Chapter Two: The Security Dilemma, Mitigation and Escape

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p.37.

21 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p.37.

22 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp.51-53, 158-61, 164-66,

23 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp.164-65.

24 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp.201-02, 369-70; Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, p.46.

25 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, ‘Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas’, International Security, 25/3 (2000), pp.22-25.

26 Brooks and Wohlforth, ‘Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War’, pp.27-29.

27 Brooks and Wohlforth, ‘Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War’, pp.22-25.

28 Brooks and Wohlforth, ‘Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War’, pp.30-31.

29 ‘Putin warning over US missile row’, BBC, 4 June 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6717119.stm, accessed on 4 June 2007; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p.378.

30 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp.378-79; Canadian Forces Press Release, 29 September 2006, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2093, accessed on 15 February, 2008; ‘RAF scrambles to intercept Russian bombers’, The Times, 18 July 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2093759.ece, accessed on 18 July 2007; ‘Russia suspends arms control pact’, BBC, 14 July 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6898690.stm, accessed on 14 July 2007.

31 John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p.249. Herz’s reference to Herbert Butterfield points to Butterfield’s argument concerning the ‘other minds problem’ faced by policymakers in attempting to enter the counter-fears of other states; see Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), pp.20-22.

32 Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp.237-39; see also Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.39-40.

33 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp.81-82; see also Chapter One.

34 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp.81-82.

35 Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Chicago and London: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp.86-87.

36 Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, pp.89-93.

37 Amitai Etzioni, The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp.84-85, 134-35.

38 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp.109-110.

39 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp.110-111.

40 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p.111.

41 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p.111.

42 Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict’, International Security 25/4 (2002), p.9.

43 Christensen, ‘The Contemporary Security Dilemma’, pp.9-10, 17-19.

44 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, International Organization, 36/2 (1982), p.357. See also Stephen Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and regime consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International Organization, 36/2 (1982), pp.185-87.

45 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, pp.358-59; see also James D. Morrow, ‘The Ongoing Game Theoretic Revolution’, in Manus I Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies II (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press: 2000), pp.164-76.

46 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.37.

47 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp.51-53.

48 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, p.357.

49 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, p.360.

50 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, pp.359-62.

51 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, pp.359-62.

52 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, pp.359-62.

53 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, pp.362-65; quote on pp.362-63.

54 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, pp.362-65.

55 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, p.368.

56 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.113-14.

57 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, pp.371-72.

58 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, pp.372-73.

59 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.120-21.

60 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.122-23.

61 See Chapter One for my discussion of Jervis’s first, second and third worlds.

62 Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30/2 (1978), p.214.

63 Charles Glaser, ‘Political Consequences of Military Strategy’: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models’, World Politics, 44/4 (1992), pp.503-05, 508-510, 528-32.; Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help’, Security Studies 5/3 (1996), pp.133-43.

64 Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists’, pp.133-43.

65 Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists’, p.134.

66 Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists’, p.142; Glaser, ‘When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming’, International Security, 28/4 (2004), pp.52-53.

67 Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty’, International Security, 31/2 (2006), pp.153-54.

68 Montgomery, ‘Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma’, pp.153-54

69 Montgomery, ‘Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma’, p.165.

70 Montgomery, ‘Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma’, p.166.

71 Montgomery, ‘Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma’, p.166.

72 Montgomery, ‘Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma’, p.167.

73 Montgomery, ‘Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma’, pp.166-67

74 Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp.184-85.

75 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, pp.184-85.

76 Kydd, ‘Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation’, International Organization, 54/2 (2000), p.326.

77 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, pp.6, 8-9.

78 Kydd, ‘Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation’, p.326.

79 Kydd, ‘Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation’, p.326.

80 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, p.198; Kydd, ‘Trust, Reassurance, Cooperation’, p.326.

81 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, p.198.

82 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, p.187.

83 Montgomery, ‘Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma’, pp.174-77.

84 Kydd, ‘Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation’, p.342.

85 Kydd, ‘Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation’, p.326.

86 Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp.287-88.

87 Garthoff, The Great Transition, pp.288-89.

88 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.150-51.

89 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p.305; The INF Treaty itself was signed in December 1987

90 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, p.228.

91 Montgomery, ‘Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma’, pp.181-82.

92 Montgomery, ‘Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma’, p.179.

93 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, p.229; Garthoff, The Great Transition, pp.318-325.

94 Sarah Mendelson, ‘Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning and the Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan’, World Politics, 45/3 (1993), p.356, cited in Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, p.230.

95 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, p.232.

96 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p.352.

97 Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘Speech to the 43^rd General Assembly Session of the United Nations’, 7 December 1988, accessed on 16 May 2006 at http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/23/documents/gorbachev/

98 Kydd, ‘Trust, Reassurance, Cooperation’, pp.230-31, 348; Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.152; Garthoff, The Great Transition, p.352. Although some quarters in Washington remained suspicious of Gorbachev in 1988, Reagan had, by this time, come to acknowledge Gorbachev’s commitment to building trust with the US and ending the confrontation of the Cold War.

99 Kydd, ‘Trust, Reassurance, Cooperation’, p.349.

100 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, p.368.

101 Montgomery, ‘Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma’, p.183.

102 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.283.

103 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p.297.

104 This use of ‘security dilemma dynamics’ is derived from this thesis’s understanding of the term.

105 Alistair Iain Johnston, ‘Beijing’s Security Behavior in the Asia-Pacific: Is China a Dissatisfied Power?’, in JJ Suh, PJ Katzenstein and A Carlson, Rethinking Security in East Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p.80.

106 Johnston, ‘Beijing’s Security Behavior in the Asia-Pacific’, p.80.

107 Johnston, ‘Beijing’s Security Behavior in the Asia-Pacific’, p.81.

108 Johnston, ‘Beijing’s Security Behavior in the Asia-Pacific’, p.82.

109 Roland Bleiker, Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), pp.17-24.

110 Bleiker, Divided Korea, pp.xxxii-xliv, 64, 70-75.

111 Bleiker, Divided Korea, p.100.

112 Suh, ‘Producing Security Dilemma out of Uncertainty: The North Korean Nuclear Crisis’, Mario Einaudi Centre for International Studies (2006), p.4.

113 Suh,, ‘Producing Security Dilemma’, p.31.

114 Suh, ‘Producing Security Dilemma’, p.30.

115 Wendt, Social Theory of international Politics, pp.328-36.

116 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp.283-96.

117 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp.294-96.

118 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp.297-299.

119 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp.299-300.

120 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp.299-301; see also Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma (2008), pp.296-97.

121 Karin M. Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), p.60.

122 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, p.60.

123 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, p.60.

124 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, pp.21-22, 62-63.

125 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, pp.16-26.

126 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, pp.62-64; Fierke, Diplomatic Interventions: Conflict and Change in a Globalizing World (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp.174-79.

127 Fierke, Diplomatic Interventions, pp.146-52.

128 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, pp.135-37.

129 Fierke, Diplomatic Interventions, p.148.

130 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, pp.146-51; Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.147-48.

131 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, pp.126-27, Booth and Wheeler The Security Dilemma, pp.149-50.

132 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, p.92.

133 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, pp.125-26, 150.

134 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, pp.158-60.

135 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, pp.158-61.

136 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, pp.82-83, 132, 160, 168.

137 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.205-08.

138 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp.164-65.

139 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp.164-65.

140 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.15.

141 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, p.368.

142 Montgomery, ‘Breaking out of the Security Dilemma’, p.167.

143 Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, p.126.

144 Chapter Three examines the period of US-North Korean interaction from 1950 to 1992 to provide a background for Chapters Four and Five.