stiletto, the spurs, breaks down as protection against the enigmatic femininity of truth.
“Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons? Perhaps her
name is—to speak Greek—Baubo [female genitals]?” (NW V. ii. 20, GS 38) “Even the
compassionate curiosity of the wisest student of humanity is inadequate for guessing how this
or that woman manages to accommodate herself to this solution of the [sexual] riddle . . . and
how the ultimate philosophy and skepsis of woman casts anchor at this point!” (NW V. ii. 105,
GS 128) Once we are put on the trail, the surprising passages appear, the text begins to open.
Man must constantly attempt to be the truth as
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woman (articulate forgetfulness) in order to know her, which is im-possible. “Man and woman
change places, exchange their masks to infinity” (QS 273). Is Derrida suggesting that, in
questioning a recoverable and possessable originary “truth,” Nietzsche is symbolically
questioning, as Freud did, the reality of a “primal scene,” of things in general being taken to
have begun with the castration of the phallus, with the distinct division into man and woman?
Is Nietzsche’s desire (as Derrida sees it) to place the castrating idea within history akin to
Freud’s rewriting of the primal “scene” into the child’s primal “fantasy?”39 Is the Nietzschean
text, in suggesting that in order to have (possess) the truth (woman) the philosopher must be
the truth (woman), undoing Freud’s incipient phallocentrism, which provides quite a different
alternative: if the son (man) disavows sexual difference, he seeks to be the phallus for the
mother (woman) and becomes “the lost object;” when the sexual difference is acknowledged,
the son (man) has the phallus through identification with the father. Is Nietzsche seeking to
undo that “repudiation of femininity” in the male—the other side of which is possession—that
Freud posits as “nothing else than a biological fact” (GW XVI. 99, SE XXIII. 252), and
describe a femininity that is not defined by a male desire to supply a lack? 40
(Perhaps Derrida’s Nietzsche goes “beyond” Derrida’s Hegel. His consistent contraction for
the Hegelian savoir absolu [absolute knowledge] in Glas is Sa. Not only is this a misspelling
of “ça” [id, it], and the usual French contraction for “signifiant” [signifier], but also a
possessive pro-noun with a feminine object, which in this case is unnamed. Absolute
knowledge as articulated by Hegel might be caught within the will to an unnamed
[unnamable] “chose féminine” [female thing—in every sense].)
Derrida ends his essay with yet another long cautionary passage about the problem of reading
Nietzsche, 41 of the fact that in his text in particular, as we have tried to explain, one
consistent reading continually erases itself and invokes its opposite, and so on indefinitely:
“Do not conclude from this that one must give up immediately the knowledge of what it
means... . To be aware, as rigorously as possible, of that structural limit . . . one must push this
deciphering as far as possible. . . . If Nietzsche meant [wanted to say] something, would it not
be this limit of meaning [the will to say], as the effect of a will to power necessarily
differential, therefore always divided, folded, multiplied? . . . As much as to say that there
would no longer be a ‘totality of Nietzsche’s text,’ even fragmentary or aphoristic.” (QS 285)
And, inaugurating for us an attitude that I shall develop later in this Preface, Derrida writes:
“The text can always remain at the same time open, proffered and indecipherable, even
without our knowing that it is indecipherable.” (QS 286)
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I should note here that Derrida always makes a ritual (and undoubtedly correct) gesture of
dismissal toward these fathers: “It was within concepts inherited from metaphysics that
Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger worked.” (ED 413, SC 251) Heidegger came close to
undoing them, “destroying” them (Heidegger’s word), but gave in to them as well. Freud
nearly always believed that he worked within them. But Nietzsche cracked them apart and
then advocated forgetting that fact! Perhaps this entire argument hangs on who knew how
much of what he was doing. The will to knowledge is not easy to discard. When Derrida
claims for himself that he is within yet without the clôture of metaphysics, is the difference
not precisely that he knows it at least? It is difficult to imagine a solution to the problem that
would go beyond Nietzsche’s: to know and then actively to forget, convincingly to offer in his
text his own misreading.
In Cartesian Meditations, Edmund Husserl differentiates between a “transcendental
phenomenology of consciousness” and a “pure psychology of consciousness,” the former a
study where “the psychic components of man . . . data belonging to the world . . . [are] not
accepted as actuality, but only as an actuality-phenomenon,” declaring them, however, an
“exact parallel.” Here is another distinction that a Nietzschean vision must undo.42 And for
Derrida, it is Freud who points toward a working of the psyche that “obliterates the
transcendental distinction between the origin of the world and Being-in-the-world. Obliterates
it while producing it.”43 Derrida does not look at psychoanalysis as a particular or “regional”
discipline, but a way of reading that unscrambles “the founding concept-words of ontology, of
being in its privilege” (35, 21). For his purposes, in other words, it is not a science that
necessarily provides a correct picture of the psychic norm and prescribes cures for the
abnormal, but rather teaches, through its own use thereof, a certain method of deciphering any
text.
Whether he acknowledges it or not, Freud implies that the psyche is a sign-structure “sous
rature,” for, like the sign, it is inhabited by a radical alterity, what is totally other—“Freud
gives it [this radical alterity] a meta-physical name, the unconscious” (MP 21, SP 151) : “The
unconscious is the true psychical reality; in its innermost nature it is as much unknown to us
as the reality of the external world, and it is as incompletely presented by the data of
consciousness as is the external world by the communications of our sense-organs.” (GW II–
III. 617–18, SE V. 613) And, when he “substitutes” for “the antithesis between” “the
conscious and the unconscious” that between the ego and the id (the it, the other), the notion
of alterity remains undisturbed: “the id . . . is its [the ego’s] other external world [seine andere
Aussenwelt].” (GW XIII. 285,
SE XIX. 55) This alterity can never be made present as such to
the consciousness, which has
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dealings only with the preconscious, an area between itself and the un-conscious. “To
consciousness the whole sum of psychic processes presents itself as the realm of the
preconscious.” (GW X. 290, SE XIV. 191) Yet “unconscious wishes always remain active....
Indeed it is a prominent feature of unconscious processes that they are indestructible.” (GW
II–III. 583, SE V. 577)
Something that carries within itself the trace of a perennial alterity: the structure of the
psyche, the structure of the sign. To this structure Derrida gives the name “writing.” The sign