European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)
April 2016
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The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is
the most water-stressed area in the world. In the
Levant sub-region, Jordan, Syria, West Bank/Gaza,
and Israel are already water scarce while two other
countries – Iraq and Lebanon – are ‘water stressed’.
This water challenge is a major problem for more
than simple development reasons – the domestic
instability that led into the Syria conflict was par-
tially driven by drought effects, and now the over-
flow of refugees is placing greater stress on dry
neighbours.
For a region that is expected to become drier yet
due to a changing climate, the potential for further
water-driven instability is significant. Responding
to this will require more than improved water sup-
plies. It will require integrated responses that ad-
dress technical, political and security challenges at
local and regional levels.
The Crescent – fertile no more?
The Levant has always been arid. But the challenge
of this natural aridity has been exacerbated by a
dramatic increase in population and the growing
impacts of climate change. In the last 30 years, the
populations of Syria, Iraq and Israel have more
than doubled and that of Jordan has almost tripled.
Since the late 1980s, the region has been struck by
a series of multi-year droughts, leading to increased
stress on groundwater reserves. A 2016 NASA study
calculated that 1998-2012 was the driest period to
strike the region in 900 years.
This drought has had a serious impact on regional
economies, particularly in the agricultural sector:
the number of people employed in agriculture has
plummeted, as has the portion of population living
in rural areas and the contribution of agriculture
to the economy. These trends are global, but have
been accelerated in the Levant, most notably in
Syria, where an estimated 1.3 million people were
pushed from rural to urban areas during 2006-
2010 as their crops and livelihoods dried up. These
shifts contributed to social and economic disrup-
tion, as large parts of the population were forced
into poverty. The government’s failure to address
the problems caused by the drought, among many
other failings, strengthened domestic opposition
and fed into the increasing domestic instability.
Rapid migrations such as in the Syrian case can
overload urban capacities to manage, in terms of
both infrastructure (sanitation, water and hous-
ing) and employment opportunities. Because both
Syria and Iraq are more reliant on agriculture to
supply jobs and contribute to GDP than their drier
neighbours Jordan and Israel, the resultant social
Ra
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Water and insecurity in the Levant
by Ido Bar and Gerald Stang
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)
April 2016
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disruptions have been more pronounced. But the
overspill of refugees from Syria and Iraq into Jordan
and Lebanon means that these states are also be-
coming severely affected.
Another consequence of rising water scarcity will
be the reduced capacity of these countries to ensure
food security. Local food shortages and rapid spikes
in food prices led to food riots and clashes with
government forces in several countries in the late
1990s, and again in 2008 and 2011. Dependence
on food imports is already above 50% in the Levant
and will continue to rise.
Water has also been the source of distrust across
borders, and has even contributed to violent con-
flict. The erection of the Israeli National Water
Carrier pipeline in the 1950s was perceived by
Syria and Jordan (both Jordan River riparian states)
as an act of aggression; construction sites were at-
tacked and several attempts to destroy the pipeline
were made. In the early 1960s, the Arab League-led
plan to divert the origins of the Jordan River into
Syria – limiting the amounts of water crossing over
to Israel – was considered to be a contributing fac-
tor to the 1967 war. Further north, Turkey’s unilat-
eral dam building changed flows in the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers, straining relations with down-
stream Iraq and Syria. This led to the deployment
of the Iraqi and Syrian armies to the Turkish border
in the 1970s. While that crisis de-escalated, water
relations remain tense among the three states.
Evolving water priorities
An understanding of these security challenges has
not always been integrated into the policies of in-
ternational actors working on water issues.
In the 1950s and 1960s, development aid was fo-
cused on meeting the demand for technical knowl-
edge and capital for economic growth. In the water
realm, this involved investment in infrastructure
and dams which could provide power, irrigation,
and flood control. In the last 30 years, more aid
has been focused on water sanitation and hygiene
(WASH). From 2007 to 2013, the EU committed
more than €2.4 billion to the water sector, mainly
for WASH, with water a focal sector for EU sup-
port in 28 countries. In the MENA region, 15%
of the population still lacks improved drinking
water sources and 18% lack improved sanitation,
but with much of this remainder concentrated in
the poorest countries, much aid for the region has
shifted to other focal sectors.
