A history of the secularization issue

Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 61 (1), 1986.

316 To give a list which is far from being exhaustive: see the titles of contributions by Elio Roggero (1979) and Jan Swyngedown (in the Journal of Oriental Studies 26 (1), 1987), the introductory text to the CISR conference on secularization (CISR 1987, p. 7), and Robertson 1971, p. 297.

317 Greeley is an enormously prolific writer: as long as fifteen years ago, he had already published "forty books and over one hundred articles in sixteen years" (McNamara 1974, p. 79). In 1972 alone, the year in which Unsecular Man appeared, he published seven books. Greeley's most recent rebuttal of secularization theory of which I am aware was published in 1989 under the title Religious Change in America (see the review by Daniel V.A. Olson in AJS 95 (4), pp. 1099-101).

318 Even though Greeley was already speaking out against secularization theory before 1965, the appearance of Cox's book seems to have dramatically bolstered his motivations.

319 As a matter of fact, Greeley often resorts to the strategy he used in criticizing Cox's book: he gives such a caricatural picture of his opponent (see for instance his caricatural characterization of the "theory of organic evolution" in his rebuttal of it: "There was absolutely nothing in the social structure of England that generated the Norman invasion" [Greeley 1972, p. 25]) that the work of demolition becomes very easy indeed.

320 That "Americanized version of Bishop Robinson's marriage of Bonhoeffer and Tillich" (Greeley, in Callahan 1966, p. 101; see also p. 125).

321 Witness for example the following menace: "Theologians like Mr. Cox and Mr. Callahan had better beware; if sociology becomes a locus theologicus, [theologians will have to argue] with obstreperous sociologists who will want to question the sociological assumptions that theologians will be making" (Greeley, in Callahan 1966, p. 101).

322 Besides theories put forward by historians of religion like Eliade, the main evidence of the persistence of religious sentiment presented by Greeley are statistics. These figures, however, concern almost exclusively America (1972, pp. 8-13).

323 The only secularization theorists working in the modern paradigm Greeley directly attacks is Peter Berger. The quotation used, however, comes from one of Berger's theological writings, and concerns a rather peripheral classic statement: unbelief* (1972, p. 5).

324 Referring to these same five items, Martin Marty (who is not unsympathetic to Greeley's claims) remarks: "Does not his comment on religious continuity die the death of a thousand qualifications because of the depth of the trauma occasioned by these five changes in the modern times alone?" (Marty 1974, p. 89).

325 However, Greeley's view of privatization is not negative. He argues that "the need to decide about religion makes religion a more central and explicit question than it has ever been before" (1972, p. 15). This is probably true in a sense, but only, it seems, at the individual level.

326 But whereas Dobbelaere's intention, in writing the report, had been to clarify the concept in order to make it more operational, Hadden draws from the report the opposite conclusion without clearly indicating that Dobbelaere's own conclusion was different: "Dobbelaere's analysis is extremely useful. More clearly than anyone else, he has illuminated the sad fact that in the exercise of sociological inquiry, 'secularization means whatever I say it means' [these quotation marks are especially disturbing: they seem to suggest that this was Dobbeleaere's own conclusion!]" (Hadden 1987, p. 595).

327 The two readers recently published by Hadden together with Anson Shupe center on this hotly debated issue (Hadden and Shupe 1986; 1988).

328 This aim is put forward quite explicitly by Hadden and Shupe: "Shortly after we began working together on the project, Hadden was elected president of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion. Shupe agreed to be Program Chair for the 1985 Annual Meetings of the society. By identifying 'Religion and the Political Order' as our Program Theme, we hoped we could entice some of our colleagues to pick up our quest" (Hadden and Shupe 1986, p. xv).

329 For an overview on new religious movements, see Robbins 1988.

330 "Modern writers [with whom the authors apparently agree on this point] use the term secularization to mean the erosion of belief in the supernatural" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, p. 429). At another place, to show that secularization theory is wrong, they say: "Surely it is to deprive the concept of secularization of coherent meaning if we describe persons deeply engrossed in supernatural beliefs and worships as secular" (1985, p. 437).

331 "Secularization is the process in which religious thinking, practices, and institutions lose their social significance" (Wilson 1975, p. 79). [...] "Religion simply does not matter socially, however much his own religion may matter to the individual" (1975, p. 80).

