Future revolutions

The low Total is probably due to the fact that the elections took place in cities and the peasants in the countryside had no facilities enabling them to vote.

On January 5, 1918. this all-Russian Parliament - with all parties present - met. In this Parliament - unlike in the Workers and Soldiers Councils - Lenin's Party had only 25%. Most other Parties opposed Lenin's Peace with Germany. So Lenin dissolved this Parliament. He insisted on Peace at any cost. The leaders of all parties protested but the electorate craved Peace and did not oppose the dissolution of a Parliament that opposed it. After this brief interlude with political freedom Lenin introduced his one-party State. Very soon Luxemburg's prediction became reality with a vengeance. On August 30, 1918, Fanya Kaplan, member of the "Social Revolutionary Party" who spent 11 years in exile in Siberia for revolutionary activities against the Tsar, was so outraged by Lenin's dissolution of the Parliament that she shot Lenin. He survived and responded by outlawing all other political Parties. Later he also banned all opposition within his own Party. He lived till 1924 and after the assassination attempt strengthened the secret police which eventually killed millions of innocents, including many of Lenin's comrades. Lenin knew that his attempt to set up a state-owned economy in Russia with its 40 million illiterate peasants was a gamble. He pinned his hopes on revolutions in Germany, France, and Britain, with their big industrial working classes. A combined state-owned economy of Russia and Germany could set a model for the rest of the world. Germany had a revolution in 1918, but - unlike Russia its Social-Democrats wanted to reform Capitalism, not to replace it. German workers, unlike Russian, had free Trade-Unions. They voted for the Social-Democrats who became a majority in Parliament and refused to nationalize the economy.

The German Communist Party delayed publication of Luxemburg's article till 1922. Most communists never heard of it. This was a grave error, since wide publicity of her article could have saved millions of lives. If heeded it would have saved Socialism.

In December 1922, 2,215 delegates, from Communist Parties of Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, met in Moscow and declared the creation of the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (USSR). It was a State stretching from Finland to Alaska ruled by Lenin's Communist Party. A leading Party organizer named Joseph Stalin declared the creation of the new State, announcing:

" Let us hope, comrades, that by forming our Union Republic we shall create a reliable bulwark against international capitalism, and that the new Union State will be another decisive step towards the union of the working people of the whole world into a World Soviet Socialist Republic ". (see "The USSR" on the Internet)

The anthem of the international revolutionary Left - "The International"- calling for worldwide workers' revolution, was declared as the anthem of the USSR.

The delegates agreed, and the “Union of Soviet, Socialist, Republics” (USSR) was established.  Three of the four words describing the USSR were lies:

1) It was not a UNION but a strictly hierarchical Dictatorship.

2) It was not ruled by "Soviets" ("Councils") but by one political Party.

3) Its "REPUBLICS" were mere departments in the One-Party State. The public had no say in any "re-public'" and no "re-public" ever held elections.

Nonetheless, the USSR abolished private ownership of lands, factories, banks. The State owned, and planned, the entire economy providing all with guaranteed employment, state-paid housing-healthcare-education-pensions. This was the core of Socialism; hence most Marxists everywhere supported the USSR despite all their criticism of it. The USSR lasted till 1991. Then it dismantled itself without violence or civil war. Nothing similar ever happened in history. Why did a world Super-power disappear without violence? Only because most of its citizens refused to defend it.
What flaw in Marx's theory caused its inability to predict - or explain - such a major historical event as the USSR collapse? His theory of history sees struggles between social classes as the main drive in politics. In a State-owned economy no one owns machines/land/houses/shares. All economic decision-makers are paid employees. They can be dismissed. No one has a Bank account. They cannot pass their privileges to their children. So they are not a class. No classes - no class struggle. Hence Marxists were unable to understand social and political struggles in societies with state-owned economies. Marx's theory could neither predict, nor explain, social struggles in BG states. Why did a 70-year old State-owned, planned, economy, without a property-owning class, providing all citizens with full employment, state-paid housing, healthcare, education, and pensions, dissolve itself without even a minority of its citizens trying to defend it? The history of the USSR shows that when people suffer acute material misery they will tolerate a tyranny that alleviates this misery. But when peoples' basic needs are satisfied they value their freedom more than economic benefits granted them by an oppressor. In a society where all are employees the conflicts are about power not about profits. In such a society political equality matters more than economic equality. If run directly by all citizens it can provide both freedom and affluence, but if run by Party-appointed officials it is oppressive. Lenin's state collapse was not caused by economic crisis, war, or foreign intervention but by frustration accumulating for decades in its citizens lacking political freedom. The BG State failed, not the socialized economy. In 1919 many in Russia fought a 2-year civil war trying to resurrect the Tsarist state. In 1991 no one in the USSR fought a civil war to resurrect Lenin's BG state. Even today (2007), sixteen years after dissolving the USSR, with all the wisdom of hindsight, most former citizens of Lenin's state do not wish to resurrect it. They miss the benefits of a socialized economy but refuse to resurrect BG one-party State fearing it will abolish their political freedom. They want a socialized economy - without Big Government.

