A history of the secularization issue

CHAPTER 13

THE SECULARIZATION "DEBATE"
As can be expected, the formulation of the CISR paradigm did not bring the discussion around the notion of secularization to an end. As a matter of fact, even though secularization as a subject-matter is no longer as popular as it was in the late 60s and in the 70s, the secularization question is still vigorously discussed today. These discussions are sometimes referred to as the "secularization debate". However, as we will see presently, this characterization is inadequate.There has never really been a debate around secularization. Of course, this is not to dey that this question has produced a lot of heat: In the last two decades, literally hundreds of papers and books related to secularization have been published by scholars not directly related to the CISR scholarly community. I will not even attempt to be exhaustive in discussing this literature, but will concentrate on the most famous of these pieces of writing. In doing this, my assumption is not that the most famous papers are the best (indeed, as I will show, some of them are rather poor). The reason for this choice is that I am trying to consistently follow the principles of my historical analysis. The CISR paradigm has been defined by an analysis of the opinion of the members of the profession themselves; the sociologists who are considered to be its opponents must be defined in the same fashion. I have therefore concentrated on certain writings which I was attracted to because I often encountered references to them in my study of the literature.

In 1969, the first international Conference on Unbelief held in Rome (Caporale and Grumelli 1971) had been dominated by a positive assessment of "secularization theory". The second conference, held in Vienna in 1975, signaled a change in mood: The impression that prevailed this time was that secularization theory was in serious need of revision (Caporale 1976, pp. 11-16). Thus, the CISR paradigm was challenged even before it was to be fully established by the publication of Dobbelaere's 1981 trend report. Before turning to the works of Greeley, Hadden, Stark and Bainbridge, Luhmann, and Bell, which constitute the most famous of these challenges against secularization theory, I would like to review a few more obscure works. Starting with the approaches most sympathetic to the notion of secularization, we will progressively move our way out to those that are more hostile.

Inside, Outside, and Beyond the Paradigm: A Brief Overview
The works which can most legitimately be viewed as situated inside the paradigm itself are those which explicitly or implicitly take the CISR paradigm as a basis for normal research. Thus for example, in 1974, Alois Hahn expanded the reach of the paradigm by incorporating into it a more detailed analysis of certain of its aspects, most notably a discussion of the problems of personal identity and meaning-construction posed by secularization (Hahn 1974). In 1975, Jean Delumeau demonstrated, in a brilliant historical analysis³¹², that the thesis of a continuous decline of Christianity starting in the middle ages was an optical illusion: In reality, the period extending from the XVI^th to the XVIII^th centuries was much more Christian in character than the previous period, which was rather pagan (Delumeau 1975). In 1976, François-André Isambert stressed that secularization was not only an effect of the impact of modern society on religion, but must also be considered at least partially the result of an internal transformation of religion (sécularisation interne³¹³) based on a mythical view of primitive religion (Isambert 1976).

But perhaps the best example of a research implicitly carried out inside the framework of the paradigm is an empirical mopping-up operation carried out by Robert Wuthnow. The different steps of Wuthnow's analysis exactly correspond to Kuhn's account of such an operation. First, through an analysis of empirical findings, Wuthnow uncovers a (well-known) "anomaly": contrary to the predictions of linear secularization theory, religious decline has not been continuous, but discontinuous. To account for this anomaly, Wuthnow proposed an ad hoc explanation, based on Mannheim's notion of "generation units". A generation unit is more than an age cohort, in that it is "bound together by a common structural location, a common cultural system, self-consciousness as a social unit, and social interaction and solidarity among its members" (Wuthnow 1976, p. 851). Thus, as Wuthnow's detailed empirical analysis suggested, the religious "decline" of the 60s (as opposed to the "revival" of the 50s) could be understood as an effect of the counterculture of the generation unit of the young in late 60s. Having established this empirical explanation, Wuthnow went on to suggest the corresponding modification in secularization theory: "Discontinuities in the secularization process need to be acknowledged as the rule, not the exception, in religious change. Theories of secularization cannot rest content in focusing on only the more continuous effects of modernization or gradual evolutionary processes within religious institutions" (1976, p. 863). Finally, this corrective to secularization theory having been put into place, Wuthnow concluded that the anomaly had been accounted for (to use a terminology Wuthnow himself did not use: the anomaly had been eliminated as a threat to the paradigm, and normal research could continue): "Fluctuations in religious trends need not be discounted as embarrassing departures from sociological principles, but can be brought within the realm of systematic sociological observation" (1976, p. 862). But this successful mopping-up operation was not quite complete yet. As any good such operation, it required and encouraged further refinement, as is evident from the literature subsequently devoted to a reanalysis of Wuthnow's paper (see for example Rigney et al. 1978). Indeed, normal research in this domain is still going on.

