A history of the secularization issue

Bryan Wilson
Bryan R. Wilson was born in 1926 in Leeds, England. He received his B.Sc. (Econ.) from London University²⁶⁴ in 1952, and his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics in 1955²⁶⁵ - one year after Berger, and one year before Luckmann. At the L.S.E. he read sociology and economics, but these courses included nothing specifically on the sociology of religion. How, then, did the agnostic Wilson come to devote the whole of his graduate work - very much to the dismay of his professor of economics²⁶⁶ - to the study of sects? The answer is not easy to give in view of the written documents. Wilson's own explanation, as he gave it to me in the interview, is the following: "I knew people who belonged to different religious groups. And they were very different people, they were acquaintances who were not close, but friends of a kind, in a loose sense of the word. And I was interested in the differences between these people, and they were very different people, and I knew them all, and they had different religions, and my curiosity was aroused".

A complementary answer to this question can perhaps be gained by a paper published by Wilson in 1959. In 1957 and 1958, Wilson was a fellow at the University of California at Berkeley. While at Berkeley, he wrote a paper on sect development which was published in the American Sociological Review (Wilson 1959). The opening lines of the abstract read as follows: "The maintenance of original value orientation and of pristine character is a crucial problem area encountered by institutions, particularly in the face of changing external or internal social circumstances. The tensions engendered in such conditions are clearly evident in sects, which provide a valuable institutional type for analysis, in that they have an explicit value commitment, are clearly circumscribed organizations, and are precisely conscious of their relations with the wider society" (1959, p. 3). Thus, in a way, sects can be regarded as providing the opportunity for a micro-sociological analysis of the impact of social change on value orientations, a problem Wilson for some reason was interested in²⁶⁷.

There is no doubt that, as an individual, Wilson is rather appalled by the moral situation of the modern world. There is no trace, in his works, of an enthusiastic endorsement of secularization. Living in a secular society, he tells us, is "painful" (Wilson 1976a, p. viii). Even though his writing always remains remarkably non-committed, when it comes to assessing the ultimate consequences of secularization and, more broadly, of modernization, Wilson's tone sometimes verges on catastrophism: "The growth of crime, of vandalism, and of neurosis and mental breakdown; the growing disruption of marriage; the increase in various types of addiction, whether to drugs, alcohol, or gambling: and the incidence of personal isolation, loneliness, and suicide, all provide a commentary on the points at which the rational social organization apparently fails. Indeed, not only does the system fail to cope with these disruptions, it appears that they arise partly as a consequence of its normal operation" (Wilson 1982, p. 46; see also 1976a, p. 102; 1976b, p. 276). A few pages later, he asserts that these problems are such that "the future of western civilization itself may be put into jeopardy" (1982, p. 88).

In 1966, Wilson published his first book, Religion in Secular Society. The Times Literary Supplement estimated that this book was "read by more people than has any other British book on the sociology of religion"²⁶⁸. The first part of the book was entitled "The Pattern of Secularization", and started with an analysis of statistical data, which Wilson considered, at this time, as providing evidence of the decline of religion. But Wilson's views on secularization have evolved somewhat over the next few years. This evolution has been summarized best by Wilson himself in the interview: "I wouldn't hold to all the propositions I put forward then, I think my conception of secularization has somewhat changed. [...] I would now want to make a distinction between [secularization and decline]. [...] The major shift is perhaps away from, or giving less importance, to church statistics as an evidence, and in regarding secularization more explicitly as something involved in the system rather than as something involved in human behaviour". These shifts, however, did not affect the basic structure of Wilson's argument: his theory is remarkably consistent. I will therefore present it as a whole, with only minimal qualifications with regard to the different periods.

Wilson is the most assertive of all the carriers of the CISR paradigm. In is view, secularization is clearly an evolutionary process (Wilson 1976a, p. vii), and he has no doubts about the secular nature of modern society: "It has become fashionable among sociologists of religion to dispute the contention that this is a secular age. [...] Yet it seems to me true to assert that this age in the West is secular in a sense that has never been true of any previous historical period - all the new marginal manifestations of religious curiosity notwithstanding" (Wilson 1976b, p. 259). Wilson's confidence in the inevitability of secularization is such that - like Berger in the 60s - he ventures to predict the future: "Religion in secular society will remain peripheral, relatively weak, providing comfort for men in the interstices of a soulless social system of which men are the half-willing, half-restless prisoners" (1976b, p. 276)²⁶⁹.

