A history of the secularization issue

Peter Berger's theory
Berger's views on secularization have evolved considerably over time - to the point that many sociologists accuse him of inconsistency. This charge, I think, is exaggerated. One of the reasons for this impression is that Berger easily and frequently shifts from "methodological atheism" to what can be viewed almost as a form of Christian apologetics. Thus for instance, two years after publishing the Sacred Canopy, Berger published A Rumor of Angels (1969), with the particularly telling subtitle: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural. The viewpoint, however, was radically different from that adopted two years earlier. In 1969, Berger was writing as a theologian²⁵⁷. And the "rediscovery" he was talking about, as he explained himself, was experienced only by a minority (1969, p. 7). In the same book, he still asserted that "abrupt changes in the secularizing trend are not very likely in the foreseeable future" (1969, p. 20). Thus the change was of tone more than of content.

The very year A Rumor of Angels (1969) was published, however, a more serious challenge to the continuity of Berger's work emerged with the beginning of his involvement in the Third World. In his field work, Berger came to the realization that his former positions on secularization were "ethnocentric" (Berger 1980, p. 41). But here again, it should be stressed that Berger never really recanted from the analysis of secularization he had proposed in 1967, but only from the pessimistic prognostic which accompanied it. Thus for instance, in a 1973 paper, he concluded on the somewhat impressionistic assessment that "the reversibility of the process of secularization is probable because of the pervasive boredom of a world without gods" (Berger [1973] 1977, p. 160). Just before making this assessment, however, he had developed two new concepts: "invisible secularization" (to refer to the continuing trend of secularization in the midst of the apparent religious revival in the 40s and 50s), and "double secularization" (to refer to two types of secularization undermining American civil religion). These new "concepts" are not terribly important for our purposes. But they point to the fact that Berger continued working in the framework provided by his old secularization theory while at the same time rejecting the pessimistic prognostic which was included in it. Berger himself quite explicitly stated this distinction between the theory and the prognostic: "[The] irreversibility of secularization [has] become doubtful. [...] This does not mean that those of us [...] who have analyzed the recent history of religion under the aspect of secularization have been wrong in this analysis (though we may perhaps have exaggerated the extent of secularization). Where some of us (myself included) may have erred, is in projecting the indefinite continuation of present trends in the future" ([1971] 1977, p. 190). To mention one last example of apparent inconsistency, in 1983, Berger asserted that the problem was no longer the crisis of religion, but rather the crisis of "secularity as a world view" itself (Berger 1983, p. 14). Even though this crisis constitutes, in a way, a reversal of secularization (in that it renders possible a certain reawakening of the hitherto repressed religious world views), it is consistent with Berger's earlier secularization theory: in effect, this theory states that pluralism undermines the plausibility of all world views, be they religious or secular. That the "myth of progress" should lose its plausibility (1983, p. 15) just as the religious myths had, is therefore not the least surprising in the framework of Berger's own theory²⁵⁸.

Thus, Berger's shift concerning the prognostic on the future of religion does not radically alter the logic of his earlier secularization theory. It is therefore possible to present it by relying almost entirely on the Sacred Canopy - in fact, there is no other possibility: Berger has never again extensively written on secularization.

Berger's secularization theory is entirely contained in part II of the Sacred Canopy (1967), entitled "Historical Elements". It represents an attempt at practical application of the theoretical perspective developed in part I of the book, and comprises three chapters, "The Process of Secularization"; "Secularization and the Problem of Plausibility"; and "Secularization and the Problem of Legitimation". Together with Wilson's Religion in Secular Society (1966), these 65 pages probably represent the single most powerful event in the history of the secularization paradigm.

The general viewpoint adopted by Berger "for heuristic purposes" is epidemiological (Berger 1967, p. 109). He considers that secularization originated in a particular locale in the social system, and then propagated itself through the system like a virus, borne by what he calls the "carriers" of secularization. In Berger's view, the main carriers of secularization in the Western world are the modern economic processes, but other carriers - some of which are located at the cultural level, sometimes inside religion itself - are at work too. Thus, secularization cannot be considered to be a monocausal process, nor a process with universal consequences. It has a very different impact in different parts of society. Religion tends to resist particularly in two opposed sectors of the institutional order. On the one hand, it survives in the most "private" sector, the family. On the other hand, it survives in a rhetorical form²⁵⁹ in the most "public" sector, politics. "At a point where everyone takes for granted that 'religion stops at the factory gate', it may nevertheless be also taken for granted that one does not inaugurate either a war or a marriage without the traditional religious symbolizations" (1967, p. 129).