8. Stalin = industrialisation + terror
In 1922 Lenin created the post of "General Secretary" to handle his Party's administrative issues: to prepare inner party elections, to nominate people to party posts, to arrange congresses, to pay party officials. He proposed Stalin for the job. Stalin was elected. Shortly before his death in 1924 Lenin regretted his choice and sent brief notes to the small group leading his Party. The notes became known as "Lenin's Political Testament". (See the Internet). Lenin feared that a split in the leadership between Stalin and Trotsky could divide the Party - and country - into two hostile camps and start a new civil war.
Shortly before his death Lenin wrote to the leadership of his Party:

"…Stalin is too rude and this defect, although quite tolerable in our midst and in dealing among us Communists, becomes intolerable in a Secretary-General. That is why I suggest that the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post and appointing another man in his stead who in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in having only one advantage, namely, that of being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc. This circumstance may appear to be a negligible detail. But I think that from the standpoint of safeguards against a split and from the standpoint of what I wrote above about the relationship between Stalin and Trotsky it is not a [minor] detail, but it is a detail which can assume decisive importance. " (see the Internet).

After Lenin's death the leaders of his Party met to discuss this note and voted on Lenin's proposal to remove Stalin from the post of "General Secretary". But the outcome of their vote - rejected Lenin's advice – and entrenched Stalin in his post. Why did members of the leadership ignore Lenin's advice (a mistake for which they paid with their lives)? They were divided on the "New Economic Policy". Bukharin wanted to continue it, Trotsky opposed this. Both were creative thinkers inventing new ideas. Stalin was a traditional thinker who used other people's ideas. Bukharin feared Trotsky's brilliance would win a majority for his policy, so he preferred Stalin. Trotsky preferred Stalin to Bukharin so he did not vote against him. Zinoviev, Kamenev and Rykov feared Trotsky. They valued Stalin's intellectual inferiority more than his rudeness. This cost them their lives. Stalin was a plotter, not a theorist. In inner-party struggles the best plotter - not the best political thinker - wins. In ALL political Parties the best plotter outplots rivals to win the leadership. Mutual mistrust among the leaders made Stalin Head of the CP - and of the world Communist movement. Zinoviev and Kamenev supported him against Trotsky. A few years later he executed them, and assassinated Trotsky. In 1937 C.L.R James wrote: “What Zinoviev and Kamenev did not see [in 1924 A.O.] was that behind them in this quarrel the party bureaucracy would inevitable range itself; behind the Party bureaucracy was the State bureaucracy, and behind these were the Capitalist elements in the Soviet Union”

(“Rise and fall of the Communist International”, Secker & Warburg, 1937, p. 149)

In 1991 the officials of BG Party and State turned most BG states into BB states.
In 1924 Stalin became Head of the Party but many in the Party still opposed him. He used his role to gain total control. He expelled Trotsky and his supporters from the Party replacing them by his own loyalists. Then he used his men to expel Zinoviev's and Bukharin's supporters from the Party, replacing them with more of his own loyalists. By 1929 he was the undisputed leader of the Party, with no open opposition. Most biographers demonize him as a cold, cruel, killer. Demonization prevents understanding. Stalin was a pragmatist, not a theorist. He concluded that in the near future there would be no more revolutions outside Russia. He had no doubt BB states would strive to destroy Lenin’s BG state and its state-owned economy. Its sheer existence threatened theirs. Defending BG concerned Stalin far more than promoting new revolutions. His supporters were the officials who ran the Party and State. He appointed them. Their roles made them an elite. They acted to defend their roles - and the regime. So did he. They feared revolutionaries like Trotsky and Bukharin, who "rocked the boat" advocating revolutions in all domains and countries. Officials crave stability, detest revolutionaries, and mistrust the population. Their roles - and lives - depended on Stalin. His role - and life - depended on them. Together they killed revolutionaries, imprisoned oppositionists and terrorized the population. Stalin - and the officials of BG State and Party he appointed - eliminated the Revolutionaries.

Stalin used his skill as a plotter to install his loyalists as leaders of the Comintern and most foreign Communist Parties. In the 1930s people loyal to his policy of "Defending the USSR" replaced most founders of Communist Parties dedicated to revolution. Stalinists replaced revolutionists. The world Communist movement became a church with Stalin its Pope. Doubting his infallibility meant that the CP - and Socialism - could be wrong. This was unacceptable. All Stalin's policies were accepted without hesitation or criticism by all CPs. Not out of fear but due to blind trust in the only Party that had carried out a successful revolution and set up a state-owned economy. This Party's leader - whoever he was - represented the first revolution that succeeded to set up a State-owned economy.

