th conference 0-29% 23-50%
9th to 19th conference 45-92% 0-13%
The two evolutions - in the institutional ties and in the themes discussed during the conferences - are not only parallel: they are causally related. Crosstabs show that authors attached to the Church (types 4 and 5) more frequently tended to write articles based directly on empirical research. These authors also more frequently wrote articles bearing on church-oriented religion¹⁸³:
Authors Authors

attached attached

to a university to the Church

(types 1-3) (types 4-5)

% of articles

bearing on

church-oriented

religion 34% 70%

These generational trends were confirmed by most of the persons I interviewed. A broad consensus supports the view expressed by Dobbelaere: "A new generation of academics could not accept the 'self'-imposed limitations of the objectives of the CISR [limited to sociography and research useful to the church] and [...] they wanted to link up again with the mainstream of sociology and the sociological traditions of Weber and Durkheim" (1989, p. 383). And virtually everybody in the CISR agrees that the fundamental changes occurred between the 1969 Rome conference and the Opatija conference two years later.

But, as convergent sources indicate, the arrival of this new generation was not always a smooth process. Most interviewed sociologists who witnessed this change do not hesitate to speak of power struggles, intrigues and personal fights¹⁸⁴. The struggle for power was between priests backed by the formally uncommitted¹⁸⁵, yet influential Catholic hierarchy, and a number of lay sociologists. Exact accounts of what happened are not easy to establish: much remains shrouded in mystery¹⁸⁶, and memories are not always very accurate. But the general trends seem to indicate that the Church loosened its informal grip first. The CISR had been indirectly supported for years by the Catholic world, through the Catholic University of Louvain when François Houtart was Secretary General, and through the Pontifical University in Rome when Emile Pin took over. But in 1969, when Pin decided to quit, the Catholic hierarchy apparently had lost some of its interest in religious sociology. At the 1969 Rome conference, the "professional sociologists" sat together, and started desperately looking for a successor, someone who would be able to provide the same logistical support¹⁸⁷. But the only candidate was Jacques Verscheure, who headed a tiny research center in southern France. So Verscheure was elected Secretary General. As it turned out, he was a very efficient Secretary, for he compensated for the lack of resources of his research center by devoting himself completely to the CISR.

This meant, however, that the CISR had become much more independent from the Catholic hierarchy¹⁸⁸. Behind Verscheure, one could no longer feel the power of the Church¹⁸⁹. In this context, the arrival of new members from the English-speaking and, more generally, northern countries¹⁹⁰, helped definitely offset the balance of power in favor of the new generation. The CISR actively sought to attract young scholars, and especially prestigious figures. Thus Luckmann, as well as Wilson - both of whom knew nothing of the CISR - were invited to give lectures¹⁹¹. Very much to his surprise, Wilson was then asked to become president at this very first conference he attended¹⁹². Obviously, this was exactly the kind of intellectual backing the CISR needed to gain a wider acceptance among professional sociologists¹⁹³.

As for Verscheure, no one seems to know to what extent he himself was converted to the new approach. What is clear, however, is that he did undertake some important moves: he sought contact with the French GSR¹⁹⁴, and considered the organization of the very important 1971 conference in Yugoslavia as "almost a geographical break [allowing the CISR] to transcend the clerical dominance of the conference, whilst nonetheless maintaining the support of the Church in a back-handed way"¹⁹⁵. Thus, the revolution came about with at least passive consent of the Catholic hierarchy. Catholic researchers may even be said to have unwittingly favored this evolution when they started engaging professional sociologists in their research centers because they felt that they needed their professional qualifications¹⁹⁶. But there is no doubt that the transition also involved a great deal of muscle-flexing. The new generation could not simply wait for the clerics who were in place to surrender control: they had to fight to get it.

One of the persons who played a central role in this battle was Dobbelaere, whose fiery temperament¹⁹⁷ contributed to the polarization of the debate between the "theological" and the "scientific" approaches. Interviews showed that, whenever the CISR found itself at an important turning point, he was present and active. Even today, he does not miss one opportunity to speak out, from the presidential seat or from the floor, against attempts to come back to a "non-scientific" sociology of religion¹⁹⁸. Indeed, if we follow Dobbelaere's explanations, it appears that the new generation took control by a kind of legal coup d'état. In effect, Dobbelaere stresses the importance of the "preparatory committee", an organism designed to plan each new conference. Provision for this committee had been included in the 1968 statutes, but it was only in 1974 that Bryan Wilson, who was at that time president, called it to meet¹⁹⁹: "Since then, all CISR conferences have been prepared by professional sociologists [...]. The impact of the following professors on the association was consequently very great: Wilson, Martin, Luckmann, Séguy, Rémy, Isambert, Gannon, Acquaviva, Guizzardi, Laeyendecker and Dobbelaere. Especially the first three, through their presence and writings, helped a younger generation of sociologists of religion to change the content and the image of the association" (Dobbelaere 1989, p. 384)²⁰⁰.