These bold assertions are made possible by a rather restrictive terminology. For Wilson, religion must be defined in terms close to everyday usage and to institutional embodiments²⁷⁰, and secularization must be understood as a transformation occurring exclusively at the structural level (Wilson 1966, p. xiii; p. xviii). He never relinquished the definition of secularization he gave in his first piece of writing on the subject: "By secularization we mean the process by which religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance" (1966, p. xiv). Compare this definition with the ones he gave in later writings: "Secularization relates to the diminution in the social significance of religion" (Wilson 1982, p. 149); "By secularization I shall understand the process whereby religion loses significance for the social system" (Wilson 1987a, p. 169). The only shift, which is consistent with what was mentioned above, is that the notion of secularization as a phenomenon related to the individual's religiosity is abandoned.

So much for "secularization". But what about "secularization theory"? Wilson takes the trouble to clarify the methodological status of this notion: "Secularization is a word which, for sociologists, is as much a concept as a mere descriptive term. The phrase, the secularization thesis, denotes a set of propositions, often loosely stated, which amount almost to a body of theory concerning processes of social change that occur over an unspecified period of historical time. Obviously, the details of such processes might be set out in varying degrees of specificity, and in application to different historical epochs" (Wilson 1982, p. 148). Consistent with this definition, Wilson explicitly shrinks from defining necessary relations between historical processes: "These phenomena [a list of historical manifestations of secularization] are likely to be causally linked, and yet they occur in varying order, and with different degrees of rapidity. In what measure, or in what period they occur, is an empirical question for each case, and cannot be settled a priori" (1982, p. 149)²⁷¹.

Although Wilson never provided an all-encompassing presentation of secularization theory, he came very close to this on the occasion of a paper read in Japan (Wilson 1976b). For the sake of an audience presumably not very familiar with the history of Western sociology, Wilson stressed that his views on secularization were nothing but the reformulation of a venerable theory, which underlay much of the early sociologists' writings, namely, the community-society dichotomy²⁷². Indeed, on another occasion, he presented secularization theory under the title "The Inherited Model" (Wilson 1985b), remaining apparently deliberately ambiguous as to what in his presentation must be attributed to "the inherited model", and what must be attributed to the author himself. This "equivalence" between secularization theory and the community/society dichotomy at first sight poses a problem: If there really is an identity between the two, in what sense does Wilson's theory differentiate itself from Becker's? If secularization is nothing but the transition from community to society, does Wilson's theory deserve to be classified as belonging to the CISR paradigm?

The answer to this question must be positive. To understand why, we must take a closer look at the way Wilson expressed himself in Japan. "My thesis is that secularization is the decline of community: secularization is a concomitant of societalization" (Wilson 1976b, pp. 265-66). As we can notice, this statement is ambiguous. On the one hand, Wilson states that secularization is the decline of community. But on the other hand, he goes on to say that secularization is a concomitant of the decline of community. Taking into account Wilson's views on secularization, it clearly appears that only the second statement applies. Secularization is clearly one of the dimensions of societalization or modernization - not the whole process itself. What Wilson wanted to stress was the following: Secularization is a necessary consequence of societalization, and this thesis has been repeatedly expressed by sociologist in the classical tradition. On other occasions, he expressed himself more clearly; for instance: "Secularization occurs in association with the process in which social organization itself changes from one that is communaly-based to a societally-based system" (Wilson 1982, p. 153).

We can now turn to a brief reconstructed account of Wilson's secularization theory. This is a difficult task. Wilson's is the most complete of all secularization theories; unfortunately, it is also the least systematic. It could be reconstructed in a number of different ways. The following account is therefore not to be considered as necessarily the best and most faithful way to present the unfolding of the process. But I belive that the main components entering into it are presented truthfully.