For most communists doubting Stalin's policy meant doubting the Revolution and the State-owned economy. How could one fight for what one doubts?

Ignazio Silone, leader of the clandestine Italian Communist Party in Mussolini's Fascist Italy, attended meetings of the Comintern leadership, and described this attitude - and Stalin's plotting tactics - as he witnessed them:

"In May 1927, as a representative of the Italian Communist Party, I took part with Togliatti (leader of Italian Communist Party (ICP) A.O.) in an extraordinary session of the enlarged Executive of the Comintern. Togliatti had come from Paris where he was running the political secretariat of the Party, and I from Italy, where I was in charge of the underground organization (in 1925 Mussolini established his Fascist dictatorship in Italy and declared the Communist Party illegal. Many Communists were killed and arrested and the ICP became a clandestine organization. A.O.) . We met in Berlin and went to Moscow together. The meeting - ostensibly summoned for an urgent discussion of what direction should be given to the Communist Parties in the struggle "against the imminent imperialist war", was actually designed to begin the "liquidation" of Trotsky and Zinoviev, who were still members of the Comintern's Executive. As usual, to avoid surprises, the full session had been preceded - and every detail prepared - by the so-called Senior-convener, consisting of the heads of the most important delegations. Togliatti on that occasion insisted, that I should accompany him to these restricted sittings. According to the rules, only he had a right to attend on behalf of the Italian delegation; but rightly foreseeing what complications were about to arise, he preferred to have the support of the representative of the clandestine organization. At the first sitting which we attended I had the impression that we had arrived too late. We were in a small office in the Comintern Headquarters. The German Thalemann was presiding and began reading out a proposed resolution against Trotsky, to be presented at the full session. This resolution condemned, in the most violent terms, a document which Trotsky had addressed to the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party. The Russian delegation at that day's session of the Senior-convener was an exceptional one - Stalin, Rykov, Bukharin, and Manuilsky.

At the end of the reading Thalemann asked if we were in agreement with the proposed resolution. The Finn Ottomar Kuusinen found that it was not strong enough. "It should be said openly" he suggested "that the document sent by Trotsky to the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party is of an entirely counter-revolutionary character and constitutes clear proof that the man who wrote it no longer has anything in common with the working class." As no one else asked to speak, after consulting Togliatti, I made my apologies for having arrived late and so not having been able to see the document which was to be condemned. "To tell the truth" Thalemann declared candidly "we haven't seen the document either".

Preferring not to believe my ears I repeated my objection in other words: "It may very well be true" I said, "that Trotsky's document should be condemned, but obviously I cannot condemn it before I've read it". "Neither have we" repeated Thalemann, “neither have the majority of the delegations present here except for the Russians, read the document". Thalemann spoke in German and his words were translated into Russian for Stalin and into French for two or three of us. The reply given to me was so incredible that I rounded on the translator. "It's impossible" I said "that Thalemann should have said that. I must ask you to repeat his answer word for word". At this point Stalin intervened. He was standing over at one side of the room, and seemed the only person present who was calm and unruffled. "The Political Office of the Party" said Stalin "has considered that it would not be expedient to translate and distribute Trotsky's document to the delegates of the International Executive, because there are various allusions in it to the policy of the Soviet State". (The mysterious document was later published abroad by Trotsky himself in a booklet entitled "Problems of the Chinese revolution" and as anyone can today see for himself it contains no mention of the policy of the Soviet State but a closely reasoned attack on the policy practiced in China by Stalin and the Comintern. In a speech of April 15 1927, in the presence of the Moscow Committees, Stalin had sung the praises of Chiang Kai-Shek and confirmed his personal confidence in the Kuomintang (Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party. A.O.) . This was barely a week before the famous anti-Communist volte-face of the Chinese Nationalist leader and of his Party. The Communists were expelled from the Kuomintang overnight; tens of thousands of workers were massacred in Shanghai and, a month later, in Wuhan. It was natural therefore that Stalin should have been anxious to avoid a debate on these matters seeking to protect himself behind a screen of 'raison d'Etat.').

Ernst Thalemann asked me if I was satisfied with Stalin's explanation. "I do not contest the right of the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party to keep any documents secret" I said "But I do not understand how others can be asked to condemn an unknown document". At this indignation against myself and Togliatti, who appeared to agree with what I had said, knew no bounds. It was especially violent on the part of the Finn, whom I have already mentioned, a Bulgarian and one or two Hungarians. "It is unheard of" cried Kuusinen, very red in the face, "that we still have such petty-bourgeois in the fortress of World Revolution. He pronounced the words "petty-bourgeois" with an extremely comical expression of contempt and disgust. The only person who remained calm and imperturbable was Stalin. He said: "If a single delegation is against the proposed resolution, it should not be presented." Then he added "Perhaps our Italian comrades are not fully aware of the internal situation. I propose that the sitting be suspended until tomorrow and that one of those present should be assigned the task of spending the evening with our Italian comrades and explain our internal situation to them"

The Bulgarian Vasil Kolarov was given this ungrateful task. He carried it out with tact and good humour. He invited us to have a glass of tea that evening in his room at the Hotel Lux. He faced up to the thorny subject without much preamble.

