A history of the secularization issue

Plan des travaux scientifiques: "Un système social qui s'éteint, un autre système parvenu à son entière maturité et qui tend à se constituer, tel est le caractère fondamental assigné à l'époque actuelle par la marche générale de la civilisation" (1822, p. 55).

53 As Jack London wrote in his autobiographical novel Martin Eden: "And here was the man Spencer, organizing all knowledge for him, reducing everything to unity, elaborating ultimate realities, and presenting to his startled gaze a universe so concrete of realization that it was like the model of a ship such as sailors make and put into glass bottles. There was no caprice, no chance. All was law. [...] All the hidden things were laying their secrets bare. He was drunken with comprehension" (London, quoted in Budd 1977, p. 139).

54 Parsons developed his differentiation theory independently from Spencer's. Only belatedly did he recognize the important similarities between his work and Spencer's (Parsons 1961). In his earlier works (most notably 1937), he considered Spencer irrelevant.

55 Wilson frequently refers to the community/society dichotomy, but nothing indicates that in doing this, he relies on Tönnies in particular.

56 Even though there has lately been some revival in interest in Spencer (Peel 1971, p. vii).

57 Unlike Comte's, Spencer's classification of societies in militant and industrial types is independent from his other evolutionary scheme in terms of increasing complexity: Some relatively undifferentiated societies are of the "industrial" type (Coser 1971, p. 94).

58 A superficial reading could lead to the conclusion that the divergence concerned the role of government. Thus, according to Spencer, "M. Comte's ideal of society is one in which government is developed to the greatest extent [...], in which the individual life shall be subordinated in the greatest degree to the social life. [...] I hold [that we are progressing toward a society] in which government will be reduced to the smallest amount possible, and freedom increased to the greatest amount possible - [a society] in which human nature will have become so molded by social discipline into fitness for the social state, that it will need little external restraint, but will be self-restrained" (1864a, p. 131). Now, this charge levelled by Spencer against Comte is not justified. According to Comte, two types of authority must be distinguished: the spiritual authority of the priest or of the scientist, and the temporal authority, held in positive society by the industrials (Comte 1822, p. 88). Ultimately, as spiritual power becomes ever more effective in the course of evolution, all temporal - or political - power will dwindle, and almost disappear (Comte 1839, p. 783). The authority of society over the individual will no longer be wielded by a government, but through the influence of civilization: "L'ordre politique n'est et ne peut être que l'expression de l'ordre civil, ce qui signifie, en d'autres termes, que les forces sociales prépondérantes finissent, de toute nécessité, par devenir dirigeantes. [...] L'ordre politique est l'expression de l'ordre civil, [et] l'ordre civil n'est lui-même que l'expression de l'état de la civilisation" (Comte 1822, p. 107).

59 It should be noted that, from our modern vantage point, this aspect of Spencer's work is highly problematic: "[Spencer] passes easily, and apparently without any sense of the enormous jump he is making, from a description of the behaviour of single inanimate objects, and groups of them, to 'aggregates of men' and finally, without any warning, to 'society'" (Burrow 1966, p. 199).

60 Spiritual power is based on a greater moral merit: it is recognized to those who are most devoted to society (Aron 1967, p. 92).

61 It should be remembered that Comte argued that not only the man in the street, but the man of science himself, was unable to become passionate about this goal, since it involved too many intellectual operations (see quotation above).

62 "The modified human nature produced by prolonged social discipline, evolves at length the conception of an independent ethics - an ethics so far independent that it comes to have a foundation of its own, apart from the previously-alleged theological foundation" (Spencer 1876-96, p. 638). This view was shared by Comte (1844, pp. 65-67). However, he does not draw from this the some conclusions as Spencer. Comte also envisioned a positive system of morality; but this system, he contended, could be effectively implemented only through the intervention of a spiritual power: "Il est [...] incontestable que l'efficacité morale d'un tel régime exige, en chaque cas, outre la puissante impulsion résultée naturellement des préjugés publics, l'intervention systématique, tantôt passive, tantôt active, d'une autorité spirituelle, destinée à rappeler avec énergie les maximes fondamentales et à en diriger sagement l'application" (1844, pp. 70-71).

63 This does not, I believe, indicate a "contamination" of secularization theory by secularist assumptions, but only an odd revival of deceased social networks.

64 A first version of the thesis developed in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft was presented by Tönnies as a doctoral dissertation in 1881 at the University of Kiel (Leif 1946, p. 13), but the final version of the book was published only in 1887. Tönnies, a member of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, to which Max Weber also belonged, was always somewhat an outsider to the academic world. Although he remained affiliated with the University of Kiel for more than half a century, he was a full professor for only eight years (Heberle 1937, p. 145).