Berger's theory need hardly be reconstructed to fit my framework. As presented in the Sacred Canopy, it unfolds very neatly according to a chronological scheme. The initial situation* is located far back in history. In Egyptian and Mesopotamian religions, Berger argues, there was a continuity between the microcosm and the macrocosm; everything that happened in daily life had its correspondent in the world of myth or in the cosmos in general.

Religious Roots (first part)
The initial rupture* with this situation was the advent of monotheism. The religious developments resulting from this rupture* can be considered "causal factors in the formation of the modern secularized world" (1967, p. 128). The main differences between the cosmological and the Biblical conceptions can be summarized under three headings. First, God became transcendentalized, placed outside of the cosmos. Yahve is a geographically mobile God, which intervenes in history through specific actions, and whose covenant with the chosen people is no longer immanent in the logic of the cosmos. Second, in part as a consequence of the transcendentalization of God, there has been a process of historicization: God having been removed from history, it became a field in which man could intervene and shape his destiny. Third, there was a process of ethical rationalization, through the development of the Torah and the elimination of all magical elements (1967, pp. 115-21). Thus, to quote Berger's well-known ironical formula: "Christianity has been its own gravedigger" (1967, p. 129).
Once this initial rupture* has occurred, the process has been set in motion. But before unfolding to its logical consequences, secularization suffered a setback during the Middle Ages. Catholicism in effect created a synthesis between the disenchanted Biblical religion and non-biblical cosmological conceptions (1967, p. 121). From the point of view of historicization, however, Catholicism did not represent a setback, but a deepening of secularization (1967, p. 122). The formation of the Church itself was a decisive step in the direction of secularization, as it automatically defined all that was outside of it as "the world" (1967, p. 123).
Religious Roots (second part)
The forces of secularization emerged again when Protestantism came back to the disenchanted Biblical religion: "Protestantism may be described in terms of an immense shrinking in the scope of the sacred in reality. [...] In other words, the radical transcendence of God confronts an universe of radical immanence, of 'closedness' to the sacred" (1967, pp. 111-12). In the new atmosphere created by Protestantism, although religion seemed very strong, it had in fact become very fragile: "With nothing remaining 'in between' a radically transcendent God and a radically human world except this one channel, the sinking of the latter into implausibility left an empirical reality in which, indeed, 'God is dead'. [...] A sky empty of angels becomes open to the intervention of the astronomer, eventually, of the astronaut" (1967, pp. 112-113).
Rationalization
Once the secularizing forces which had been contained by Catholicism had been liberated, secularization started spreading, propagated by the growth of capitalism: "Modern industrial society has produced a centrally 'located' sector that is something like a 'liberated territory' with respect to religion. Secularization has moved 'outwards' from this sector into other areas of society" (1967, p. 129). The reason for this very strong link between secularization and industrialism is that industry is of necessity based on the operation of rational processes (1967, p. 132). Berger does not at any point explain what he means by "rationality"; his analysis of this phenomenon remains very sketchy. The reason why it is nevertheless necessary to present Berger's views on rationalization is that they play such an important part in the structure of his theory. As what Berger has to say on this subject is very brief, I will quote him in full rather than paraphrase him: "A modern industrial society requires the presence of large cadres of scientific and technological personnel, whose training and ongoing social organization presupposes a high degree of rationalization, not only on the level of infrastructure but also on that of consciousness. Any attempts at traditionalistic reconquista thus threaten the rational foundations of modern society" (1967, p. 132). The rational spirit carried by the capitalist order is diffused to all other institutions, in particular to the state: "As the modern state is increasingly occupied with the political and legal requirements of the gigantic economic machinery of industrial production, it must gear its own structure and ideology to this end. On the level of structure, this means above all the establishment of highly rational bureaucracies; on the level of ideology, it means the maintenance of legitimations that are adequate for such bureaucracies" (1967, p. 132).
Autonomization*
As we can see, Berger definitely sets the issue between religion and the world in terms of power. Indeed, the present situation* of religion is characterized by the fact that industrial capitalism has allowed society to "liberate" itself from the grip of religion. Autonomization* is again one of the ideas which Berger does not devote much time to, but which is very important in his theory. Indeed, he defines secularization as "the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols" (1967, p. 107).

What does this mean in historical terms? The first sign of autonomization comes with the separation of church and state (differentiation*). As a result, "the state no longer serves as an enforcement agency on behalf of the previously dominant religious institutions" (1967, p. 130). This is accompanied by the expropriation of church lands and the "emancipation of education from ecclesiastical authority". Finally, this same process may also be observed in "the decline of religious contents in the arts, in philosophy, in literature and, most important of all, in the rise of science as an autonomous, thoroughly secular perspective on the world" (1967, p. 107).