But the attitudes of sociologists of religion discussing secularization are not always as positive toward the paradigm. Most other people explicitly referring to the CISR paradigm are much more critical of it. Many of these attempts boil down to not-so-well informed and largely ritual denunciations of the "mythological" aspect of secularization theory (see for example Ferrarotti 1984). Others are better informed. Thus for example, Enrica Rosanna concludes a book-long study of secularization theory by arguing that sociologists have underestimated the resilience of historical religions (that is: religions which contain in them an extra-human force, as opposed to a conception of religion as a purely cultural product), and that we must consider the modifications religions have gone through not only in negative terms, but as dynamic contributions of religion to society (Rosanna 1973). Therefore, she argues, we should not speak about the secularization of religion, but about its "transfunctionalization" (trasfunzionalizzazione). Another well-informed, and much more sociologically inspired attempt, has been made by Peter Glasner. In a dissertation written at the London School of Economics under the direction of David Martin, Glasner attempts to show that "no scientific theory of the secularization process has been developed" (Glasner 1977, p. vii), and that secularization theory is based on "generalizations from limited empirical findings used by sociologists to bolster an implicit ideology of progress" (1977, p. 64). The problem with Glasner's approach is that he arbitrarily reduces all the theories to one of their dimensions. Thus for example Wilson's theory is categorized as a theory of "decline" - but this categorization rests only on the statistical aspect of Wilson's work, which we know to be of only secondary significance. On the other hand, Wilson is excluded from the "differentiation" category, where we find only Parsons and Bellah. Briefly, Glasner's classification of the theories - which constitutes his basis for the claim that no theory has been formulated - is the result of an attempt to impose on secularization theory an external and preconceived frame of reference. By being too intent to uncovering what is "implicit" in the theories, Glasner engages in a rather doubtful whiggish reconstruction reflecting mainly his own interests, and not much of the authors' original intentions.

Two other contributions to secularization theory which must briefly be mentioned are those by Sabino Acquaviva (1961) and by Alasdair MacIntyre (1967). Both these theories were put forward before the formulation of the paradigm: Acquaviva's book, which was revised and expanded several times, was first published in 1961, and the lectures on which MacIntyre's book is based were delivered in 1964. Acquaviva's starting point is psychological. Religion is bound to decline is modern society because technical society is not compatible with the psychological underpinnings that sustain religion. Desacralization (Acquaviva's equivalent for secularization) is an individual phenomenon first, and a social phenomenon only derivatively. The history of desacralization is the history of a global change in human psychology. This theory, one of the most radical secularization theories, has never been taken very seriously by sociologists outside of Italy³¹⁴. As for MacIntyre's theory, it proposes only a fragmented view of secularization, presented as a result of the breakdown of community life and of the emergence of differentiated classes in the wake of the industrial revolution and of urbanization. MacIntyre's central point is that industrialization did not directly cause secularization, but rather that industrialization caused a moral decline, which in turn resulted in secularization. As a result, it is useless to attempt to restore morality by restoring the power of religion. MacIntyre's approach has never been considered very seriously either by sociologists. The reason for the relative unsuccess of these two approaches must probably be sought in the quasi-simultaneous emergence of the much more complete and sociologically compelling works of Luckmann, Berger, and Wilson and their subsequent crystallization in the CISR paradigm.