"Let's be frank" he said to us with a smile "Do you think I've read the document? No I haven't. To tell you the whole truth I can add that that document doesn't even interest me. Shall I go further? If Trotsky had sent me a copy here secretly, I'd refuse to read it. My dear Italian friends this isn't a question of documents. I know that Italy is a classic country of academies, but we aren't in an academy here. Here we are in the thick of a struggle for power between two rival groups of the Russian Politburo. Which of the two groups do we want to line up with? That's the point. Documents don't come into it. It's not a question of finding the historic truth about an unsuccessful Chinese revolution. It’s a question of a struggle for power between two hostile - irreconcilable - groups. One's got to choose. I'm for the majority group. Whatever the minority says or does, whatever document it draws up against the majority, I repeat to you that I'm for the majority. Documents don't interest me. We aren't in an academy here." He refilled our glasses with tea and scrutinized us with the air of a schoolmaster obliged to deal with two unruly youngsters. "Do I make myself clear?" he asked addressing me specifically. "Certainly" I replied. "Very clear indeed". "Have I persuaded you?" he asked again. "No" I said. "And why not?" he wanted to know. "I should have to explain to you" I said "why I am against Fascism". Kolarov pretended to be indignant, while Togliatti expressed his opinion in more moderate, but no less succinct, terms. "One can't just declare oneself for the majority or for the minority in advance" he said, "One can't ignore the political base of the question". Kolarov listened to us with a benevolent smile of pity "You're still too young" he explained as he accompanied us to the door. "You haven't yet understood what politics are all about".

Next morning in the Senior-convent, the scene of the day before was repeated. An unusual atmosphere of nervousness pervaded the little room into which a dozen of us were packed. "Have you explained the situation to our Italian comrades?" Stalin asked Kolarov. "Fully" the Bulgarian assured him. "If a single delegate" Stalin repeated "is against the proposed resolution it cannot be presented in the full session. A resolution against Trotsky can only be taken unanimously. Are our Italian comrades" he added turning to us "favourable to the proposed resolution?"

After consulting Togliatti I declared: "Before taking the resolution into consideration we must see the document concerned" The Frenchman Albert Treint and the Swiss Jules Humbert-Droz made identical declarations (both of them, a few years later, also ended outside the Comintern). "The proposed resolution is withdrawn" said Stalin. After which we had the same hysterical scene as the day before, with the indignant, angry, protests, of Kuusinen, Rakosi, Pepper, and the others. Thalemann argued from our "scandalous" attitude that the whole trend of our anti-Fascist activity in Italy was most probably wrong and that if fascism was still so firmly entrenched in Italy it must be our fault. He asked because of this that the policy of the Italian Communist Party should be subjected to a thorough sifting.

This was done and as a reprisal for our "impertinent" conduct those fanatical censors discovered that the fundamental guiding lines of our activity, traced in the course of the previous years by Antonio Gramsci, were seriously contaminated by a petty-bourgeois spirit. Togliatti decided that it would be prudent for us to address a letter to the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party explaining the reasons for our attitude at that meeting of the Executive. No communist, the letter said in effect would presume to question the historical pre-eminence of our Russian comrades in the leadership of the Comintern. But this pre-eminence imposed special duties on our Russian comrades. They could not apply the rights it gave them in a mechanical and authoritarian way. This letter was received by Bukharin who sent for us at once and advised us to withdraw it so as not to worsen our already appalling political situation." ("The God that failed" Columbia University Press. 2001 p 106)

But this wasn't the end of the affair. "In Berlin, on my way back, I read in the paper that the Executive of the Comintern had severely rebuked Trotsky for a document he had prepared about recent events in China. I went to the offices of the German Communist Party and asked Thalemann for an explanation. "This is untrue" I said to him sharply. But he explained that the statutes of the Comintern authorized the Presidium, in case of urgency, to adopt any resolution in the name of the Executive. During the few days I had to stay in Berlin, while waiting for my false documents to be put in order, I read in the papers that the American, Hungarian and Czechoslovak Communist Parties had energetically deplored Trotsky's letter. "Has the mysterious document finally been produced then?" "No" he answered me "But I hope the example set by the American, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak Communists has shown you what Communist discipline means. These things were said with no hint of irony but indeed with dismal seriousness that befitted the nightmare reality to which they referred." ("The God that failed" p. 111)