The main reason why Berger's analysis of autonomization* is not further developed is that its logical consequences are analyzed on the two separate levels included in the definition of secularization: with regard to the "religious institutions" on the one hand, and with regard to the "religious symbols" on the other hand. At the social level ("objective secularization"), the new situation is characterized by pluralism. And pluralism itself is related, at the level of consciousness (or "subjective secularization") to the collapse of the world view*.

Thus, two levels of analysis are closely interconnected: social structure, and culture. To fully understand the interconnectedness of these two levels, we must remember Berger's sociology of knowledge framework: Social institutions are legitimized by religious world views, but these, in turn, can survive only if they are based on an existing social structure. On the one hand, "religion legitimates social institutions by bestowing upon them an ultimately valid ontological status, that is, by locating them within a cosmic and sacred frame of reference" (1967, p. 33), but on the other hand, "each world requires a social 'base' for its continuing existence as a world that is real to actual human beings. [...] Thus, for example, the religious world of pre-Columbian Peru was objectively and subjectively real as long as its plausibility structure, namely, pre-Columbian Inca society, remained intact" (1967, p. 45).

As a consequence of this dialectical perspective, Berger argues, "it is very largely a matter of convenience [...] as to which of the two spheres one begins with. Depending on the starting point, one may then be able to show how a particular theoretical constellation results from a certain practical infrastructure, or conversely how a practical social structure is the result of certain movements in the realm of idea" (1967, p. 155). For reasons which are not entirely clear, Berger himself chooses to start with the social structure: "In looking at the collapse of plausibility suffered by religion in the contemporary situation, hic et nunc, it is logical to begin with social structure and to go on to consciousness and ideation, rather than the reverse. Quite apart from its theoretical justification, this procedure will avoid the pitfall (to which religiously inclined observers are particularly prone) of ascribing secularization to some mysterious spiritual and intellectual fall from grace" (1967, p. 129)²⁶⁰. Whatever Berger's reasons may have been, we will follow his example, and start with the social-structural aspect of autonomization*.
Pluralization
In the monopolistic phase of Christendom, the Church and the state, which both "represented the same religious world view" (1967, p. 136), cooperated to impose this world view upon individuals. But when the state renounced using this power of imposition, "the man in the street [was] confronted with a wide variety of religious and other reality-defining agencies that compete[d] for his allegiance or at least his attention, and none of which [was] in a position to coerce him into allegiance" (1967, p. 127). Pluralization is clearly conceptualized by Berger as a direct consequence of secularization: "Secularization brings about a demonopolization of religious traditions and thus, ipso facto, leads to a pluralistic situation" (1967, p. 135). Pluralism does not just mean that a denomination vies against another denomination to transmit its world view, but also that each denomination must now compete with a variety of secular world views. As a consequence of this, there appears a free market, in which different world views are offered to individuals: "The religious tradition, which previously could be authoritatively imposed, now has to be marketed. It must be 'sold' to a clientele that is now no longer constrained to 'buy'. The pluralistic situation is, above all, a market situation. In it, the religious institutions become marketing agencies and the religious traditions become consumer commodities" (Berger 1967, p. 138).

This market situation has some particularly interesting consequences for the religious institutions. As they now find themselves in a competitive situation, they tend to organize themselves, and even to fashion the world view they propose, in such a manner as to gain a competitive advantage. The main result is that religious institutions become increasingly rational: "'Public relations' with the consumer clientele, 'lobbying' with the government, 'fund raising' with both governmental and private agencies, multifaceted involvements with the secular economy (particularly through investment) - in all these aspects of their 'mission' the religious institutions are compelled to seek 'results' by methods that are, of necessity, very similar to those employed by other bureaucratic structures with similar problems" (1967, p. 140). As they all tend to become organized according to the same criteria, the religious institutions increasingly resemble each other, and even non-religious institutions. In other words, pluralism forces religious institutions to become more worldly*. Another result of pluralism is that it fosters ecumenicity. This, for at least two reasons: because, as they increasingly resemble each other, the religious institutions lose some of the reasons which kept them apart; but also because cartelization is a more efficient course of action given the situation (it brings advantages in dealings with consumers as well as with the government). Still another consequence is that, if they want to be successful, denominations must take into account the wishes of their "clients". Thus, not only does religion become subjected to fashion, but it also increasingly tends to cater to the "private" psychological problems of individuals through counselling and quasi-therapeutic action (1967, pp. 145-47).

