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they were a subject to an immediate sharing through “divorce offices” though, however,
this image is quite misleading.
Some participants of the “Viskulevskaya interlude” were likely to think in the begin-
ning that the symbolical (nominative) function of the CIS in the future, when new elites
turn completely into the state ones, and the NIS become real subjects of international
law, will be also a subject to “redistribution”. Otherwise, it will be a subject to substitution
accompanied by the dissolution of the Commonwealth. Anyway, it is indicative, that the
initial name “the Union of the Independent States” was replaced by the “Commonwealth”.
It is difficult to say, what stage the projects were at when it came to different attributes of
sovereignty (national currencies, embassies, flags, anthems and etc.). However, there were
all reasons to believe that direct participants perceived the process of deposition of the
imperial
center as the crucial one, “without any analogues in history”.
Meanwhile, the logic of this process is not something “out of the common”… The
analysis of the Mongol Empire decline, initiated by Musafar Alam, can serve as a per-
fect scenario of the Empire complex dissemination. ”Under the conditions of political
and military adventurism revelry, - the author marks, - the imperial authority was ac-
companied with, and it led to its decline. None of the adventurers were powerful enough
to dethrone the emperor and to force others to obey. All of them struggled separately
to make their own fortunes, and threatened positions and achievements of each other.
Some of them, however, managed to dominate over the others. When their achievements
were given institutional recognition, a center was required to legalize them” [5]. M. Alam
demonstrates that the decline of the imperial power combined with the simultaneous
strengthening of province autonomy leads to the following result: local authorities con-
tinue to be viewed through “a certain pretence of the imperial center”, which is given the
legitimate function.
In strict sense, the CIS has a similar model: nominal and morphological (the con-
stitution, parliament, national currency, territory, population and so forth) attributes of
sovereignty are not sufficient. They are required if the state wants to be recognized by
the, so to say, “external” side. The president of a Republic, John Austin reminds, is the one
who considers himself/herself the president of the republic, though contrary to a mad-
man considering himself a Napoleon, this person must have substantial grounds to think
so. Thus, the CIS realized the symbolical function of compensation/indemnification both
when it reminded all the NIS-citizens about the “family of the people”, and when the gaps
in national sovereignties were filled. If, for example, the former secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU, becomes the head of the state in case of the party self-dissolution,
then he or she consequently inherits party capitals; only a legitimate external center can
give a certain image of legality to such a deal. This center, actually, serves as the ground,
mentioned by Austin: that is how one of the agents of one elite (Yeltsin, Shevardnadze,
etc.) turns into the leader of new elite in such a mysterious way. In this case, the elite is
guaranteed a certain share of the “property” that used to be common.