The initial situation* is "community". In this type of society, which was based on affectual motives, religion fulfilled very important latent functions, most notably social control, social integration, the legitimation of the group's ends, the interpretation of the cosmos, and the canalization of the emotions. It also fulfilled one manifest function, in that it provided means of salvation (Wilson 1976b, p. 266). Although "community" does not refer to any historical period in particular, in the West, it can be roughly situated in the Middle Ages. This does not imply that the Middle Ages were an age of faith, but simply that "life was effectively regulated, at least in its public concerns, by the demands of the Church. The Church controlled not only the moral fabric of society (perhaps the least of all), but the formal processes of political, juridicial, commercial, and social intercourse - the institutional operation of society. [...] Even for that age, 'the age of faith' is perhaps a misnomer: we should refer only to the age of religiously-prescribed social order" (Wilson 1976a, pp. 9-10).

The rupture* from this situation was caused by a number of different factors, and was very spread out in time. Some of the causes of the rupture* are to be found in religion itself, some others are extrinsic to it. In his early writings, Wilson stated that it was not possible to tell which were preponderant a priori (Wilson 1966, p. 36). In his later writings, however, he tended to consider that the preponderant factors were extrinsic to religion, and were merely expressed in a religious language: "Religion spoke the language that men already knew, and so new ideas had to be expressed in terms of the old. [...] Thus it was that radically secularizing developments were first enunciated within the framework of religious discourse" (Wilson 1976b, p. 261).

Rationalization (first part)
Before discussing the role of rationalization in the process of secularization, we must briefly present Wilson's conception of rationality. In Wilson's scheme, rationality is not simply, nor even primarily, an application of reason. "Modern society certainly depends pre-eminently on rational procedures but [...] it does so not solely, perhaps not even mainly, by recourse simply to reason. Its recourse is rather to abstract and institutionalized rationality, embraced not so much by the minds of sentient citizens as in the planned framework of organizational techniques" (Wilson 1985a, p. 330). Wilson's concept of rationality²⁷³ is definitely more dependent upon technology than upon reason as such: "The process of rationalization has had various sources, but the most fundamental and pervasive, and the one of increasingly global significance, is the process of technologization" (Wilson 1987a, p. 170).

Applying this conception of rationality to the problem of secularization, Wilson argues that the factors which are most fundamental in causing the rupture* are all related to scientific and technical evolution. "As scientific orientations increase, and in particular those of the organizational and behavioral sciences, so we can expect conceptions of society itself to become increasingly affected by rationalistic preconceptions" (Wilson 1966, p. 37). Why is that so? Because, Wilson argues, "technology demands the development of much more rational modes of thought. [...] If [the individual] drives a car, he learns to be rational and to stop when the traffic signals are against him - no matter how urgent his business" (Wilson 1982, p. 43). This evolution leads to the breakdown of community: "Technical evolution disrupted the old moral consensus and the strength of local community" (Wilson 1985a, p. 324). "Societal organization is itself the result of a process of rationalization" (Wilson 1982, p. 156).

Does this mean that Wilson's view is the one denounced by Berger as naively assuming that the modern world view is intrinsically superior? Wilson refuses to be put into this category: "All this is not to suggest that the confrontation of science and religion [...] was in itself harmful to religion, or even that there was an incompatibility between them. Indeed, religion and science can coexist as alternative orientations to the world" (Wilson 1966, p. 43). Wilson goes out of his way to stress that the XIX^th century "conflict" between science and religion was a false debate (1966, p. 46). Why, then, was the scientific world view important? The only - and not very convincing - explanation provided by Wilson is that science undermined the status of religious functionaries as compared with scientists and technicians (1966, pp. 74-85). But what should have caused this loss of prestige, if not the demise of religion itself with the rise in the prestige of science? Wilson's explanation is problematic and, on numerous other occasions, he reverts himself. For example: "Christianity, with the impact of scientific and social scientific hindsights, has lost general theological plausibility" (Wilson 1968, p. 86; see also 1982, p. 54).

Why, then, is Wilson so eager to dispel the impression that he should view science as intrinsically superior to religion? Because, I would contend, this would allow critics to put him into the same bag as the XIX^th century evolutionists and positivists²⁷⁴, for whom the warfare between science and religion was the most important aspect of "secularization". To express the dilemma in my own terminology: Wilson was too much aware that "scientization" was not a "exemplar" that should fit into the CISR paradigm to recognize putting it forward.