The money that is still spent on water issues is in-
creasingly focused on water governance – to limit
demand and pursue integrated management of
water systems. Jordan, for example, has benefited
from support to update its water policies and work
on integrated water management. It is still an ineffi-
cient water user – the rate of groundwater pumping
is still far above the replacement rate – but Jordan’s
agricultural sector has reduced the farming of wa-
ter-intensive grains. Now, barely 2% of the grains
consumed in Jordan are grown in the country.
But water is so integral to lives and economies that
technical support to water projects can only par-
tially address the wider challenges caused by in-
creasing water scarcity.
Aid, politics and crisis
Since the end of the Cold War, there have been two
major evolutions in aid work. The first is a greater
focus on poverty reduction, seeking to make the
greatest impact on the poorest sectors. The second
evolution has been an attempt to better understand
and work with the political realm. Rather than at-
tempting to stay apolitical and technocratic, politi-
cally smart development takes into account politi-
cal and security realities. An important example of
this is the new World Bank strategy for the MENA
region, which explicitly recognises peace and sta-
bility challenges, attempting to identify how devel-
opment work can address them, rather than work-
ing around them.
For the EU, both these evolutions are captured in
the 2011 Agenda for Change, which has strongly
informed programming for the 2014-2020 period.
For middle-income countries (which include all
the countries of the Levant except Israel), EU aid
has thus shifted to different focal areas. In Jordan,
EU aid targets the rule of law, energy, employment
and the private sector, while in Lebanon, security
sector reform, social cohesion, and natural resourc-
es management are focal sectors. In Iraq, the EU
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)
April 2016
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10
15
20
25
30
35
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Data source: The World Bank
Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)
had water and agriculture as a focal sector for the
2011-13 period, funding major projects on water,
sanitation and comprehensive water management.
However, oil-rich Iraq now has close to 90% ac-
cess to improved WASH facilities, so support has
shifted towards governance and rule of law is-
sues.
This makes sense since in richer countries, re-
source challenges are less about availability than
about prioritisation, management and governance.
Water is both a technical and a political issue. This
is why there is great value in effective application
of a comprehensive approach that integrates un-
derstanding of political and security issues into
development planning, and that raises the profile
of water, natural resource management and devel-
opment policy for diplomatic and security actors.
The impacts of water scarcity on security, and the
impacts of security problems on water manage-
ment, require joined-up analysis and cooperation
across disciplines. This includes integrating water
and natural resource issues into the policies, tools
and activities that diplomats can use to avert or
address crises.
The European Union has already made some
progress on this integration. At the transbound-
ary level, the European Council passed new con-
clusions on water diplomacy in 2013, prioritising
integrated and cooperative responses to political,
security, and transboundary challenges with-
in river basins. The EU also uses its Instrument
Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), which
is based on the principle that ‘future work on se-
curity and development should include the se-
curity and development implications of climate
change, environmental and natural resource man-
agement issues, and migration’. Another valuable
diplomatic tool is the Global Conflict Risk Index,
produced by the Joint Research Council of the
European Union, which includes water stress as a
potential factor in determining conflict risk.
The EU has also increased support for
long-term
resilience-building among vulnerable populations.
The EU has produced a smart Action Plan for
Resilience in Conflict-Prone Countries, supports
the Global Climate Change Alliance plus (GCCA+)
for the most climate vulnerable countries, and
runs the SHARE (Horn of Africa) and AGIR (Sahel
and West Africa) initiatives to improve food secu-
rity, nutrition, and livelihoods in a climate-proof
way. However, most countries in the Middle East
are not eligible for these projects for geographic or
wealth reasons, yet are among the countries most
affected by water stress, climate change, and the
resulting security consequences.
Supporting water management
Building on existing efforts, there are thus sev-
eral areas in which additional resources can be
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)
April 2016
4
dedicated to addressing the impacts of water scar-
city in the Levant.
