Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

political, economic, social and military consequences. We also signed the report 

and went to the minister of defense. When we came into Ustinov’s office, Ogarkov 

said that we had prepared the report together in his name and handed it to 

[Ustinov.] Dimitry Fedorovich [Ustinov] started to read slowly, making notes in 

the margins. I thought that his reaction would be turbulent, but Ustinov was 

outwardly calm, although intuitively we sensed his internal tension. Having 

finished reading, the minister took some [корочки] from his table and put two 

sheets of the report in them. He signed at the top of the first sheet, saying “this is 

for you, for the prosecutor.” He then closed the files, calmly returned the report to 

Ogarkov and said “You’re too late. The decision has already been made.” Ogarkov 

tried to protest once again: “Dimitry Fedorovich, the General Staff knows nothing 

about this. Our actions could be seen all over the world as expansionism.” “Once 

again I’m telling you that the decision has already been made. Therefore instead of 

discussing the actions of the Politburo you should be carrying out the decision 

Ustinov said agitatedly and made it clear that the conversation was over. We left 

the office and went back [to our offices.] Sergey Fedorovich Ahromeev stayed 

behind in the reception area. On the way Nikolay Vasilievich [Ogarkov] said to me 

“If the decision has been made, we need to prepare a directive.” Ogarkov went into 

his office (which was on the third floor – AL) and I went upstairs to the fifth floor. 

When I came into my office the telephone which was a direct line to the Chief of 

the General Staff rang: “ Valentin Ivanovich, while you were going upstairs I 

spoke with the minister – that is, he called me and ordered me to write a directive 

regarding the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. It seems that Sergey 

Fedorovich stayed behind to suggest to Ustinov’s assistance that such a document 

was needed. I will give the order to Abolins to write the draft of such a directive. 

You, also, should look at it and then come see me together.”  

 

 

That evening Ustinov convened the Collegium of the USSR Defense Ministry and informed [them]: a 

decision will obviously be made in the near future concerning the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and an 

appropriate military force [gruppirovka] needed to be prepared. Directive Nº 312/12/00133 was urgently sent to the 

field. Beginning on 10 December Ustinov began to issue verbal orders to Ogarkov to form a new combined-arms army 

in the Turkestan Military District; prepare an airborne division, an independent airborne regiment, and five Military 

Transport Aviation divisions for an airborne landing operation; increase the combat readiness of two divisions in the 

Turkestan Military district; bring the pontoon bridge regiment in the Kiev Military District up to full strength and send 

it to the Termez region…Everything was done secretly and with cover stories [legendirovalos’]. 

 

 

On 10 December the Commander of the 108

th

 Motorized Rifle Division Major-General Konstantin Kuz’min, 

en route to the “Krym” sanatorium, arrived in Tashkent where he remained in a hospital, expecting to fly to 

Simferopol’ the next day. But he was unexpectedly called by the Commanding General of the Turkestan Military 

District General-Colonel Yuriy Maksimov and ordered to immediately return to the division. 

 

 

The adviser to the Chief of the DRA Armed Forces Main Political Directorate Maj.-Gen. Vasiliy Zaplatin 

was urgently summoned from Kabul to Moscow on 10 December as a person who knew the state of affairs in the 

Afghan army thoroughly inasmuch as the new Chief Military Adviser, Magometov, was not yet sufficiently well 

acquainted with the situation in Afghanistan in a short period. He arrived at the Bagram airfield in the evening but he 

could not fly out that same day. The next day he first flew into Tashkent and then on to Moscow on another plane. He 

was taken right away to the office of the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army 

General Aleksey Yepishev, to whom Zaplatin reported in detail his perspective on the situation in the DRA and the 

Afghan army. 

 

 

On the morning of 12 December Zaplatin was summoned to see Ustinov. Ogarkov and Yepishev were also 

there in his office. Having heard Zaplatin’s report, Ustinov left, but Ogarkov, Yepishev, and Zaplatin discussed the 

situation which had developed in Afghanistan for a long time. According to Zaplatin, Ogarkov spoke consistantly 

against the deployment of Soviet troops to Afghanistan. 