Why did German, American, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak communists behave like this? In 1927 communists outside the USSR did not fear reprisals by Stalin. Togliatti remained leader of the Italian Communist Party till his death in 1964. Support for Stalin at that time was not due to fear. Fervent support for USSR was typical of most communists everywhere. Their sense of criticism - sharp and alert when dealing with BB economies - became paralyzed when dealing with Lenin’s BG state. Even leaders like Bill Haywood, founder of the American IWW (Industrial Workers of the World) suffered from this symptom.{see “Living my Life” by Emma Goldman, Vol.2 p..915). Later, in the 1930s, Stalin's response to dissidents changed and many feared to criticize him lest they - or their families - lose their jobs, freedom, or lives. But in the 1920's Communists did not fear Stalin, yet they adamantly refused to criticize him. For two reasons:

1. Fear of disillusionment.

Many feared that if the leader of the USSR was wrong then something could be wrong with a state-owned economy. Maybe even with Marx' theory. This would shatter their hope that a state-owned, planned, economy would solve all social ills. If it doesn't, then why make a revolution? They feared to lose hope. For many people hope is more important than life, and loss of hope is worse than loss of life.

2. Respect for the only party that succeeded to carry out a socialist revolution.

Any leader of that party (if Trotsky, Bukharin or Kirov, were leaders the attitude would have been the same) was not s person but a symbol, symbolizing - to most communists everywhere - the Party, and the Party symbolized the Revolution. They believed - wrongly - that loyalty to the leader was loyalty to the revolution.

Ignazio Silone recounts an incident which illustrates the adoration of Lenin:

" One of my best friends, the Head of the Russian Communist Youth, Lazar Schatzky, one evening confided to me how sad he was to have been born too late, and not to have taken part either in the 1905 or 1917 revolutions. "But there'll still be revolutions", I said to console him, "There'll always be need of revolutions, even in Russia". We were in the Red Square, not far from the tomb of Lenin. "What kind?" he wanted to know, "And how long have we got to wait?" Then I pointed to the tomb, which was still made of wood at that time, and before which we used to see everyday an interminable procession of poor ragged peasant slowly filing. "I presume you love Lenin", I said to him "I knew him too and have a very vivid recollection of him. You must admit with me that this superstitious cult of his mummy is an insult to his memory and a disgrace to a revolutionary city like Moscow". I suggested to him, in short, that we should get hold of a tin or two of petrol, and make "a little revolution" on our own by burning the totem hut. To be frank, I did not expect him to accept my proposal there and then, but at least I thought he would laugh about it. Instead of which my poor friend went very pale and began to tremble violently. Then he begged me not to say dreadful things of that kind, either to him or still less to others. (Ten years later, when he was being searched for as an accomplice of Zinoviev, he committed suicide by throwing himself from the fifth floor of the house he lived in).

I have been present at the marching-past of immense parades of people and armies at the Red-Square, but in my mind the recollection of that young friend's emotion and of his frightened and affectionate voice has remained stronger than any other image there. It may be that that memory is "Objectively" more important".

("The God that failed" Columbia University Press, 2001, p.102)
Not only Schatzky's adoration was genuine, so was that of the peasants filing past Lenin's tomb. It wasn't a "superstitious cult of a mummy" but a voluntary gesture of respect for the man who gave them land. No one forced them to visit his grave, and to reach Moscow they had to overcome many difficulties. Yet they undertook these hardships to express their gratitude. When millions of mourners kept filing past Lenin's coffin after his death in 1924 the political leadership decided - against protests by Lenin's widow - to embalm his body, and use the mourners as a symbol of support for the regime. Mourners came to pay homage to the man, not to the regime.
The conflict between Stalin and Trotsky had its personal causes. Stalin was jealous and paranoid. He envied, hated and feared Trotsky's brilliance as thinker and orator, whose predictions were repeatedly confirmed while his own failed repeatedly. Trotsky's intellectual arrogance caused him to underestimate Stalin and to ignore his skill as a plotter. Trotsky despised Stalin as stupid, dishonest, and vulgar. Stalin knew Trotsky had the ability - and credentials - to replace him as leader of the USSR and of the world revolutionary movement. He knew that if he committed a big blunder Trotsky could replace him. While Trotsky was alive Stalin was replaceable so he felt politically insecure. This motivated him to kill Trotsky in Mexico even as late as 1940, though he knew Trotsky had neither men nor means to harm him.
However, the basic reason for the conflict between Stalin and Trotsky was not personal but political and would have surfaced anyway, even with different personalities. Its causes are rooted in Marx's theory. Marx believed that economic collapse of BB economies and the rise of State-owned, planned, economies is an inevitable phase in the evolution of all societies. However, this could not occur simultaneously all over the world but was bound to start in industrial societies and spread gradually to all others. How should a state with a state-owned economy relate to states with a BB economy which have not yet had a revolution? Marx never considered this problem. Moreover, a socialized economy in an agricultural society of 140 million illiterate peasants contradicted his theory.