Thus, the paradigm change was made possible by a change of personnel. The revolution was not only intellectual, it was also political. The Kuhnian model is thus confirmed (see chap. 1). And the fact the the very persons who were most active in the political struggle - most notably the four presidents in the paradigmatic period: Wilson, Martin, Dobbelaere, and even Acquaviva - were also the ones who most explicitly vindicated the secularization paradigm can certainly not be attributed to mere chance.

"Secularization" in the Acts of the CISR
Let us now again turn to secularization itself, and analyze how this theme was discussed during this revolutionary period. From the very beginning of the CISR, there have been discussions about secularization, atheism, unbelief, and dechristianization²⁰¹. Articles discussing secularization in this early period fall into three categories. First, we find attempts to explain the causes of dechristianization without breaking with the assumptions of religious sociology. Second, we find articles in which many elements of the later secularization theories were already present, without being presented in a systematic manner, and without the emphasis on the word "secularization" itself. Finally, in one article, the problems of secularization were considered from a coherent and comprehensive theoretical point of view - although this point of view was very peculiar, and differed widely from the paradigm which emerged later on.

Let us first consider a few of the papers seeking to explain "dechristianization" from the point of view of religious sociology. In this framework, the problem of dechristianization was considered mainly under a moral and pastoral angle. The explanations given to dechristianization were sometimes tautological, and never reached beyond the boundaries of religious sociology. The authors of these articles were apparently unable to transcend the limits set by their theological training and by their practice as churchmen.

In a paper presented at the 1959 conference, Birou explicitly starts from a moral point of view: "We shall attempt to judge certain tendencies and certain excesses which mark society today from the point of view of a Christian moralist" (CISR 1960, p. 228). He then goes on to explain the causes of the irreligion of modern times. The main source of irreligion, he explains, is to be seen in the use of technique; technical development as such is a neutral factor, which does not have any immediate moral consequences. But the way we use this technique does have moral consequences. Because we have glorified technique, it has become an end in itself, and has resulted in an alienation of man: "What we have here is a magical mentality in front of technical power, which thus becomes a new pagan religion, a powerful materialistic principle of collective integration and of personal disintegration, which, as we will see, is the fundamental cause of modern irreligion" (CISR 1960, p. 230).

For a sociologist, Birou's explanation is tautological. If technique as such is not a cause, the cause must be sought in a human attitude to it. But no explanation of this attitude, other than moral²⁰², is given by the author, who explicitly refuses the sociological explanation: "The frequently repeated enumeration of the causes of dechristianization is often nothing but a list of epiphenomena: loss of the sense of the family, leisure forms, working conditions, migratory movements, and so forth. What we wanted to show is that there is, more profoundly, a global phenomenon which has an impact on all dimensions of existence and which provokes a religious disintegration. [...] Urbanization itself and industrialization in their present forms are merely consequences of this global phenomenon. This phenomenon could be characterized by the fact that man has become his own end in a rational and scientific control of his whole destiny" (CISR 1960, pp. 233-34). In short, Birou takes the very evil he wants to explain²⁰³ as a causal factor for the explanation. This result is probably unavoidable as long as the situation to be explained and the explanation are both defined in moral terms.

The paper presented at the same conference by Abbé Laloux falls prey to deficiencies of the same order. Laloux explains religious change - one of whose modalities is dechristianization - by a growing inadequacy between the "subject" (i.e., man) and the "object" (i.e., the Church): "Adequacy as it was realized in the times of unanimous practice has deteriorated because of a rapid evolution of the subject in front of which the object remained immobile or has taken a radically opposed position of reaction" (CISR 1960, p. 58). Although his aim is to explain the "why" as well as the "how" of religious change and dechristianization, Laloux explains no more than the "how". The "evolution of the subject" is explained by the "facing" (affrontement) of a new reality ("réalité nouvelle", CISR 1960, p. 53), and by "social change" (CISR 1960, p. 59), but the author does not explain what this new reality is nor analyze this social change. Furthermore, his analysis, by restricting itself to the interaction between the Church and the believer²⁰⁴, remains inside the boundaries of the sociology of church-oriented religion.

In contrast to these narrow explanations, some papers presented arguments which went much further, and which displayed the influence of modern sociological theory. At the same conference, an article by Jacques Maître²⁰⁵ contains many elements of the future paradigm: "In a certain period, when it was at the apex of its influence, Catholicism fulfilled almost all the functions in society. [...] The practical functions have been largely secularized through the invasion of technique [...]. Likewise, the political functions are secularized by the progressive tendency toward the neutralization of the state [...]. The fight for well-being itself is carried out in completely secularized forms [...]. The functions [which were fulfilled by Catholicism] have been progressively torn away [...] through social change" (CISR 1960, pp. 113-116). But these elements - which are to play a central role in the later theories - are presented by the author as unproblematic. They do not play an important role in his theory about religion and social change, but are used as the most obvious and simple way of describing a seemingly well-known phenomenon.