At this point in the analysis of the post-paradigmatic work, and before turning to a more detailed analysis of more famous writings, I would like to stress that these (and some of the following) somewhat skeptical comments on the research performed outside the CISR paradigm do not imply that the paradigm is flawless, nor even very satisfactory. They only imply that the paradigm remains the most satisfying tool to date for an understanding of the historical evolution of religion in the western world. Obviously, sooner or later, the paradigm will be superseded. But at present, approaches which really allow sociology to move in that direction are very rare. Ironically, the most interesting attempt yet to my knowledge to move beyond the paradigm is provided by one of the carriers of the paradigm himself: Richard Fenn. As I have already extensively discussed Fenn's work, I will not engage in a detailed presentation of his latest research. Some of the original dimensions of his approach were already evident in his refusal to define religion, and in his very open-ended reconstruction of the secularization process. Since these early writings, he has moved on to explorations of the conflict of religious and secular languages which break new ground (Fenn 1982; 1986; 1987). Fenn is the first sociologist of religion I am aware of who, by shifting his empirical field from surveys and church statistics to the secular courts, and his theoretical references from standard sociology to speech-act theory, anarchist thought, and psychoanalysis, succeeds in escaping from the narrow boundaries of functionalist sociology.
A Skinnerian Approach to Theoretical Misunderstandings
Let us now turn to a more detailed analysis of a few rather prominent sociologists who very explicitly proposed alternative accounts of the secularization process. As we will see, some of them are very critical of "secularization theory". But their criticisms almost all miss their target, simply because the "alternative" view they propose is no alternative at all: it is the very same view under a superficial terminological disguise. The rest of this chapter will therefore be devoted mainly to the study of what could be viewed as a big misunderstanding. Quite naturally, one is led to wonder how such a misunderstanding was possible in the first place. How can people arguing against each other fail to notice that they in fact agree?

As a matter of fact, the way I just put this question is rather misleading. In reality, it is not so much the participants in the debate who are mistaken - although some of them seem to be - as the observers of the debate. Noticing that one party puts forward something called "secularization theory", while another party attacks something called "secularization theory", the observer is almost bound to draw the conclusion that there is a "secularization debate". This impression is compounded by the fact that the pronouncements around secularization are often referred to as a "debate". This formula is used by virtually everyone: by leading secularization theorists as well as by casual observers. Witness for example the title of one of Wilson's papers: "The Debate Over 'Secularization': Religion, Society, and Faith" (Wilson 1975). Or the following assertion by an external observer, Keiichi Yanagawa: "In the latter part of the sixties and all through the seventies, there were various positions and extremely lively debates concerning 'secularization' in the sociology of religion" (Yanagawa 1987, p. 1). Or, again, the following title of a paper by Yves Lambert: "Un paradigme inspiré de Weber: pour contribuer à renouveler le débat sur la sécularisation"³¹⁵. Numerous other examples could be presented³¹⁶. But even when the word "debate" is not actually used, the verbal behavior of some sociologists strongly suggests that such a debate is going on. Jeffrey Hadden proposes to "desacralize" secularization theory (see below), a project to which Frank Lechner answers by offering a "rebuttal" of the "case against secularization" (Lechner 1990). Wilson asserts that "over the last twenty years, [...] secularization has been the single most prominent issue engaging the minds of those who participated [in the CISR conferences]" (Wilson 1987b, p. 5). And Luckmann asserts that "religion is not disappearing from modern society and [...] is anything but shrinking. What did shrink is the span of transcendence with which modern religions are primarily concerned. This assertion is not in accord with the widely accepted notion that modern societies are 'secularized' and that secularism is an essential part of modern life" (Luckmann 1990, pp. 127-28).

However, as we will see, on closer inspection, it turns out that the "opponents" are in fact not speaking of the same thing. Even in the rare cases where they nominally attack each other, they are in reality not attacking the other's position, but merely trying to make a point they consider very important. Thus, I will be arguing that the "secularization debate" is mostly an optical illusion. There has never been such a debate. All there has been is different groups of people interested in different issues, and all trying to make their point by using the very convenient term "secularization".