After achieving power Lenin faced a new problem: What foreign policy to conduct? To act as a State or as a revolutionary? To seek normal relations with BB states or to help their revolutionaries to overthrow them? (The same problem caused the split between Castro and Che Guevara in 1965). All BB states were hostile to Lenin's BG, so how ought the USSR to defend itself? Two foreign-policy strategies were possible.

1) To help revolutionaries in BB States to make more revolutions. (As Ho-Chi-Min, leader of North Vietnam, used to say: "The best way to help Vietnam is to make a revolution in your own country"). This meant constant conflict with all BB states.

2) To establish normal relations with BB states and to try convincing them that the USSR has no intention to overthrow them, thus reducing their hostility to USSR. This implied minimal support for other revolutionaries. The first approach was called "Permanent Revolution" - the second "Socialism in One Country" (where revolution won - rather than everywhere). The two contradicted each other. Lenin did not resolve this contradiction. He created the "Comintern" to promote revolutions in BB states and also embassies in BB states to promote normal relations with them.

Trotsky supported "Permanent Revolution". Stalin - "Socialism in One country".

When Stalin won the power struggle in his Party he redefined "a revolutionary" as: "One who always defends the USSR". This changed the priorities of all communists - from making a revolution in their own country, to defending the USSR. Acceptance of this principle turned revolutionaries into Stalinists. Any revolution causing problems for the USSR had to be abandoned. In 1943 Stalin dismantled the Comintern and changed the anthem of the USSR from "The International" to a patriotic song praising the USSR In its 1944 version the line "Long Live our Soviet Motherland" is repeated three times but revolution is not mentioned once. The original anthem calling for a revolution of workers all over the world ceased to be the USSR's anthem. This expressed Stalin's home and foreign policies.

A Yugoslav communist leader (Milovan Djilas) who visited Stalin in 1943 recalled that Stalin said to him:"…The situation with the Comintern was becoming more and more abnormal. Molotov and I were racking our brains [how to improve relations with USA and UK during WW2. A.O] while the Comintern was pulling in its own direction and the discord grew. It is easy to work with Dimitrov [the Bulgarian leader of the Comintern. A.O.] but with the others it was harder. Most important of all, there was something abnormal, something unnatural about the very existence of a general Communist forum when the Communist parties should have been searching for a national language and fight under the conditions prevailing in their own countries" ("Conversations with Stalin" by Milovan Djilas, Harcourt, Brace, New York 1962.p.80). Djilas adds that Dimitrov himself told him: "It was apparent that the main power in the spread of Communism was the Soviet Union and that therefore all forces had to gather around it." [same book p.33]

The original definition: "Revolutionaries are those who make revolutions" was denounced by Stalin as "irresponsible adventurism". He replaced it by a new one:

"Revolutionaries are those who always, and everywhere, defend the USSR" .

Stalin feared that if the USSR supported revolutions in other countries their rulers would try to destroy the USSR. Trotsky argued that this would be the case even if the USSR did not support revolutions. Anti USSR policies were not a response to USSR's foreign policy but to its socialized economy. States with BB economies - afflicted by unemployment - feared the attraction a socialized economy had on their own unemployed. Guaranteed employment, state-paid housing-healthcare-education were very attractive to unemployed, underpaid, and unpensioned workers in BB economies, who could not afford to send their children to college, or pay a doctor.

The sheer existence of a state-owned economy showed that it was a viable alternative. Women in the USSR had full equality in jobs and wages, and legalized abortions paid by the state, while in BB economies abortions were a crime or very expensive. Many unemployed saw the socialized economy as a desirable option. This scared all states with BB economies. They knew the USSR would not attack them as its leaders believed BB economies must collapse due to economic crises. They feared that BG’s social benefit will influence their own unemployed to act for a state-owned economy in their own country. So they demonised the USSR regime and tried to topple it.
To reduce hostility to the USSR Stalin decided to restrain revolutions everywhere. Trotsky argued that this would not reduce hostility to the USSR. In 1927 Stalin supported the Chinese Nationalists led by Chiang-Kai-Shek while Trotsky argued against this. Stalin ordered the Chinese communists to form an alliance with Chiang-Kai-Shek. This put them under Chiang's control who used the first opportunity to massacre them. In 1937, when Japan invaded China and the USA gave Chiang arms to fight Japan, they asked him: "Why do you use our weapons against Chinese Communists rather than against the Japanese invaders?" He replied: "Because the Japanese are like a rash on the skin but the communists are a cancer". He was right.