To summarize: Wilson's theory is that the prime factor in the initial decline of community life is a form of instrumental rationality informed by technical conceptions. In this view, "reason" itself, as a basis for scientific development and for attacks against theology played a secondary, albeit not entirely negligible role.
Obviously, rationalization was not the only factor that caused the rupture. Wilson himself warns that "it would be very easy to exaggerate the significance of purely ideological developments in the process of secularization" (Wilson 1966, p. 54). Wilson refuses to set forth a hierarchy of influential factors, and most often contents himself with presenting a list of the factors which undermined the social standing of religion. Among these, we can mention briefly the birth of autonomous institutions (differentiation*; 1966, pp. 56-57), the emergence of modern democracy, the world view offered by the mass media and the entertainment industry, and the birth of autonomous art forms (1966, pp. 36-58). Among the factors intrinsic to religion, we can mention confessional diversity (Wilson 1976a, p. 11; p. 30). Thus rationalization is not the only cause of secularization. The problem, however, is that it is the only factor that clearly emerges from Wilson's discussion as being of primary importance in its own right. As for the other factors just mentioned, we will discuss them more at length later on: they all occupy a place in Wilson's theory, but not really as primary factors. They always appear inseparably as products and as factors of secularization. Before discussing these factors, however, we must turn to the consequences rationalization had on religious movements themselves.
Worldliness*
Wilson develops an analysis of the rise of new denominations - most notably Methodism - in XVIII^th and XIX^th century England. From this analysis, it appears that these new denominations were more worldly than the religions which preceded them. But in which sense exactly? Here, Wilson follows Weber's lead. After describing the puritan spirit of "this-worldly asceticism", he remarks: "In this orientation, reflecting necessarily the qualities which the man of business himself needs in the pursuit of his livelihood, there is a beginning of the secularization process" (Wilson 1966, p. 23). (Note the implication: for Wilson, as for Luckmann and for Berger, secularization has religious roots*; see Wilson 1982, p. 150, n. 2; p. 168.) Now, Methodism was deeply influenced by this spirit, and fulfilled a definitely worldly* function, in that it "accomplished the dissemination of a work ethic to new social strata"²⁷⁵ (Wilson 1966, p. 24). "Christianity's genius was in its adaptability to new classes throughout processes of social change. It was only as these new classes showed a firm disposition to self-discipline and organization and to establish and maintain effective social control, that permanent organizations - 'denominations' - emerged" (1966, p. 21).

But increased worldliness* is not apparent only in the denominations; it is also apparent in society in general: "The proportion of the Gross National Product devoted to the supernatural has diminished in the course of the centuries. [...] It is a plausible hypothesis that the more developed the economic techniques of a society, and the more affluent its circumstances, the lower the proportion of its productive wealth will be devoted to the supernatural. If that hypothesis is not disconfirmed, it might be taken as our best indicator of secularization, showing what man chooses to do with his resources, his energies, and, by implication, his time" (Wilson 1976a, p. 25).