The most important point which must be established in order to avoid the pitfall of considering secularization a "debate" is: What was each group interested in when they used the term secularization? To use a Skinnerian terminology, what were the different groups doing in using the term secularization? As for the people explicitly working in the framework of the paradigm - Berger, Wilson, Martin, Fenn, and Dobbelaere - the answer is quite clear: they were trying to give a theoretical account of the transformations of religion over a long historical period, thus establishing a foundation for the claim that modern society was essentially secular, and must be understood in secular, and not in religious terms. By doing this, they established the foundation for a sociology of religion radically separated from theological concerns, resting on the insights of the "founding fathers", and incorporated in modern academic sociology. As we will see, people who challenge secularization theory are all motivated by very different interests.

Homo Religiosus: Andrew Greeley
There have been several attempts to criticize secularization theory by putting forward the idea that man's nature is essentially religious. We have already mentioned several of these approaches, for example Eliade's and Luckmann's. But these criticisms were expressed before the emergence of the CISR paradigm - in fact, Luckmann's criticism was itself one of its foundations. In this section, I will concentrate on one writer I take to be typical of this approach, and who was the first to directly challenge the CISR paradigm: Andrew Greeley, a Catholic priest turned sociologist (as well as a very successful writer of popular novels!).

The core of his argument was developed in a book published in 1972 under the title Unsecular Man: The Persistance of Religion. Greeley has, to this day, remained a staunch opponent to secularization theory, and does not miss one opportunity to denounce it³¹⁷. Indeed, according to Martin Marty, the critique of secularization theory is "the most consistent motif" through Greeley's career (Marty 1974, p. 87).

A number of the criticisms levelled against theories close to Greeley's have focused on the problem of the definition of religion. If religion is defined in very broad terms as being part of human nature, it is argued, then of course any evaluation of religious changes is bound to fail. This is not the line of argument I am going to follow. It seems to me that religion can be defined in a number of different ways, all of which can be legitimate as long as they are not reified. What I am going to argue, instead, is that Greeley's argument to the effect that religion is a part of human nature does not run counter the CISR paradigm.

As noted above, in order to understand what a theorist is saying, we must understand his intentions. In other words, we must determine what this particular writer was interested in. The main animus of Greeley's reaction against the secularization thesis seems to be secular theology, most notably as represented by Harvey Cox³¹⁸, whom Martin Marty calls Greeley's bête noire (Marty 1974, p. 88). Indeed, Greeley reacted very rapidly and vehemently to the Secular City. His hasty comments, included in The Secular City Debate (Callahan 1966), hinge on the notion that Cox's thesis rests on a misreading of the sociological literature. Greeley argues that Cox has taken at face value the theory of mass society, a "pop" version of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft thesis: "secular man is a theologian's romanticized version of mass man - and he doesn't exist either" (Greeley, in Callahan 1966, p. 101). It is hard to get by the impression that this charge itself rests on a very superficial reading of Cox's book³¹⁹ - as Cox himself easily demonstrates in his reply (Cox, in Callahan 1966, pp. 113-120).

In reality, polemics put aside, it seems that what Greeley dislikes most in Cox's book is his theology³²⁰, and that he uses sociological arguments only to try to corner him³²¹. As a matter of fact, when faced with a different audience, Greeley changes his appreciation of Cox. The very same year these comments were published, in his presidential address before the ACSS, he tried to convince his fellow-religionists that the Catholic Church must fight the traditionalists and adapt its practice in order to fulfill the need of modern man to find again the "warmth and fellowship of a tribal society" (Greeley 1966, p. 126). To bolster his argument, he did not hesitate to use Cox, and his secularization theory: "The Catholic Church is becoming secularized, secularized not in the sense of secularism as it was condemned repeatedly by the American bishops but rather secularized in Harvey Cox's sense of the word" (1966, p. 119). In other words, what Greeley was fighting in Cox's views was not so much his description of secularization (which he apparently deemed applicable at least to the Catholic Church) as the positive evaluation which accompanied it. Thus, the prime animus of Greeley's intervention in the "secularization debate" was not really sociological, but related to a problem of Church policy: By showing that modern man still needed the warmth of the religious congregation, he was fighting theological liberalism as well as conservativism.