In 1945 Japan surrendered. In 1949 Mao-Tse-Tung's Communists defeated Chiang-Kai-Shek's nationalists and set up a state-run economy in China. In a country of 400M people. Where millions died of hunger they saw to it that every citizen got one cup of rice per day. This alone was a major achievement. Since then China's population has increased to 1.5 billion all of whom eat, dress, and live, incomparably better than they did before Mao’s regime. The case for a state-owned economy gained more by Mao's victory than by Stalin's policy of curbing Mao's revolutionary zeal and alliance with the nationalists. Trotsky predicted this and was proved right again.

In the 1950s and 1960s the USSR's foreign policy faced the same dilemma when struggles for independence started in British, French, Portuguese, Belgian, and Dutch colonies in Africa and Asia. Liberation struggles were led by two groups: Nationalists and Marxists. The nationalists wanted independence, the Marxists - independence and a state-run economy. USSR rulers continued Stalin's policy by supporting mostly nationalists, not Marxists. They feared that support for a state-run economy would increase hostility to the USSR. In Cuba, Fidel Castro - while fighting in the Cuban mountains (1957/8) against the corrupt Batista regime - was denounced by communists everywhere (including in Cuba) as a "petty bourgeois adventurer".

In addition to this dilemma in Foreign Policy, the USSR faced a dilemma in its agricultural economy. Its 140 Million Peasants with their privately run farms, who originally supported Lenin, were bound to come into conflict with the State-owned, planned, economy. In 1921 Lenin approved the "New Economic Policy" allowing the peasants to sell part of their produce at their own prices (the other part was sold to the State at fixed price and ensured basic food rations to all citizens). The taxes imposed on the peasants enabled the regime to pay for industrialization, to build dams, power stations, and heavy industry. But the pace of industrialization was slow, and the peasants found that their money could not buy much. The peasants' lack of motivation could slow down industrialization and cause food shortages. Food production was in the hands of the peasants, not of the state. In 1928 Stalin decided to take a drastic step by abolishing all private farms and setting up collective, state-owned, farms. 140 million peasants lost their farms overnight. At a stroke he turned all peasants into enemies of the USSR. From supporters of Lenin they turned overnight into enemies of Stalin. In 1929 he set up state-owned communal farms ("Kolkhozes") and forced the peasants into them. It was a fateful decision, causing a famine in which seven million peasants died. To make the peasants work Stalin terrorized them by arresting 20 millions and sending them to forced-labour camps. A network of forced-labour camps ("Gulag") was set up all over the USSR and millions were forced to work in abysmal conditions. Experts estimate that introducing state-owned agriculture cost the lives of 20M peasants. In 1928 Stalin introduced his first "Five Year Plan" to accelerate industrialization. Its success was declared already in 1932 but Stalin said the USSR was 50 years behind the world's industrial powers, and must "industrialize or be crushed" by its enemies. Starting in 1928, the first ‘Five-Year plans’ built the foundation for a heavy industry in Russia’s underdeveloped economy without waiting years for capital to accumulate through the expansion of light industry, and without reliance on foreign loans. The country was industrialized at an unbelievable pace, surpassing Germany’s pace of industrialization in the nineteenth century and Japan’s earlier in the twentieth. After reconstructing the economy, and after the initial plans of further industrialization were fulfilled, the rate of growth slowed down, but it still surpassed most other countries in terms of total material production (GDP).

Despite difficulties with the first plan, Stalin went ahead with the Second Five Year Plan in 1932. The Second Five-Year Plan (1932-1937) brought a spectacular rise in steel production, more than 17 million tons, placing the USSR close to Germany as one of the world’s major steel-producing countries. The second 5-year plan was not uniformly successful, failing to reach the recommended production levels in such crucial areas as coal and oil. However, industrialization progressed fast and by 1938 the USSR was an industrial power. In 1941 it produced 6590 tanks while Germany (whose “Blitzkrieg” war depended on tanks) produced only 5200. In 1942 (during WW2) USSR produced 24.446 tanks and Germany only 9300. In 1941 USSR produced 15,735 aircraft but Germany only 11,776. In 1942 it produced 25,436 aircraft and Germany only 15,556. The industrial workforce in USSR was 11M in 1941 while the German was 16M. Considering that USSR state-owned economy began to industrialize only in 1921 in a devastated backward country without experts or loans from abroad, its achievements were amazing. However, the hardships caused by industrialization initiated secret opposition to Stalin even within his party. Stalin worried he might be replaced by Kirov, the Party leader in Leningrad.
In the 17^th Congress of the Party (January 1934) all delegates applauded Stalin's speech but in the secret ballot for membership of the Politburo 267 voted against Stalin and only 4 against Kirov. Delegates approached Kirov asking him to run for the post of General Secretary of the Party. Molotov falsified the election results announcing Stalin as the winner. The voting against him after the applause on his speech shocked Stalin and deepened his mistrust of the Party. .In December '34 Kirov was assassinated, probably by Stalin's instigation who accused Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and their followers and rigged a series of show trials (1936/7/8) against them. All were framed on false charges. All trials consisted only of admissions by the accused who did not try to defend themselves after being tortured and their families threatened. They were shot as "Enemies of the Revolution". Thus Stalin "purged" the Party of all critics killing most delegates to the 1934 Congress and most leaders of the 1917 revolution who could replace him. From 1937 onwards the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was merely a rubber stamp for Stalin's decisions.