Emile Pin²⁰⁶ was the author of two papers presenting secularization theories, at the 1959 and 1965 Conferences. However, in these two articles, Pin makes no use of the word secularization. The first paper is based on two elements: autonomization* and the transformation leading from community to society²⁰⁷. Dechristianization is presented as a consequence of the "demicrostructuration" of society - the disappearance of small communal groups to the profit of a network of specialized groups. Dechristianization results in a loss of the power which the Church wielded through these groups: "The Church used to embrace the individual in a tight mesh of groups, and most notably of small groups, which all tied him to the global religious society. [Society put] to the service of the Church a microstructure of organizations, small groups, small societies, first of all the family. [...] Beyond the family, the Christian reference is warranted by many other associative and communitary levels: the school (founded and overseen by the curé), the brotherhoods, the workshops, the neighborhoods which exercise an informal but efficient control. The curé had to control but a limited number of individuals to ensure that all individuals are controlled through them" (CISR 1965, pp. 125-26).

In his other paper presented in 1965, Pin develops a typology of religious motivation which allows him to explain the transformations of religion in the transition from a pre-industrial to an industrial society. These transformations are brought about by a change in some of the motivational bases traditionally underpinning religion: "In the transition to an industrial and technical society, some of the motivations which underlay religious activities in the pre-technical and traditional society tend to crumble" (CISR 1966, p. 34). It would be wrong, however, to speak of an automatic decline of religion in modern society. For in this society, certain new motivations can prove efficient in sustaining religious life: "It is not impossible that, after a more or less long technical experience, [...] new motives for seeking the help of the numinous should appear. Most notably the need to find a meaning to an existence whose creative effort is suddenly terminated by death, and the need to give to society a new equilibrium and an integration that the administrative and political techniques alone will not allow" (CISR 1966, p. 24). This theory reminds unmistakably some of the features of Berger's and Luckmann's theories: it describes something which is akin to the "loss of plausibility" described by these authors. Moreover, the remarkably moderate judgement on the fate of religion brings it close to some of the more subtle secularization theories (in particular those of Luckmann and Fenn): "In conclusion: the transition from a pre-industrial society to an industrial society on the part of a particular social class, region or nation, will be accompanied by the retention or even the renewal of religious activity, or, on the contrary, by its disappearance, largely as a result of the type of motivation which the religious society had produced in its members before the epoch of change. That which worked efficiently yesterday can be a cause of the failures and losses of tomorrow" (CISR 1966, p. 26).

Finally²⁰⁸, in an article presented in 1967, Jean Rémy²⁰⁹ develops a secularization theory which is very close to the "privatization" theory offered by Luckmann, which the author does not seem to know: "Religion having lost a number of functions would no longer be a decisive element to explain the development and the organization of society. [...] This new insertion of the religion institution, which undermines its position of power, does not preclude that the religious product can be valorized very strongly on the level of the personality system [...]. Our hypothesis is opposed to the thesis frequently to be found among the first sociologists of religion, who consider it as a cultural residue" (CISR 1967, pp. 437-39).

Thus, the problems related to secularization received an increasing amount of attention. However, in all these discussions, there was no awareness that the concept of secularization might be important. "Secularization theory" itself was not an important theme. Authors talked about secularization, not about the way secularization ought to be talked about. The only exception to this pattern is found in 1959, when Sabino Acquaviva delineated the main features of the desacralization theory he was to develop later in his famous book, L'ecclisi del sacro nella civiltà industriale (1961). What is interesting to note as far as Acquaviva's analysis is concerned is not so much the theory in itself as the new attitude toward the problem of secularization it implied. This paper was the first to pose the problems of the dynamics of secularization in all their implications. For the first time, secularization appeared as a difficult problem which needed an ad hoc theoretical explanation: "All this points out the importance of the study of the essential differences between the pre-technological world and the technological world for the right understanding of the dynamics of religious life. Such a study has been repeatedly made by eminent scholars. But they have failed to arrive at that unified sociological theory which should be the basis of further progress in this enquiry. In our opinion, such a theory becomes a practical possibility only if elaborated within the framework of the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of behavior. It is only through these more elaborate instruments that the broad causes can be grasped in such a way as to bring out the logical place of neo-paganism in the recent history of mankind" (CISR 1960, p. 214).

To summarize: the relation between the secularization debate and the deconfessionalization of the CISR is clear. Although criticisms against sociography developed early, it was only in 1971 that the era of religious sociology came to an end. The new era which began then coincided with the arrival in the CISR of a new generation of sociologists coming from the universities. This new generation brought with it the modern sociological view of religion which had developed earlier, mainly in the U.S.A., but it also brought something which is of particular interest for us: the secularization paradigm. However, the theoretical discussion did not really take place within the CISR: The new development took place outside of it, and was presented to the public directly in book form. Secularization theory itself was not used as a weapon inside of the CISR. this seems to point to the subordinate role of the intrinsically scientific logic, and to the preponderance of the political factors.