332 "If we concede the abundance of the sects and cults, does this create any embarrassment for those who support the secularization thesis? I hardly think so. These movements thrive precisely because the culture is secularized: in a religionless society they could scarcely arise, or, if arising, survive. They are themselves a religious response to the secularization of society, but they are essentially a marginal phenomenon" (Wilson 1975, pp. 81-82).

333 The intrinsic logic of their text suggests that this latter possibility is the correct one.

334 This is Wilson's thesis, which Stark and Bainbridge also accept: "We acknowledge that secularization is a major trend in modern times, but argue that this is not a modern development. [...] the dominant religious organizations in any society are always becoming progressively more worldly" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, pp. 1 and 2). The restrictions brought to this thesis by Stark and Bainbridge need not concern us here, as they still acknowledge secularization in modern society. In fact, they even implicitly recognize that this last wave of secularization is qualitatively different from the previous ones, as they comment at length on the consequences of the rise of science, and conclude that as a result of this rise, religions no longer include magic in their offering (1985, pp. 432-433).

335 Stark and Bainbridge forcefully demonstrate this in their study, but Wilson never denied it. However, Stark and Bainbridge and Wilson differ as to the reasons of this continuing importance. For them, religion continues to be important because it provides "general compensators based on supernatural assumptions" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, p. 8), whereas for Wilson, religion can be important to individuals because it can provide a communal form of life: "Religion in the past solemnized men's social relationships and their community life. [...] Today, if these functions are to be fulfilled, that fulfillment must come from religious organizations, and perhaps only new religious movements can provide it" (Wilson 1982, pp. 133-34 and 135).

336 This (the idea that cults are unable to fill the gap) is again Wilson's position, which is also accepted by Stark and Bainbridge: "We are not suggesting that cult movements are currently filling the gap left by the weaknesses of conventional religion" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, p. 454).

337 "Hundreds of cult movements have arisen there, as our theory predicts. When one of them will achieve real success, we cannot say" (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, p. 455).

338 "Religion in secular society will remain peripheral, relatively weak, providing comfort for men in the interstices of a soulless social system of which men are the half-willing, half-restless prisoners" (Wilson 1976b, p. 276).

339 Stark and Bainbridge, at any rate, deny it.

340 For a critique of the reward/compensator dichotomy, see Wallis 1984, pp. 62-64.

341 Definition 34: Differentiation refers to cultural specialization at the level of groups rather than at the level of individuals.

342 Unfortunately this paper, which would constitute an interesting challenge for the paradigm if its findings could be replicated (more because of its implications with regard to pluralism than because of its implication for religious involvement, which is not a central element of the paradigm), has drawn sharp criticism on both methodological and empirical grounds (see Breault 1989 and the subsequent debate between Stark/Finke and Breault in the pages immediately following the article).

343 There is one exception to this pattern. In keeping with their theoretical framework, Stark and Bainbridge argue that Nazism can be considered to have been a political sect (1987, pp. 306-307). According to them, this proves that sects can be very powerful at the macro-social level. To me, it only suggests that their theory ought to be revised.

344 Roy Wallis, who is one of Wilson's most devoted followers, has done so (Wallis 1984), but he is not one of the "official" carriers of the paradigm.

345 On the notion of ostension, see chapter 1, and Barnes 1982, pp. 22-27.

346 This notion is largely based on her former studies of rural communities.

347 On the congruence between Fenn and Luhmann, see Tschannen 1989.

348 Luhmann distinguishes different types of social systems: interaction systems, which form spontaneously when two persons meet, organizations, which are much more institutionalized, and societies (Gesellschaftsysteme, as distinguished from Soziale Systeme).

349 For a more detailed analysis of this question, see Tschannen 1989.

350 For a presentation of the notion of self-reference as applied to religion, see Luhmann 1985.

351 Luhmann expands Husserl's notion by incorporating in it not only alter's experiences, but all the other situations where choices which were left out remain in the system's consciousness as refused potentialities (Luhmann 1977, p. 22, n. 28).

352 Here, I am borrowing Dobbelaere's translation (1984, p. 211).

353 On the other hand, another consequence of secularization is that the churches increasingly turn to social preoccupations - thus reverting from primary to secondary function (1977, p. 264).

Olivier Tschannen, Université de Fribourg / Suisse

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