Pluralization*
Wilson's account of pluralization is not as detailed as Berger's²⁷⁶. For the most part, Wilson rests content with the idea that the emergence of the new denominations we just mentioned further undermined the power of religious institutions: "In creating institutionalized expression of social differences and division, [and] in extending choice, [the new denominations] allow[ed] some to make no choice at all" (Wilson 1966, p. 30). Wilson considers that pluralism, as it exists in America, exhibits a logic which can best be understood in the framework of secularization theory: "For a commodity with as little relevance to everyday American life as religion, competition may function to maintain the interest and the affiliation of a wide clientele" (Wilson 1968, p. 78).
Thus, rationalization obviously had an impact as early as two centuries ago. For the most part, however, Wilson's discussion of the consequences of rationalization bears on the present situation*. The consequences of the process of societalization for religion can first all be brought together under one heading: autonomization*. This development, however, can take place only after differentiation has occurred. On the other hand, autonomization* can be further divided in four manifestations: decline in practice, unbelief*, rationalization, and sociologization*.
Differentiation
Differentiation is itself one of the results of rationalization - in the limited sense of technical evolution: "Secularization is associated with the structural differentiation of the social system - separation of different areas of social activity into more specialized forms. This process occurs with the development of technique and the extension of the division of labour" (Wilson 1976a, p. 40). As a result, "whereas once the clergyman, if he was a diligent incumbent, was also the educator, the guardian of community morals, the social worker, at times even the magistrate, the sick visitor (when not actually a medical adviser), today, these roles have been taken over by others" (1976a, p. 16). Clearly, differentiation is one of the ways in which the transition from community to society can be described. And in this disappearance of the homogeneous community - what Berger would call the "social basis supporting the plausibility of the religious world view"²⁷⁷ - Wilson sees one of the causes of secularization.
Autonomization*
Wilson's very definition of secularization - like Berger's - is centered on the idea of autonomization* (Wilson does not use this term, although he speaks of the institutional spheres having become more "autonomous" [see below]). To repeat, secularization is "the process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance" (Wilson 1966, p. xvi). In the early phase of his thinking, Wilson tended to rely on statistics for evidence of this process. Thus for instance, the diminution of the influence of the church can be assessed by the decline in the proportion of children attending Sunday school, and by the decline in the proportion of religious publications as over against secular publications (1966, p. 5).

Wilson very explicitly links autonomization* and differentiation. "The process of structural differentiation [...] has led not only to the eradication of religious involvement in other areas of activities [...], but also to the loss of the presidency which religion once exercised over practically all of man's doings" (Wilson 1982, p. 41). Autonomization means, quite simply, that society no longer needs religion: all the latent functions which it fulfilled have been taken over by other institutions. Even salvation, the one explicit function of religion, is no longer as much needed as before: "Since life has itself been more thoroughly regulated; since we expect to be able to solve our human and social problems by science and planning; since the hardships we suffer are no longer 'unexplained' and 'unpredictable', so there is less thought of a compensatory life hereafter" (Wilson 1976b, pp. 267).

As each of the new institutional spheres developed, they freed themselves, in their own domains, from religious tutelage. But these new spheres did not rest content with their newly acquired autonomy: they increasingly entered in competition with religion. Thus for instance, the entertainment industry "was from the outset a challenge to religion, offering diversion, other reinterpretations of daily life, and competing for the time, attention and money of the public. [...] From being a very powerful voice in the local community, the clergyman became one of several voices with divergent religious messages" (Wilson 1966, pp. 40-41).

Another example is provided by art. Once it has freed itself from religious supervision, Wilson tells us, art becomes a very dangerous competitor for religion. "Art deals, as religion deals, in emotional responses, in meaningful communications, in interpreting, evaluating, evoking responses and inviting the individual's participation in a complex set of conceptions and feelings" (1966, p. 43). Therefore, the development of autonomous art forms further encroaches upon the claims religious institutions lay on the conduct of the individuals' lives and thoughts.

Other institutional spheres which have become autonomous are law (1966, p. 62), education, and politics (1966, pp. 58-59). Wilson also discusses these spheres in some detail. But since the two examples just given seem sufficient to make the point, I will refrain from discussing them.
Decline in Practice
As already mentioned, Wilson's views on the role of practice as an index of secularization evolved over time. This change reflects a similar change in the paradigm itself. In the early life of the paradigm, practice tended to play a more considerable role than later on - if only because of the influence of Catholic sociology. As criticisms against secularization theory developed, and as Catholic sociology as a distinctive approach definitely disappeared, it became apparent that religious practice was not as reliable an index of secularization as first thought. But as the idea of decline of practice is congruent with the general logic of the paradigm, I will present Wilson's early position.

Wilson recognizes that "the meaning of religion cannot be completely assessed by numerical means, either by head-counting or attitude surveys" (1966, p. 1). This qualification having been made, he goes on to assert that "the decline in organized religious participation indicates a way in which the Churches are losing direct influence over the ideas and activities of men. [...] We can regard the evidence of the statistics as an index of secularization in the sense of the decline of religious influence and religious organization" (1966, p. 2). Wilson's figures, based on the Church of England's own statistics (1966, p. 7, n. 1), are presented in several tables (the only instance of the presence of statistical tables in any secularization theory in the CISR paradigm). All indicators point to a declining involvement in religious rites: decline of infant baptism rates, of the rate of confirmations, of Sunday school attendance, of church enrollment, of Easter Day Communicants, and of religious marriages (1966, pp. 5-16).

