Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

to the CC CPSU 

 

 

The Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, General Secretary of the CC PDPA, and 

Prime Minister of the DRA H. Amin recently has insistently been raising the issue of the necessity of 

sending to Kabul of a motorized rifle battalion for defense of his residence. 

 

 

Taking account of the situation as it has developed and the request, H. Amin considers it 

expedient to sent to Afghanistan the detachment of the GRU of the General Staff which has been 

prepared for these goals, with a complement of about 500 men, in a uniform which does not reveal 

its belonging to the Armed Forces of the USSR. The possibility of sending this detachment to the 

DRA was envisioned by the decision of the CC CPSU Politburo 

of 06.29.79 No. P 156/IX. 

 

 

Regarding the fact that issues related to the sending of the detachment to Kabul have been 

agreed with the Afghan side, we propose that it is possible to drop it in on airplanes of military 

transport aviation during the first half of December of this year. Cde. Ustinov, D.F. is in agreement. 

 

Yu. Andropov, N. Ogarkov 

No. 312/2/0073 

4 December 1979 

 

 

On the same day a meeting was held in Washington between national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski 

and the Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoliy Dobrynin at which they discussed the question of the ratification of the 

SALT-II treaty. Brzezinski anticipated that the treaty would be ratified in March 1980. They also discussed the 

prospects for Soviet-American cooperation: SALT-III, a visit to the US by Leonid Brezhnev in July 1980, a reduction 

in medium-range missiles…Not a word was said about Afghanistan. At the beginning of December, Margaret 

Thatcher paid a visit to the White House to coordinate the positions of Great Britain and the US at the December 

session of NATO where the issue of the stationing of American medium-range missiles in Europe targeted against the 

Soviet Union would be decided. 

 

 

After the conclusion of the training of the “Muslim” battalion, Col. Kolesnik was recalled to Moscow and 

went to work performing his daily duties. In accordance with the CC CPSU Politburo decision of 6 December the 

personnel and combat equipment of the “Muslim” battalion (520 men) were transported to Afghanistan on Military 

Transport Aviation aircraft on 9 and 10 December, to Bagram airfield. They were all dressed in Afghan uniforms, 

outwardly indistinguishable from local servicemen. This uniform had been sewn from samples sent through military 

intelligence channels. 

 

 

Soviet Ambassador Tabeyev informed Amin that his requests to send two Soviet battalions to reinforce the 

security of the residence of the head of state and Bagram airfield had been carried out. At the same time he informed 

him that the Soviet leadership was ready to receive him in Moscow on an official visit… 

 

 

Meanwhile in Moscow officials increasingly calculated that without Soviet troops it would be difficult to 

create the conditions for the removal of Amin from power, if this were even possible; it was risky to count on domestic 

opposition alone. Where were the guarantees that the Afghan army would accept and support  Karmal? And even if he 

managed to seize power, could he fight off the attacks of the armed opposition, whose resistance was growing 

constantly? 

The leadership was leaning more and more to the opinion that without Soviet troops it would be difficult to 

create the conditions for removing Amin. Even if such a thing were possible, the leadership believed, it would be risky 

to rely solely on internal opposition. Where was the guarantee that the Afghan army would support Karmal? And even 

if he successfully seized power, would he be able to repel the attacks of the armed opposition? The resistance was 

constantly growing. 

 

Behind the scenes there was great fuss regarding the decision to introduce troops onto Afghan territory. The 

leadership of the general staff tried to explain to Ustinov the situation in Afghanistan and measures for stabilizing it. 

V.I. Varennikov, at that time the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Main Operational 

Directorate, wrote: 

 

 

15

---

Feeling that the leadership of the country was at the threshold of changing their decision regarding 

the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, the Chief of the General Staff N.V.Ogarkov made a last 

attempt to convince the Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov not to do it. In connection with this he 

invited S.F. Ahromeev and myself and informed us that he would like, in our presence, to state the 

inexpediency of such a move and to substantiate [his claim.] If necessary, we were to support him. 