 

 

19

---

 

When Ustinov returned he again listened to Zaplatin’s report and then showed him a cable from a folder 

signed by the KGB representative and gave it to the general to read. In the estimation of the KGB representative the 

situation in the DRA was approaching a critical point. Having read it, Zaplatin said that he would not have put his 

signature to this report. Ustinov asked, “Why?” He replied that the authors of the cable overdramatized the situation in 

the Afghan army. The minister said: “You there can’t agree but we here have to make a decision.” Then Ustinov 

added, ‘You are evaluating the situation in Afghanistan incidentally but they are answering for it with their heads.” 

Zaplatin said that he knew the sources of information the representatives of the special services were using, they did 

not inspire confidence, and therefore everything needed to be re-checked, but Ustinov replied – “It’s too late.” Zaplatin 

did not understand these words then and only much later did it become known to him that it was at a CC CPSU 

Politburo meeting, from which Ustinov had just come, that the decision to deploy troops to Afghanistan had been 

made. 

 

 

Actually the information from various sources was very contradictory and the solutions proposed were polar 

opposites. Moreover there was an unwritten rule – send primarily that information which would suit the leadership, 

that was in harmony with its positions, and “guess” the information which corresponded to the leaders’ notions about 

one or another issue and confirmed their prescience. Often the initial information sifted through the “strainer” of 

various echelons changed to the point of being unrecognizable. This forced Moscow into a very difficult position. 

Each department defended its own interests. Even so, politicians were obliged to hear out various opinions, analyze the 

situation deeply and from various angles, forecast the trend of developments of the military and political situation in 

the region and the world, and also consider the consequences of a deployment of troops and the reaction of the West. 

Only on this basis could the correct decision be made. But they chose another method – they were guided by old 

approaches and dogmas, although by that time the situation in the world had already changed to the detriment of the 

USSR. 

 

 

 

This step was insufficiently supported at informational and propaganda levels. The reference to the troops 

being introduced at the request of the DRA government was a propaganda ploy. There indeed were about 20 such 

requests in all sent via Soviet representatives. Amin made seven of them even after he had removed Taraki. In 

addition, there were personal appeals to the Soviet leadership at summit meetings and during telephone conversations. 

However, if specialists on Afghanistan had earlier cast doubt on the existence of such requests, accusing the USSR of 

treacherously invading the territory of a sovereign state with its troops, they later recognized that there were such 

requests but they had no legal force and it was wrong to refer to them since “the Russians removed and killed everyone 

who had invited them there.” In this there is common sense and its own logic. 

 

 

The decision of NATO foreign affairs and defense ministers at a meeting in Brussels on 12 December became 

the last drop tipping the scales in favor of the deployment of troops. They approved a scenario for stationing new 

American medium-range cruise and Pershing-2 missiles in Western Europe. 

 

Information for reflection 

 

 From 

Brussels 

 

 

The ministers of foreign affairs of the NATO countries in Brussels have approved a plan for 

stationing new medium-range missiles in Western Europe. The meeting was called exceptionally 

important and successful. According to the information, the US Secretary of State [Cyrus Vance] in 

particular stressed: “We have decided to implement a plan for the modernization of NATO nuclear 

forces.” 

 

 

It was decided at the meeting that the US would produce cruise and Pershing-2 missiles. 

Taken into service in Western Europe these missiles can hit Soviet territory. At the meeting attempts 

by the Soviet Union to convince NATO members to reject the stationing of these missiles were 

mentioned. The only country where this attempt was successful was the Netherlands, although there 

is information that they will submit their final decision in two years. Also, Belgium postponed 

consideration of this issue for six months. The remaining NATO members confirmed that any delay 

in implementing this plan is unacceptable. 

 

 

20

---