65 The two notions are, of course, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Although these German terms can readily be translated into English, the first as "community", the second as "society", I will follow a widespread practice (see the English edition I am using [Tönnies 1887], and also Heberle 1937), and use instead the German terms.

66 For a discussion of a few of these proposals, and of the way they relate to Tönnies', see Loomis 1957.

67 Even Durkheim's distinction between "mechanic" and "organic" solidarities is not often used as such in present-day sociological discourse; it is used mostly in discussions of Durkheim's work.

68 Indeed, a historical analysis of the genesis of the theory shows that this was Tönnies' starting point (Leif 1946, p. 13).

69 The notion of will must be understood in a very broad sense: as a matter of fact, it encompasses almost all of human nature, or at least all those aspects of human nature which are related to the motives that prompt human action (Leif 1946, p. 14).

70 Of course, this terminology was not invented by Tönnies; it was quite common in German at that time (1887, pp. 33-34). Tönnies only systematized its use. It should also be noted that Tönnies did not consider these concepts as corresponding to empirical types of societies, but merely as analytic abstractions.

71 1: Community of blood, based on vegetative life; 2: Community of locality, based on animal life; 3: Community of ideas, based on mental life (1887, p. 42).

72 In contrast, for example, with the situation obtaining in the family (type 1), where the common will expresses itself in the "family spirit".

73 It should be noted that public opinion is not simply an addition of the opinions of all members of society; it is the product of the thinking of the most enlightened of its members (1887, p. 220). The instrument of public opinion is the press, an immaterial power in many respects far more effective that the material power of the state itself (1887, p. 221).

74 A superficial reading could lead to the conclusion that the divergence concerned the role of government. Thus, according to Spencer, "M. Comte's ideal of society is one in which government is developed to the greatest extent [...], in which the individual life shall be subordinated in the greatest degree to the social life. [...] I hold [that we are progressing toward a society] in which government will be reduced to the smallest amount possible, and freedom increased to the greatest amount possible - [a society] in which human nature will have become so molded by social discipline into fitness for the social state, that it will need little external restraint, but will be self-restrained" (1864a, p. 131). Now, this charge levelled by Spencer against Comte is not justified. According to Comte, two types of authority must be distinguished: the spiritual authority of the priest or of the scientist, and the temporal authority, held in positive society by the industrials (Comte 1822, p. 88). Ultimately, as spiritual power becomes ever more effective in the course of evolution, all temporal - or political - power will dwindle, and almost disappear (Comte 1839, p. 783). The authority of society over the individual will no longer be wielded by a government, but through the influence of civilization: "L'ordre politique n'est et ne peut être que l'expression de l'ordre civil, ce qui signifie, en d'autres termes, que les forces sociales prépondérantes finissent, de toute nécessité, par devenir dirigeantes. [...] L'ordre politique est l'expression de l'ordre civil, [et] l'ordre civil n'est lui-même que l'expression de l'état de la civilisation" (Comte 1822, p. 107).

75 It should be noted that, from our modern vantage point, this aspect of Spencer's work is highly problematic: "[Spencer] passes easily, and apparently without any sense of the enormous jump he is making, from a description of the behaviour of single inanimate objects, and groups of them, to 'aggregates of men' and finally, without any warning, to 'society'" (Burrow 1966, p. 199).

76 Spiritual power is based on a greater moral merit: it is recognized to those who are most devoted to society (Aron 1967, p. 92).

77 It should be remembered that Comte argued that not only the man in the street, but the man of science himself, was unable to become passionate about this goal, since it involved too many intellectual operations (see quotation above).

78 "The modified human nature produced by prolonged social discipline, evolves at length the conception of an independent ethics - an ethics so far independent that it comes to have a foundation of its own, apart from the previously-alleged theological foundation" (Spencer 1876-96, p. 638). This view was shared by Comte (1844, pp. 65-67). However, he does not draw from this the some conclusions as Spencer. Comte also envisioned a positive system of morality; but this system, he contended, could be effectively implemented only through the intervention of a spiritual power: "Il est [...] incontestable que l'efficacité morale d'un tel régime exige, en chaque cas, outre la puissante impulsion résultée naturellement des préjugés publics, l'intervention systématique, tantôt passive, tantôt active, d'une autorité spirituelle, destinée à rappeler avec énergie les maximes fondamentales et à en diriger sagement l'application" (1844, pp. 70-71).