When we came to Ustinov’s office he was with the head of the Main Political Directorate 

A.A.Epishev. Nikolai Vasiilevich [Ogarkov] presented for a long time, trying to substantiate the 

inexpediency of such a move and to convince Ustinov of this. At the end of Ogarkov’s presentation 

the minister did not comment, but only ask Epishev, “Aleksey Alekseyevich, do you have any 

questions?” The head of the MPD responded: “No I don’t have any questions. The General Staff 

always have their own special opinion.” Ustionv noted: “This is true. But I will take the opinion of 

the General Staff into account.” I supported Ogarkov: “Comrade Minister of Defense, we feel that 

this is the last chance.” Ahromeev was quiet. As we were leaving, Ogarkov once again turned to 

Ustinov: “Dmitiry Fedorovich, we’re really counting on you.”  

 

According to the information of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul of that period:  

The Afghan opposition has considerably expanded its social base, strengthened its ranks, and created 

a base of operations on Pakistani territory. Anti-government uprisings have taken place as a result of 

the counterrevolution’s influence on the personnel of a number of garrisons, predominantly those far 

from headquarters. For examples, mutinies occurred in the 30

th

 Mountain Infantry Regiment 

(Asmar), the 36

th

 Infantry [Regiment] (Naray), the 18

th

 Infantry [Regiment] (Khowst), and other 

units which were isolated from their superior headquarters and which have received no support for a 

long time…The appearance of new IOA and IPA formations has been noted in the provinces of 

Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Paktia, Kapisa, Ghazni, Zabol, Kandahar, Ghowr, Badghis, Bamian, 

and Herat. About 70% of Afghan territory in which more than 10 million people live is under 

opposition control (or outside government control), practically the entire rural population… 

 

Moreover the fierce struggle in the Afghan leadership on the issue of the attitude toward the army led to considerable 

disorder in the DRA armed forces. The constant personnel shakeups, purges, repressions, and the forced conscription 

of youth into the army substantially undermined the cohesion and combat effectiveness of the troops. The Afghan 

army ended up considerably weaker and, from Amin’s statements, was not in a condition to defend the ruling regime 

and the sovereignty of the country by itself. However the main reason for the deployment of Soviet troops  was not 

due to the situation in the DRA. It was of a different nature. 

 

 

The memoirs of Academician Yevgeniy Chazov shed light on many circumstances. He wrote in his 1992 

book Zdorov’ye i Vlast (“Health and Power”):  

When now voices are sometimes heard, including from the former leadership, that the 

Politburo and CC CPSU were not informed about the true state of Brezhnev’s health, this is not even 

clever nor a subterfuge but a “white lie”. For those who knew and came to terms with the situation 

need to justify their silence and inaction somehow. Yes, to be quite honest, what could they have 

done? At that time all power was in the hands of “Brezhnev’s group” and this situation suited those 

in the leadership who were not in this group for they preserved their position and their future with an 

impotent Brezhnev….This also concerns the issue of the beginning of the Afghan war which is very 

painful for our country. 

 

 

I am not familiar with the details of the preparation for and the carrying out of the invasion 

of Afghanistan by our troops. If one believes some of the mass media then just four people – 

Ustinov, Gromyko, Andropov, and Tikhonov [SIC] – prepared and carried out this invasion and no 

one in the leadership or the CC knew what such an act… was to be. But…the members of the 

country’s leadership and CC members were constantly informed of the situation in Afghanistan. 

Hundreds of our representatives, including Party advisers, KGB officials, and military intelligence 

officers, had collected extensive material and submitted it to Moscow. 

 

 

For me the Afghan events began earlier than the deployment of our troops to Afghanistan. 

They began in the period when, on Amin’s order, the head of the Party (PDPA) and state, Taraki 

 

16

---