Unbelief*
Wilson expressed his views in relation to the notion of unbelief* in the framework of the 1969 Conference on Unbelief organized by Berger and the Vatican in Rome. Wilson finds the concept problematical, in the sense that in community, where individual choice did not really exist, the very idea of "unbelief", as an individual choice, did not really apply²⁷⁸. As a result, "over most of the historical past, belief may be readily regarded less as a matter of individual choosing than of the culture in which individuals lived" (Wilson 1971, pp. 247-48).

This having been said, however, secularization clearly has an impact on the beliefs of individuals. The decline of practice must not be considered simply as a phenomenon in the social structure; something has changed in the consciousness of individuals, too. "It is not merely that the Churches have lost members, but that men have largely ceased to think - or to respond - to the world with a sense of mystery and awe" (Wilson 1966, p. 57). The reason for this change is directly linked to rationalization. In principle, Wilson tells us, rational society "is an intellectually comprehensible world, but it is not a world with which humans readily establish emotional rapport. It is a world that can be comprehended, but which cannot be understood" (Wilson 1971, p. 266). Thus, unlike Luckmann and Berger, Wilson contends that unbelief* is linked to rationalization, and not to differentiation: "Actual belief [...] appears to decline, and belief is only the most conspicuous aspect of supernaturalist thinking. The rational structure of society itself precludes much indulgence in supernaturalist thinking in the normal performance of social roles" (Wilson 1975, p. 81).

But unbelief* does not affect just religion. As the rise of new cults like scientology suggests, "many people have lost all faith in external systems of knowledge, whether science, political theory, ideology, of religion. The cults suggest that you can save yourself; and no one else, and nothing else, can" (Wilson 1976a, p. 67).
Rationalization (second part)
As noted above, rationalization was the single most important cause for the rupture*. But in a sense, rationalization can also be viewed as one of the consequences of autonomization. The freedom society takes to apply rational criteria is in itself an indication of the measure to which it has become autonomous from the norms edicted by the church. Thus, society, which is a rationally planned pattern of social life, sets the framework for the present situation* of religion.

Society distinguishes itself from the community in that social control is realized through juridical and technical (vs. moral) procedures, in that social cohesion is prescribed in constitutions (vs. resting in religion), in that the interpretation of the world is made in scientific (vs. religious) terms, and in that the canalization of the emotions is achieved through the entertainment industry. "Society [...] involves the interaction of unknown role-players. [...] Society is a centralized, rationally articulated system, increasingly organized and consciously planned. It is increasingly dominated by instrumental values" (Wilson 1976b, p. 264). "The old control, with its 'letters of testimony' [...] relied on a man's general disposition to industriousness, punctuality, thrift, sobriety, willingness and reliability: the new control demand nothing of his 'character' - the conveyor-belt could exact from him all the control that was needed, Industry has thus passed from internalized 'character' values, to mechanical manipulation. Thus it has turned from religious socialization to technical devices for the means of regulating the work situation and the productive process" (Wilson 1966, p. 48). In other words, "societal organization demands the mobilization of intellectual faculties: it contrasts with the requirements of community organization, which relies on the mobilization and manipulation of affective dispositions" (Wilson 1976b, p. 260).

Wilson's view of modern society is nothing but rosy²⁷⁹: "Control has become a matter for mechanical and bureaucratic devices. It has become impersonal and amoral, a matter for routine techniques and unknown officials. Our world has been de-moralized" (Wilson 1976a, pp. 19-20). As a result, "widespread and intensive moral socialization of children has become cost inefficient" (Wilson 1985a, p. 321).
Sociologization*
As already noted, Wilson lies great stress on the "rational", bureaucratic aspect of modern societies. Modern societies, he explains, are rational, and hence, they can be subjected to rational planning. In other words, secularization fosters a situation in which men feel that they are able to use a rational view of the world (for instance sociology) to determine which social arrangements are to be preferred, and to implement the chosen arrangements. On the very first page of Contemporary Transformations of Religion, we read: "Perhaps the most significant aspect of our conception of what it means to be modern, is the idea that we can consciously change the character of society and the condition of our lives. [...] We are committed to the idea that we can make the future, by conscious planned activity. [...] When once we thought that consequences were God's will, we now deliberately programme, regulate, and organize our own future - in family planning" (Wilson 1976a, p. 1). In this framework, sociologists play a very important role: "Societalization[²⁸⁰] [...] is the process by which the apparently 'accidental' effects of particular social arrangements, which remained undiscovered until sociologists discovered them, are subjected to rational thought and deliberative action" (Wilson 1976b, p. 268).

