768
The Wealth of Nations
tal stock, to another set of persons (the creditors of the public,
who have no such particular interest ), the greater part of the rev-
enue arising from either, must, in the long-run, occasion both the
neglect of land, and the waste or removal of capital stock. A credi-
tor of the public has, no doubt, a general interest in the prosperity
of the agriculture, manufactures, and commerce of the country;
and consequently in the good condition of its land, and in the
good management of its capital stock. Should there be any gen-
eral failure or declension in any of these things, the produce of the
different taxes might no longer be sufficient to pay him the annu-
ity or interest which is due to him. But a creditor of the public,
considered merely as such, has no interest in the good condition
of any particular portion of land, or in the good management of
any particular portion of capital stock. As a creditor of the public,
he has no knowledge of any such particular portion. He has no
inspection of it. He can have no care about it. Its ruin may in
some cases be unknown to him, and cannot directly affect him.
The practice of funding has gradually enfeebled every state which
has adopted it. The Italian republics seem to have begun it. Genoa
and Venice, the only two remaining which can pretend to an in-
dependent existence, have both been enfeebled by it. Spain seems
to have learned the practice from the Italian republics, and (its
taxes being probably less judicious than theirs) it has, in propor-
tion to its natural strength, been-still more enfeebled. The debts
of Spain are of very old standing. It was deeply in debt before the
end of the sixteenth century, about a hundred years before En-
gland owed a shilling. France, notwithstanding all its natural re-
sources, languishes under an oppressive load of the same kind.
The republic of the United Provinces is as much enfeebled by its
debts as either Genoa or Venice. Is it likely that, in Great Britain
alone, a practice, which has brought either weakness or dissolu-
tion into every other country, should prove altogether innocent?
The system of taxation established in those different countries,
it may be said, is inferior to that of England. I believe it is so. But
it ought to be remembered, that when the wisest government has
exhausted all the proper subjects of taxation, it must, in cases of
urgent necessity, have recourse to improper ones. The wise repub-
lic of Holland has, upon some occasions, been obliged to have
recourse to taxes as inconvenient as the greater part of those of
Spain. Another war, begun before any considerable liberation of
the public revenue had been brought about, and growing in its
progress as expensive as the last war, may, from irresistible neces-
sity, render the British system of taxation as oppressive as that of
Holland, or even as that of Spain. To the honour of our present
system of taxation, indeed, it has hitherto given so little embar-
rassment to industry, that, during the course even of the most
769
Adam Smith
expensive wars, the frugality and good conduct of individuals seem
to have been able, by saving and accumulation, to repair all the
breaches which the waste and extravagance of government had
made in the general capital of the society. At the conclusion of the
late war, the most expensive that Great Britain ever waged, her
agriculture was as flourishing, her manufacturers as numerous and
as fully employed, and her commerce as extensive, as they had
ever been before. The capital, therefore, which supported all those
different branches of industry, must have been equal to what it
had ever been before. Since the peace, agriculture has been still
further improved; the rents of houses have risen in every town and
village of the country, a proof of the increasing wealth and rev-
enue of the people; and the annual amount of the greater part of
the old taxes, of the principal branches of the excise and customs,
in particular, has been continually increasing, an equally clear proof
of an increasing consumption, and consequently of an increasing
produce, which could alone support that consumption. Great
Britain seems to support with ease, a burden which, half a century
ago, nobody believed her capable of supporting, Let us not, how-
ever, upon this account, rashly conclude that she is capable of
supporting any burden; nor even be too confident that she could
support, without great distress, a burden a little greater than what
has already been laid upon her.
When national debts have once been accumulated to a certain
degree, there is scarce, I believe, a single instance of their having
been fairly and completely paid. The liberation of the public rev-
enue, if it has ever been brought about at all, has always been
brought about by a bankruptcy; sometimes by an avowed one,
though frequently by a pretended payment.
The raising of the denomination of the coin has been the most
usual expedient by which a real public bankruptcy has been dis-
guised under the appearance of a pretended payment. If a six-
pence, for example, should, either by act of parliament or royal
proclamation, be raised to the denomination of a shilling, and
twenty sixpences to that of a pound sterling; the person who, un-
der the old denomination, had borrowed twenty shillings, or near
four ounces of silver, would, under the new, pay with twenty six-
pences, or with something less than two ounces. A national debt
of about a hundred and twenty-eight millions, near the capital of
the funded and unfunded debt of Great Britain, might, in this
manner, be paid with about sixty-four millions of our present
money. It would, indeed, be a pretended payment only, and the
creditors of the public would really be defrauded of ten shillings
in the pound of what was due to them. The calamity, too, would
extend much further than to the creditors of the public, and those
of every private person would suffer a proportionable loss; and