79 This does not, I believe, indicate a "contamination" of secularization theory by secularist assumptions, but only an odd revival of deceased social networks.

80 A first version of the thesis developed in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft was presented by Tönnies as a doctoral dissertation in 1881 at the University of Kiel (Leif 1946, p. 13), but the final version of the book was published only in 1887. Tönnies, a member of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, to which Max Weber also belonged, was always somewhat an outsider to the academic world. Although he remained affiliated with the University of Kiel for more than half a century, he was a full professor for only eight years (Heberle 1937, p. 145).

81 The two notions are, of course, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Although these German terms can readily be translated into English, the first as "community", the second as "society", I will follow a widespread practice (see the English edition I am using [Tönnies 1887], and also Heberle 1937), and use instead the German terms.

82 For a discussion of a few of these proposals, and of the way they relate to Tönnies', see Loomis 1957.

83 Even Durkheim's distinction between "mechanic" and "organic" solidarities is not often used as such in present-day sociological discourse; it is used mostly in discussions of Durkheim's work.

84 Indeed, a historical analysis of the genesis of the theory shows that this was Tönnies' starting point (Leif 1946, p. 13).

85 The notion of will must be understood in a very broad sense: as a matter of fact, it encompasses almost all of human nature, or at least all those aspects of human nature which are related to the motives that prompt human action (Leif 1946, p. 14).

86 Of course, this terminology was not invented by Tönnies; it was quite common in German at that time (1887, pp. 33-34). Tönnies only systematized its use. It should also be noted that Tönnies did not consider these concepts as corresponding to empirical types of societies, but merely as analytic abstractions.

87 1: Community of blood, based on vegetative life; 2: Community of locality, based on animal life; 3: Community of ideas, based on mental life (1887, p. 42).

88 In contrast, for example, with the situation obtaining in the family (type 1), where the common will expresses itself in the "family spirit".

89 It should be noted that public opinion is not simply an addition of the opinions of all members of society; it is the product of the thinking of the most enlightened of its members (1887, p. 220). The instrument of public opinion is the press, an immaterial power in many respects far more effective that the material power of the state itself (1887, p. 221).

90 A superficial reading could lead to the conclusion that the divergence concerned the role of government. Thus, according to Spencer, "M. Comte's ideal of society is one in which government is developed to the greatest extent [...], in which the individual life shall be subordinated in the greatest degree to the social life. [...] I hold [that we are progressing toward a society] in which government will be reduced to the smallest amount possible, and freedom increased to the greatest amount possible - [a society] in which human nature will have become so molded by social discipline into fitness for the social state, that it will need little external restraint, but will be self-restrained" (1864a, p. 131). Now, this charge levelled by Spencer against Comte is not justified. According to Comte, two types of authority must be distinguished: the spiritual authority of the priest or of the scientist, and the temporal authority, held in positive society by the industrials (Comte 1822, p. 88). Ultimately, as spiritual power becomes ever more effective in the course of evolution, all temporal - or political - power will dwindle, and almost disappear (Comte 1839, p. 783). The authority of society over the individual will no longer be wielded by a government, but through the influence of civilization: "L'ordre politique n'est et ne peut être que l'expression de l'ordre civil, ce qui signifie, en d'autres termes, que les forces sociales prépondérantes finissent, de toute nécessité, par devenir dirigeantes. [...] L'ordre politique est l'expression de l'ordre civil, [et] l'ordre civil n'est lui-même que l'expression de l'état de la civilisation" (Comte 1822, p. 107).

91 It should be noted that, from our modern vantage point, this aspect of Spencer's work is highly problematic: "[Spencer] passes easily, and apparently without any sense of the enormous jump he is making, from a description of the behaviour of single inanimate objects, and groups of them, to 'aggregates of men' and finally, without any warning, to 'society'" (Burrow 1966, p. 199).

92 Spiritual power is based on a greater moral merit: it is recognized to those who are most devoted to society (Aron 1967, p. 92).

93 It should be remembered that Comte argued that not only the man in the street, but the man of science himself, was unable to become passionate about this goal, since it involved too many intellectual operations (see quotation above).

94 "The modified human nature produced by prolonged social discipline, evolves at length the conception of an independent ethics - an ethics so far independent that it comes to have a foundation of its own, apart from the previously-alleged theological foundation" (Spencer 1876-96, p. 638). This view was shared by Comte (1844, pp. 65-67). However, he does not draw from this the some conclusions as Spencer. Comte also envisioned a positive system of morality; but this system, he contended, could be effectively implemented only through the intervention of a spiritual power: "Il est [...] incontestable que l'efficacité morale d'un tel régime exige, en chaque cas, outre la puissante impulsion résultée naturellement des préjugés publics, l'intervention systématique, tantôt passive, tantôt active, d'une autorité spirituelle, destinée à rappeler avec énergie les maximes fondamentales et à en diriger sagement l'application" (1844, pp. 70-71).

