Full page photo

ALLS 7(4):95-112, 2016

102
 

In his explanation of the nature of metaphor in Functional Grammar (FG), Halliady is on the belief that metaphor is " 
the variation in the expression of meaning" (1985: 320), and the "lexical selection is just one aspect of 
lexicogrammatical selection, or ' wording'; and that metaphorical variation is lexicogrammatical rather than simply 
lexical"(ibid). Halliday, furthermore, stresses the grammatical dimension of metaphor, so, "there is a strong element in 
rhetorical transference; and once we have recognized this we find that there is also such a thing as grammatical 
metaphor, where the variation is essentially in the grammatical forms although often entailing some lexical variation 
as well." Halliday, furthermore, has classified metaphors into two categories: metaphors of transitivity (ideational 
metaphors), and metaphors of mood and modality ( interpersonal metaphors). Transitivity, being a concept of the 
Hallidayan linguistic paradigm (1980:101), "specifies the processes that are recognized by the language, and the 
structure in which they are expressed." These processes are represented by the structure of the clause. In the light of 
Halliday's 
hierarchical grammatical constituency,
the group is a small grammatical unit in a larger grammatical unit, 
i.e., the clause. This elucidation will form the basis for the linguistic description or the linguistic circle, which will be 
interlinked to the aesthetic circle.
The aesthetic form, on the other riverside, will be interpreted in terms of Kant's 
Aesthetics
, more specifically, his 
Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment
. Kant has divided the process of aesthetic judgment into certain 
moment
s. The first 
moment or axiom is that "aesthetic judgment is free or pure of any such interests. 
Interest
is defined as a link to real 
desire and action. When saying, "That is a beautiful sunset," our saying involves an aesthetic judgment (or "judgment 
of taste"). Such a judgment is disinterested, meaning that we take pleasure in something because we judge it 
beautiful"(Immanuel Kant, 2016). The second Kantian moment or axiom is that "aesthetic judgment behaves 
universally. If I judge a certain landscape to be beautiful, then, I implicitly demand universality in the name of 
taste
"(ibid). 
Purposiveness
is the third Kantian moment or axiom. Kant argues that "beauty is equivalent neither to 
utility nor perfection, but still purposive. Beauty in nature, then, will appear as purposive with respect to our faculty of 
judgment, but its beauty will have no ascertainable purpose"(ibid). This is why beauty is pleasurable since, Kant 
argues(ibid), "pleasure is defined as a feeling that arises on the achievement of a purpose, or at least, the recognition of 
purposiveness." The fourth and the last axiom of the Kantian aesthetic paradigm is that of necessity. Kant thinks that " 
the judgment does not either follow or produce a determining concept of beauty, but exhausts itself in being 
exemplary precisely of an aesthetic judgment(ibid). The necessity of judgment is grounded upon " common sense," by 
which Kant means a priori principle of our taste, that is, our feeling for the beautiful"(ibid). This elucidation will form 
the framework for the aesthetic circle. The two circles of the textual analysis will be conjoined to realize the stylistic 
merit(s) of the whole text. Hence, the linguistic statement will be sustained by the aesthetic interpretation.