essential limits or not, the entire field covered by the cybernetic
program will be the field of
writing. If the theory of cybernetics is by itself to oust all metaphysical concepts—including
the concepts of soul, of life, of value, of choice, of memory—which until recently served to
separate the machine from man, 3 it must conserve the notion of writing, trace, grammè
[written mark], or grapheme, until its own historico-metaphysical character is also exposed.
Even before being determined as human (with all the distinctive characteristics that have
always been attributed to man and the entire system of significations that they imply) or
nonhuman, the grammè—or the grapheme—would thus name the element. An element
without simplicity. An element, whether it is understood as the medium or as the irreducible
atom, of the arche-synthesis in general, of what one must forbid oneself to define within the
system of oppositions of metaphysics, of what consequently one should not even call
experience in general, that is to say the origin of meaning in general.
This situation has always already been announced. Why is it today in the process of making
itself known as such and after the fact? This question would call forth an interminable
analysis. Let us simply choose some points of departure in order to introduce the limited
remarks to which I shall confine myself. I have already alluded to theoretical mathematics; its
writing—whether understood as a sensible graphie [manner of writing] (and that already
presupposes an identity, therefore an ideality, of its form, which
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in principle renders absurd the so easily admitted notion of the “sensible signifier”), or
understood as the ideal synthesis of signifieds or a trace operative on another level, or whether
it is understood, more profoundly, as the passage of the one to the other—has never been
absolutely linked with a phonetic production. Within cultures practicing so-called phonetic
writ-ing, mathematics is not just an enclave. That is mentioned by all historians of writing;
they recall at the same time the imperfections of alphabetic writing, which passed for so long
as the most convenient and “the most intelligent”4 writing. This enclave is also the place
where the practice of scientific language challenges intrinsically and with increasing
profundity the ideal of phonetic writing and all its implicit metaphysics (metaphysics itself ),
particularly, that is, the philosophical idea of the epistémè; also of istoria, a concept
profoundly related to it in spite of the dissociation or opposition which has distinguished one
from the other during one phase of their common progress. History and knowledge, istoria
and epistémè have always been determined (and not only etymologically or philosophically)
as detours for the purpose of the reappropriaton of presence.
But beyond theoretical mathematics, the development of the practical methods of information
retrieval extends the possibilities of the “message” vastly, to the point where it is no longer the
“written” translation of a language, the transporting of a signified which could remain spoken
in its integrity. It goes hand in hand with an extension of phonography and of all the means of
conserving the spoken language, of making it function without the presence of the speaking
subject. This development, coupled with that of anthropology and of the history of writing,
teaches us that phonetic writing, the medium of the great metaphysical, scientific, technical,
and economic adventure of the West, is limited in space and time and limits itself even as it is
in the process of imposing its laws upon the cultural areas that had escaped it. But this
nonfortuitous conjunction of cybernetics and the “human sciences” of writing leads to a more
profound reversal.
The Signifier and Truth
The “rationality”—but perhaps that word should be abandoned for reasons that will appear at
the end of this sentence—which govems a writ-ing thus enlarged and radicalized, no longer
issues from a logos. Further, it inaugurates the destruction, not the demolition but the de-
sedimentation, the de-construction, of all the significations that have their source in that of the
logos. Particularly the signification of truth. All the metaphysical determinations of truth, and
even the one beyond metaphysical onto-theology that Heidegger reminds us of, are more or
less immediately inseparable from the instance of the logos, or of a reason thought within the
lineage of the logos, in whatever sense it is understood: in the pre-
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Socratic or the philosophical sense, in the sense of God’s infinite under-standing or in the
anthropological sense, in the pre-Hegelian or the post-Hegelian sense. Within this logos, the
original and essential link to the phonè has never been broken. It would be easy to
demonstrate this and I shall attempt such a demonstration later. As has been more or less im-
plicitly determined, the essence of the phonè would be immediately proximate to that which
within “thought” as logos relates to “meaning,” produces it, re9eives it, speaks it, “composes”
it. If, for Aristotle, for example, “spoken words (ta en to phone) are the symbols of mental
experience (pathemata tes psyches) and written words are the symbols of spoken words” (De
interpretatione, 1, 16a 3) it is because the voice, producer of the first symbols, has a
relationship of essential and immediate proximity with the mind. Producer of the first
signifier, it is not just a simple signifier among others. It signifies “mental experiences” which
themselves reflect or mirror things by natural resemblance. Between being and mind, things
and feelings, there would be a relationship of translation or natural signification; between
mind and logos, a relationship of conventional symbolization. And the first convention, which
would relate immediately to the order of natural and universal signification, would be
produced as spoken language. Written language would establish the conventions, inter-linking
other conventions with them.
Just as all men have not the same writing so all men have not the same speech sounds, but
mental experiences, of which these are the primary symbols (semeia prôtos), are the same for
all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images (De interpretatione, 1,
16a. Italics added) .
The feelings of the mind, expressing things naturally, constitute a sort of universal language
which can then efface itself. It is the stage of transparence. Aristotle can sometimes omit it
without risk. 5 In every case, the voice is closest to the signified, whether it is determined
strictly as sense (thought or lived) or more loosely as thing. All signifiers, and first and
foremost the written signifier, are derivative with regard to what would wed the voice
indissolubly to the mind or to the thought of the signified sense, indeed to the thing itself
(whether it is done in the Aristotelian manner that we have just indicated or in the manner of
medieval theology, determining the res as a thing created from its eidos, from its sense
thought in the logos or in the infinite understanding of God). The written signifier is always
technical and representative. It has no constitutive mean-ing. This derivation is the very origin
of the notion of the “signifier.” The notion of the sign always implies within itself the
distinction between signifier and signified, even if, as Saussure argues, they are distinguished
simply as the two faces of one and the same leaf. This notion remains therefore within the
heritage of that logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism:
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