95 This does not, I believe, indicate a "contamination" of secularization theory by secularist assumptions, but only an odd revival of deceased social networks.

96 A first version of the thesis developed in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft was presented by Tönnies as a doctoral dissertation in 1881 at the University of Kiel (Leif 1946, p. 13), but the final version of the book was published only in 1887. Tönnies, a member of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, to which Max Weber also belonged, was always somewhat an outsider to the academic world. Although he remained affiliated with the University of Kiel for more than half a century, he was a full professor for only eight years (Heberle 1937, p. 145).

97 The two notions are, of course, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Although these German terms can readily be translated into English, the first as "community", the second as "society", I will follow a widespread practice (see the English edition I am using [Tönnies 1887], and also Heberle 1937), and use instead the German terms.

98 For a discussion of a few of these proposals, and of the way they relate to Tönnies', see Loomis 1957.

99 Even Durkheim's distinction between "mechanic" and "organic" solidarities is not often used as such in present-day sociological discourse; it is used mostly in discussions of Durkheim's work.

100 Indeed, a historical analysis of the genesis of the theory shows that this was Tönnies' starting point (Leif 1946, p. 13).

101 The notion of will must be understood in a very broad sense: as a matter of fact, it encompasses almost all of human nature, or at least all those aspects of human nature which are related to the motives that prompt human action (Leif 1946, p. 14).

102 Of course, this terminology was not invented by Tönnies; it was quite common in German at that time (1887, pp. 33-34). Tönnies only systematized its use. It should also be noted that Tönnies did not consider these concepts as corresponding to empirical types of societies, but merely as analytic abstractions.

103 1: Community of blood, based on vegetative life; 2: Community of locality, based on animal life; 3: Community of ideas, based on mental life (1887, p. 42).

104 In contrast, for example, with the situation obtaining in the family (type 1), where the common will expresses itself in the "family spirit".

105 It should be noted that public opinion is not simply an addition of the opinions of all members of society; it is the product of the thinking of the most enlightened of its members (1887, p. 220). The instrument of public opinion is the press, an immaterial power in many respects far more effective that the material power of the state itself (1887, p. 221).

106 In the Polish Peasant, another very important landmark in the development of empirical sociology, religion also appeared as a subject-matter worthy of study (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918, pp. 205-88; 1280-303). However, it appeared important mainly in the introduction, which presented the Polish peasant's traditional way of life, and the general analytical category underlying the whole study was disorganization, not secularization (which was apparently not mentioned).

107 For this reason, I will refer to the "Chicago paradigm", although Becker pursued his career at the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

108 This is confirmed by Martindale and Monachesi in their textbook: "We believe the [sacred-secular] terminology was initially used in his seminar by Robert E. Park at the University of Chicago" (TXT 1951, p. 204, n. 22).

109 One of Park's colleagues in Chicago.

110 "[...] done under the tutelage of Dr. Faris at the University of Chicago" (1928, pp. 756-57).

111 By needs, Becker refers to more than just biological needs.

112 Although Burgess was from the University of Chicago and must have known at least Redfield's theory, he did not refer to any literature in this particular article.

113 For an analysis of the numerous misunderstandings that accompanied Tönnies' reception in America, see Cahnman 1977.

114 Indeed, the sacred-secular dichotomy is widely recognized as one of the very numerous variations on Tönnies' typology (Loomis 1957).

115 This is also the conclusion reached by Hermann Lübbe (1964, p. 229).

116 Sociologists of religion have always been complaining that "American sociologists in the main may be predisposed to perceive religion as no longer exercising a crucial influence on social life and, therefore, to dismiss it as a suitable subject for inquiry" (Glock 1959, p. 175). David Martin has expressed the same view in stronger words: "To study religion is like studying a residual penumbra. Of all the different enclaves of contemporary specialization the sociology of religion most resembles the republic of Venice just before Napoleon snuffed it out for ever. [...] The proper place for religion is a footnote" (Martin 1966, pp. 355 and 358). Other authors have expressed similar complaints quite recently. No matter how justified these comments are today, they are certainly less justified than they were at the beginning of the century.

117 The chapter on religion was missing in 1934.

118 Third president of the ACSS.

119 Founder of the