But sociologization* is not only one of the consequences, but also one of the factors promoting further secularization. "The very conception that social arrangements, distributions of power, wealth, prestige, life chances and the general pattern of life circumstances, can be affected by instrumental action, and primarily by mass decision-making (or decision-making in the name of the masses) has in itself gradually altered man's recourse to demands for supernatural intervention in his affairs" (Wilson 1966, p. 36). However, there remains a paradox: this does not mean that individuals have become more rational. Even though in the early phase of his thinking, Wilson tended to believe to a certain extent in rational man, this belief was always subordinated to an emphasis on the rational organization: "Men may have become more rational, and their thinking may have become more matter-of-fact, as Veblen expressed it, but perhaps even more important is their sustained involvement in rational organizations [...] which impose rational behaviour upon them" (1966, p. 37; see also 1971, p. 266).

Secularization does not imply disappearance
As Wilson is the most assertive of all carriers of the CISR paradigm, I have chosen to pick him to support my case that this paradigm does not imply the disappearance of religion. Wilson explicitly recognizes that, in spite of secularization, and even though religion has become socially irrelevant, humans continue to need it. But the reason they still need religion is not related to one of the explicit functions of religion, but to one of its latent functions: the need for community life. In our cold, impersonal society, religion provides a kind of ersatz for the vanished community. The kind of togetherness provided by traditional religion, however, is itself empty, nearly anonymous (Wilson 1968, p. 79). It is in this context that the rise of the new religious movements must be understood: "There is no doubt that men hanker after the benefits of community, seek contexts in which they are personally known, and in which they share responsibilities with others. New religious movements can supply precisely this context in a way that no other social agency can do" (Wilson 1982, p. 134; see also 1976a, p. 96). Even though this type of remark is most typical of Wilson's later writings, it is also to be found in his early works, before the new religious movements had become a popular topic. Thus in 1968, he asserted: "Prophets arise in times of social distress, and distress in contemporary society appears to be very widespread" (Wilson 1968, p. 100). In 1969 in Rome he observed: "Sectarianism has frequently been associated with secularization. New religious movements are an expression of man's needs for religious gratifications and religious accommodation that arise in circumstances where old religions have ossified" (Wilson 1971, p. 268).

Wilson's secularization theory explicitly refutes the idea that religion is in the process of disappearing: "What [my] definition [of secularization] does not imply is that all men have acquired a secularized consciousness. It does not even suggest that most individuals have relinquished all their interest in religion, even though that may be the case. It maintains no more that religion ceases to be significant in the working of the social system. [...] Religion's loss of significance may cause men to gain psychological or individual independence from it, but that is a matter to be investigated, since there may be other mon-religious constraints which operate to hold men to religious institutions or to persuade them to go through the motions of religious rituals" (Wilson 1982, pp. 149-50). To summarize: "Religion is not eliminated by the process of secularization, and only the crudest of secularist interpretations could ever have reached the conclusion that it would be" (Wilson 1987b, p. 8).

In conclusion, I would like to stress the coherence, on the logical level, of Wilson's model. For reasons already mentioned, this coherence does not appear in neatly organized patterns. But on some occasions, it clearly emerges in sentences which crystallize, as it were, this coherence. Witness the following utterance, in which the three core exemplars of the paradigm, worldliness*, rationalization, and differentiation, are brought together: "The laicization [read: worldliness*] and incipient rationalization that have occurred in Christianity is wholly consonant with the steadily growing influence of science and technology [read: rationalization] in western cultures generally, and with the way in which society itself has been systematically reorganized [read: differentiated]" (Wilson 1982, p. 81).