Turning to more directly sociological concerns, how can we assess Greeley's intervention as far as the challenge to the CISR paradigm is concerned? In Unsecular Man (1972), Greeley starts from the assumption that "the basic human religious needs and the basic religious functions have not changed very notably since the late Ice Age" (Greeley 1972, p. 1). This, he asserts, has repeatedly been ignored by the proponents of secularization theory, who are unable to grasp the significance of religion in the daily lives of ordinary people³²² because they spend their lives on university campuses - the only place, perhaps, where "secular man" can be found (1972, p. 3).

So far, Greeley's argument does not seriously challenge secularization theory: it remains on the level of individual religiosity. But what about the social level? Greeley reports that, in a private conversation, Peter Berger³²³ remarked: "But something must have changed!" (Berger, quoted in Greeley 1972, p. 14). Certainly, Greeley admits, something has changed. But what exactly? The five items listed by Greeley in answer to that question correspond fairly accurately to three of the main exemplars of the CISR paradigm³²⁴: 1) autonomization* ("Religion has no direct influence over the large corporate structures which have emerged in the last four hundred years"); 2) rationalization* ("A considerable number of phenomena which once received a directly religious interpretation now can be explained by rational science" and "Man's development of his capacities for abstract thought and expression means that myths are no longer self-sufficient and must be interpreted" [see also p. 50]); 3) and privatization*³²⁵ ("Religion is a more explicit and individual matter now than it has ever been in the past" and "Religious commitment is, at least to some extent, a matter of free choice" [see also p. 52]).

It thus seems that there is little difference, if any, and certainly no incompatibility, between Greeley's macro-structural view on religion and the secularization paradigm. One difference, however, must be acknowledged. Greeley argues that Gesellschaft has not totally replaced Gemeinschaft: the latter continues to survive in the midst of the big city. This is not a very original position. The originality lies in the further development he gives to this thought: the number of relationships a given individual can have is not strictly limited. The fact that he has more Gesellschaft-type relations does not necessarily imply that he has fewer Gemeinschaft-type relations: "A vast network of gesellschaft relationships has become a superstructure based on an infrastructure of persisting gemeinschaft relationships. [...] The large corporate structures which constitute the gesellschaft technological society represent additions to the pool of human relationships and not substitutions for the old relationships" (1972, p. 31).

This is an original view, which is not to be found in the writings of any carrier of the CISR paradigm. Furthermore, it is an interesting hypothesis, which merits careful consideration. But what are its implications as far as the secularization paradigm is concerned? All secularization theorists recognize that community and the need for it have not entirely disappeared. As we know, the "longing for community" is very central for instance in Wilson's theory. What is asserted in the CISR paradigm is that the societal, technological sphere of social life is more powerful than the community sphere - hence the demise of religion, associated with community. The divergence thus boils down to a question of emphasis. The secularization paradigm emphasizes the losses suffered by religion (in trivial terms: the glass is half empty), while Greeley emphasizes all it has left (the glass is half full). Now, such differences of emphasis are the stock in trade of the researcher working in the framework of normal science. The evaluation of such divergences is precisely what "mopping-up operations" consist of; it hardly signals a paradigm shift, let alone an intellectual revolution.

The final assessment of Greeley's approach must take into account the fact that the very concerns which it addresses (the possibilities of religious affirmation in the framework of the Catholic Church) are different from those that lay at the roots of the CISR paradigm. We must therefore distinguish two levels of analysis. On the one hand, we have Greeley's whole argument about the persistence of religious sentiment. This concern hardly intersects the CISR paradigm: in fact, on this level, the two approaches are incommensurable. On the other hand, however, Greeley's argument does intersect the secularization paradigm whenever he speaks of transformations of religion at the macro-social level. On this level, as noted above, although his emphasis differs, the basic structure of his argument is very similar to that found in the secularization paradigm. This aspect of his theory does not constitute a challenge to the paradigm, but merely to some aspects of normal research carried out in its framework.