But how, then, can we explain the recent "rediscovery of denominational identities" in America? Precisely through the same market analysis: As religious products become increasingly similar, the religious institutions tend to lose their distinctiveness, which is also a valuable element in the competitive market environment. "[This] 'countervailing movement' is brought about by the need for marginal differentiation in an over-all situation of standardization". Most often, however (as is the case with the "identities" of commercial products forged by advertisement), "the differentiation is one of 'packaging' only - inside the package may still be the same old standardized product" (1967, p. 149).
Collapse of the World View*
The collapse of the world view*²⁶¹ is a direct consequence of pluralization (and not of rationalization!): "The pluralistic situation described above ipso facto plunges religion into a crisis of credibility" (1967, p. 151). It should be most emphatically stressed that Berger refuses to consider that the scientific and rational world views as such undermine the plausibility of religion. As a matter of fact, Berger explains, the generally held assumption that the modern world view is superior to the more ancient ones stems from the fact that, whereas modern thinkers always "relativize [the past] in terms of this or that socio-historical analysis [...] the present [...] remains strangely immune from relativization" (Berger 1969, p. 51). In other words, in terms of epistemological certainty concerning supra-empirical matters, we are not better off than our forebears, and thus, our epistemology is not "more convincing" for intrinsic, but for social reasons²⁶².

If we want to explain secularization and the collapse of the world view, instead of resorting to this shallow explanation, we must turn to a social-structural process, to wit, the "pluralization of world views" (Berger [1967] 1977, p. 170). The central idea, which is exactly the same as Luckmann's (presented under the heading of differentiation), is that, because of pluralization, all views of the world, religious or not, tend to become relative and to suffer a crisis of plausibility. Berger's theory can be summarized as follows: the process of rationalization, born from religion, leads to autonomization*, which in turn leads to pluralism, which causes the collapse of the world view*.

This manifested itself as early as the XVIII^th century, as can be seen by the loss of plausibility of the Christian theodicy evident in the distressed reactions of intellectuals to the 1755 Lisbon earthquake. For the first time, tradition was no longer sufficient to answer the question "How could God permit this?" (Berger 1967, pp. 78-79). But this general crisis can be brought out most clearly in the case of Protestantism, where an increasingly liberal theology engaged in a huge "bargaining process" with secular consciousness, to end up with a much narrower prestige than it started with. Berger provides a fairly detailed analysis of this crisis, tracing the progressive relativization of Christian truths as they were redefined by succeeding generations of Protestant theologians²⁶³. As a consequence of the collapse of the religious world view, in this new theology, religious activities are almost reduced to being legitimized as "some sort of psychotherapy" (1967, p. 167), even though "in a truly impressive salto mortale, this very dissolution of theology into psychology is hailed as a vindication of religion" (Berger [1967] 1977, p. 167).
Unbelief*
The consequence of this collapse for the individual is that "subjectively, the man in the street tends to be uncertain about religious matters" (1967, p. 127). Obviously, this does not mean that all individuals have lost their faith, but only that religious belief acquires a new status. There is "a change in the 'location' of religion within consciousness. [...] As the plausibility of the world view is weakened, so will the subjective reality of the religious world in question. [...] The old religious contents can now only be reached by a deliberate effort, an act of 'faith'" (1967, p. 150). As a logical consequence, religion becomes a matter of personal opinion or, as the Americans put it, of "preference", a development which ushers in the "age of skepticism". Note, however, that Berger does not provide any statistics, and does not pronounce on the extent of unbelief. All he seems to assert is that, all things being equal, secular society tends to transform belief into a more personal, and hence, more difficult, act. In other words, the burden of making sense of the world has been transferred from society to the individual: "The realissimum to which religion refers is transposed from the cosmos or from history to individual consciousness. Cosmology becomes psychology. History becomes biography" (1967, p. 167).
The Epistemological Stance: Methodological Unbelief
In an appendix to the Sacred Canopy entitled "Sociological and Theological Perspectives", Berger summarized most clearly and cogently the epistemological stance which I take to be shared by all adherents to the CISR paradigm - as contrasted with committed Catholic sociologist or with committed secularists. First, he asserts sociology's autonomy over against theology: "Questions raised within the frame of reference of an empirical discipline (and I would emphatically consider sociological theory to be within such a frame of reference) are not susceptible to answers coming out of the frame of reference of a non-empirical and normative discipline" (1967, p. 179). But Berger's methodological stance does not stop here - if it did, it would not differ from the usual positivist stance. Theology cannot pronounce on sociology; but sociology cannot pronounce on theology either. On the one hand, "sociological theory must, by its own logic, view religion as a human projection". On the other hand, however, "to say that religion is a human projection does not logically preclude the possibility that the projected meanings may have an ultimate status independent of man" (1967, p. 180). And Berger bolsters his explanation through the example of mathematics. Mathematics are, quite as obviously as religion, a projection of the human mind. But "so far nobody has suggested that therefore modern science is to be regarded as a great illusion" (1967, p. 181). The practical methodological precept which follows from these considerations is that, in the course of sociological inquiry, the ultimate status of religious definitions of reality must be bracketed, and that the sociologist must practice a methodological atheism.