Stalin knew that four elites had motivation, ability and credibility to replace him:

1) Pre-1917 Revolutionary leaders. 2) Planners of the economy 3) The High Command of the Army, and 4) The Command of the secret service. To pre-empt all

conspiracies against him he imprisoned prominent members of each elite forcing them by torture and threats to their families to admit false charges of treason and to denounce their friends. He then staged show-trials (1935-38) where the accused publicly admitted their - and their friends' -"guilt". All the accused and implicated were executed. Denunciation of friends served to destroy trust. Without trust no one could organize a conspiracy. Thus Stalin pre-empted all conspiracies to depose him.

In 1956, Nikita Khrushchev, the new leader of the CPSU, gave a secret speech to the 20^th Congress of the CPSU where he told thousands of delegates:

"Having at its disposal numerous data showing brutal and arbitrary steps against Party officials, the present Central Committee set up a Party commission under the control of the Central Committee's Presidium. It has been charged with investigating what made possible mass repressions against the majority of the Central Committee members and candidates elected to the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). This commission has become acquainted with a large quantity of materials in the NKVD archives and with other documents. It has established many facts pertaining to the fabrication of cases against Communists, to false accusations, [and] to glaring abuses of socialist legality, which resulted in the death of innocent people. It became apparent that many Party, Soviet and economic activists who in 1937-1938 were branded "enemies" were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were honest Communists. They were merely stigmatized [as enemies].

Often, no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged themselves (at the order of the investigative judges/falsifiers) with grave and unlikely crimes.

The commission has presented to the Central Committee's Presidium lengthy and documented materials pertaining to mass repressions against the delegates to the 17th Party Congress and against members of the Central Committee elected at that Congress. These materials have been studied by the Presidium.

It was determined that of the 139 members and candidates of the Central Committee who were elected at the 17th Congress, 98 persons (i.e. 70%) were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-1938). What was the composition of the delegates to the 17^th Congress? It is known that 80% of the voting participants of the 17th Congress joined the Party during the years before the Revolution and during the Civil War, i.e. before 1921. By social origin the basic mass of the delegates to the Congress were workers (60% of the voting members). For this reason, it is inconceivable that a Congress so composed could have elected a Central Committee in which a majority would prove to be enemies of the Party. The only reasons why 70% of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the 17^th Congress were branded as enemies of the Party and of the people were because they were slandered, accusations against them were fabricated, and revolutionary legality was gravely undermined.

The same fate met not only Central Committee members but also the majority of the delegates to the 17th Party Congress. Of 1,966 delegates with either voting or advisory rights, 1,108 persons were arrested on charges of anti-revolutionary crimes, i.e., decidedly more than a majority. This very fact shows how absurd, wild and contrary to common sense were the charges of counterrevolutionary crimes made out, as we now see, against a majority of participants at the 17th Party Congress…"

(for the full speech see the Internet).

Khrushchev was a former Stalin loyalist. In 1936 he participated in perpetrating the crimes he denounced in 1956. This was well known, so someone in the audience of the 20^th Congress shouted "And what did you do comrade Khrushchev, when all these crimes were perpetrated?" Khrushchev replied: "Who asked this question?"

No one stood up. Khrushchev then said: "That's your answer"
All Communist parties in the 1930s defended Stalin's show trials. They argued that the accusations were valid, and the legal procedures were proper. In the trials the accused admitted their guilt and presented no defence. Some trials lasted a day or two from accusation to execution. No wonder Khrushchev's speech caused a major crisis in every Communist Party. It started the decline of the entire Communist movement.

Nothing like Khrushchev's revelations had ever happened in history. However, his speech was not due to a "troubled conscience". It was a calculated move to pre-empt attempts by Stalinists in the CPSU leadership to depose him. He discredited Stalin's supporters by his revelations. Outside the USSR he discredited all those who justified Stalin's show trials, or followed the USSR blindly, opposing any criticism of it.

Stalin's apologists argue that despite his atrocities he changed the USSR from a backward agricultural society into a modern, industrialized, world power. From a socialist point of view this is irrelevant since socialism aimed to liberate humanity from oppression, exploitation and social injustice through economic equality, not to modernize one country. Lenin's One-Party state killed socialism. Socialism is dead. So too is the idea that a State-run economy will solve all social ills. The alternative to Big Business is not Big Government but direct democracy - a society where any citizen can - at any time - propose, debate, and vote on any issue of society.