To start, reducing the impacts of water scarcity re-
quires continued improvement in managing the
water itself – matching demand with sustainable
supply. This will involve emphasis on water con-
servation, particularly in the agricultural sector.
The proportion of freshwater dedicated to agricul-
ture ranges from 56% (Israel) to 88% (Syria) in the
Levant, but MENA irrigation efficiencies remain
well below 50%. This marks it as the key sector
for cutting water use, while being aware of its im-
portance for rural livelihoods and for contributing
to domestic food security. Increased use of water
pricing could help, but requires investment in
metering and data collection, as well as political
choices about subsidised water users.
On the supply side, greater diversification of wa-
ter sources can help avoid over-reliance on one
source. More effective treatment and re-use of
wastewater and greywater, for example, can play
a role in a rapidly urbanising region. Additional
investment in infrastructure will also be needed,
including transport and storage facilities and the
development of sustainable sources. Brand new
water sources, unfortunately, are hard to come by.
The MENA region leads the world in desalination,
for example, but with costs and energy require-
ments only gradually dropping, it is mostly used
in the driest and richest places such as in the Gulf
or in Israel.
These efforts at demand reduction or supply im-
provement should not occur in isolation but as
part of integrated water management systems that
take into account changing resource availability,
climate impacts and population needs when plan-
ning infrastructure and agriculture. International
donors can provide financial and technical support
for these initiatives, including by facilitating data
collection, research and technical cooperation. But
for the hard decisions about subsidies and domes-
tic distribution of resources, international actors
can only play a limited supporting role.
Addressing security risks
International actors can play a role, however, in
managing the wider impacts of water scarcity
on stability and security. While there has been
progress on understanding the links between wa-
ter and conflict, water issues are not always suf-
ficiently reflected in early warning tools or conflict
assessments. Increased research can help identify
potential local hotspots, with the understanding
that scarcity impacts can be felt across countries,
regions, and transmitted via markets across the
globe.
In responding to the
transboundary waters chal-
lenge, it is noteworthy that around the world it
is easier to find examples of cooperation than of
conflict. Even in the Middle East, the water coop-
eration between Jordan and Israel is an important
model. While the EU engages in water diplomacy,
notably in Central Asia and on the Nile, the Levant
has not been a priority. But the paucity of coop-
erative transboundary mechanisms in the region
suggests that additional external support can be
helpful, if not always readily welcomed. The even-
tual resolution of the Syrian conflict, for example,
will create a new situation in which to engage
on Turkey-Iraq-Syria water relations; in the long
term, support for water management can go be-
yond national settings to Joint Water Committees
that help allocate shared water resources at the ba-
sin level.
Insecurity risks can also be addressed through ex-
panded support for community resilience. On the
food security issue, the countries of the Levant can
be helped to adapt to increasing reliance on food
imports by facilitating local access to markets, re-
ducing trade barriers, and enhancing market in-
formation so that food price fluctuations can be
successfully managed. On the livelihoods issue,
extra support may be welcomed by countries that
are managing changes to the distribution of water
and the related livelihoods. Changes to agricul-
tural systems, water systems and land use often
have the biggest impacts on rural areas. Since even
positive investments in sustainable agriculture can
have a negative impact on agricultural employ-
ment, extra support may be required for disrupted
populations. This is especially the case during the
current migrant crisis: among the biggest limiting
factors in settling displaced populations within
the region is water availability.
In the end, while much of the effort to address
the wider consequences of water scarcity involves
action in the development arena, these efforts
can be most effective if they are embedded in a
comprehensive, conflict-sensitive, and politically
aware strategy that explicitly targets the potential
security risks.
Ido Bar is a Junior Analyst and Gerald Stang a
Senior Associate Analyst at the EUISS.
© EU Institute for Security Studies, 2016. | QN-AK-16-015-2A-N | ISBN 978-92-9198-448-0
| ISSN 2315-1110 | doi:10.2815/513715
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