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Position of the third parties.
Important factor is that members of the CIS and Shanghai group have
not supported the Russian military actions against Georgia and have not rec-
ognized independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the Final Declaration
of the Moscow Meeting of the CSTO member-states on September 5, 2008,
participants supported Russian military actions without enthusiasm, and re-
jected to recognize the firmer Georgian regions’ independence. It was of spe-
cial importance the reject of Belarus, as the main ally and satellite of Russia
at the post-soviet space, to recognize independence of the Georgian regions.
Furthermore, right from this moment we can witness open rapprochement of
Minsk with Brussels. 
Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis because of the overprice for gas in 2009
started not least because Russian Federation to guarantee support of Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan had signed with them in August-September 2008
agreements on supply of energy resources at the European prices, not taking
into account their possible decrease in the end of the  year (Russia and Uzbek-
istan…, 2008).  One of the reasons for such an agreement was wish to prevent
transportation of the Central Asian gas via the territory of Georgia and desire
to minimize support of the Caucasian states from the side of Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan. 
It is necessary to mention that despite the official denunciation of the
Russian actions from Ukraine and expressed support of Georgia, high per-
centage of the Ukrainian population, especially on the East and South of the
country, positively reflected the Russian actions. First of all, it took place be-
cause of the high level of confidence to the news programmes of the Russian
TV channels unlike Ukrainian ones.  Additionally, internal political confronta-
tion in Ukraine and activation of the pro-Russian parties contributed to this. 
Ukraine, not taking direct part in the conflict and in its settlement, nev-
ertheless faced serious threats and consequences of the Russian-Georgian
conflict, and de-facto lost information war when Russia accused it, in partic-
ularly concerning the “illegal” arms trade and existence of the “Ukrainian mil-
itary mercenaries” in Georgia. August crisis demonstrated a big role of the
information war and information filling as an instrument of the foreign policy.
Unfortunately, today Ukraine loses in such “disputes”. That is why it is neces-
sary to view all sides of the informational substance of the foreign policy of
Ukraine and reaction, especially in crises and disputes with other states. It is
also necessary to elaborate mechanisms of the adequate and rapid informa-
tional reaction and foreign media presence for objective highlights, receiving
of the information from the “first hands” by the citizens and political elites of
the foreign states.
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After the Russian-Georgian conflict, there were fears that the Russian
Federation could repeat that scenario in Moldova. Though such an idea has a
right for existence, it is impractical because on the Caucasus, the South Osset-
ian region has an immediate border with Russia, and this fact makes possible
a military intervention on the side of the separatist region. Transnistria has
borders only with Moldova and Ukraine. As Ukraine supports the territorial
integrity of Moldova, it makes impossible passage of the Russian troops
through its territory. However, there is still a possibility of the political influ-
ence on Moldova, threatening by the South Caucasian scenario. Thus, Moscow
can bolster influence on Chisinau insisting on Kozak Plan or any other peace
plan acceptance, which will allow Russian military contingent presence on
the territory of Transnistria during the next 20 years. Nevertheless, this pos-
sibility is reduced after the Communist party lost Parliamentary elections
2009.
Turkey appeared in August 2008 in a difficult situation. On one hand, it
is connected with Georgia by oil and gas pipelines projects, and is one of the
main investors in the infrastructural projects and economy of Georgia. On the
other hand, Turkey actively cooperates with the Russian Federation both in
energy sphere (Blue Stream Project) and in naval sphere (anticipation of the
NATO operation “Active Endeavors” expanding to the Black Sea region). More-
over, Russia promised to prohibit Russian tourists to visit Turkey in case of the
strong support of Georgia, and this could significantly influence the state
budget filling. 
When in August 2008 Russian bombers attacked oil pipeline Baku – Tbil-
isi – Ceyhan, usually safe in the relation with Russia, Turkey reacted very dras-
tic. Being a NATO member, Turkey allowed several naval ships of NATO states
(in particularly Germany, Spain, the USA and Poland) to enter the Black Sea
via Bosporus and Dardanelles aiming humanitarian aid to the population of
Georgia. In addition, Turkey helped Georgia with firefighting, which was
caused by the Russian bombing of the Borjomi-Kharagauli Forest Reserve. In
the mid of August, just after the events in South Ossetia, Prime Minister of
Turkey Mr. Erdogan tried to be a mediator in the conflict and met with Mr.
Medvedev and Mr. Putin. At the same time, Mr. Erdogan met President of Geor-
gia Mr. Saakashvili, according to whom “fraternal Turkey” granted the biggest
humanitarian aid to Georgia and promised to reconstruct Gori city
(Туреччина, 2008).
Armenia, which is the main partner of the Russian Federation on Cauca-
sus, appeared in the most difficult situation. De-facto its territory is isolated
because of the problematic relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Georgia is
the only link that connects Armenian territory with other states. That is why
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