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I would like to return to our trail, and the question posed in the previous section.
Governments can make mistakes. ‘China Scenarios 2007’ advocated that the Chinese
government might do so. What, then, about Japan? We Japanese inherit an ancient
wisdom saying that we must always live with the ‘four disasters’: earthquakes,
thunderbolts, firestorms and unwise rulers. We know that they are always with us.
The best we can do is learn to survive them.
However, for understandable reasons, Japanese government bureaucrats themselves
are much less willing to accept this truth. When I work for them, it is quite hard to
facilitate a discussion of how a dysfunctional government could cause a social
disaster. This assumption instantly embarrasses bureaucrats; sometimes so much so
that they won’t come to the next workshop.
From my experience, business people are generally more receptive to stories in which
their (mis)management causes a crisis. They even giggle while jotting down their
own possible mistakes. On the contrary, I observe that bureaucrats have a general
inhibition to anticipate their eventual failure. A high-ranking bureaucrat once told
me that the process of implementation in government is far more complex and wider
in scope than that in private sector – and that therefore, the complex process of policy
making and implementation could only be trusted to masterly public servants. The
other, natural, interpretation – that because of the complexity, mistakes are more
likely in government – had not occurred to him. Didn’t he ever call to mind the
ancient wisdom about Japan and its rulers?
If people in the government feel very unwilling to acknowledge the chance of their
work eventually going wrong, then the scenario exercise is pointless for them. This
exercise usually depends on accepting the assumption that the environment around
policy implementation may change over time, that implementation itself is imperfect,
and that one therefore has to be ready for when things go wrong.
2.6. Recapitulation: Five scenario projects
In this paper I have shared tales of the five scenario projects. What have I learned
from each?
“A tragedy” was a tough project for a business entity. It was designed as a series of
workshops for the top
management team, which had been divided over the possible
closure of a large factory. During the exercise, scenario planners experienced
compelling pressure calling for a decision, and the rebirth of internal power-games,
which made it very difficult for the planner to facilitate the project.
“Nuclear Power scenarios 2005” was initiated by the personal aspirations of an ex
high-ranking bureaucrat, after the possible revision of current government nuclear
policies. The scenario planners learned that the world inhabited by Japanese high-
ranking bureaucrats is adversarial and competitive in policy-making and propagation.
The scenario exercise was conducted analytically but was unfit for the ex-bureaucrat
because it was not designed to tell one story of his, namely that the chosen policy
package would yield ‘a better future’ than any other.
The “Energy 2030” scenario was born amid increasing pressure to respond to the
global climate change agenda. The Japanese government wanted to envision a low-
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carbon society and the transition paths from the present to the future. The scenario
planner allowed the participants to chase this vision, then asked them to deliberately
derail from their visionary future and to think of possible ‘failed’ scenarios. This
facilitation successfully revitalised the project.
“Urban Mobility 2040” was the scenario work conducted by a team from Japanese
academia. The work illustrated two different stories of Japan’s urban design and was
intended to encourage wide civic discussion. The two stories expected that Japan
would become a low carbon society and called for government to play a significant
role to realize this future. The scenario planner questioned himself whether the
government would always do so constructively.
Lastly, “China Scenarios 2007” was the work done by a Japanese research institute.
The intention was to ignite a constructive conversation
between Chinese and Japanese
experts on energy saving issues. The scenario stories were crafted in an intentionally
challenging manner. A Japanese-made scenario pointed out that the Chinese
government could make mistakes in coping with an international or domestic
macroeconomic crisis, which would have an influence on the behavioural aspect of
Chinese energy use. This story was made cautiously, stemmed from solid analysis.
The venue of the presentation was designed free from political debates, hence, this
work brought about a good exchange of views among the policy makers and experts.
To sum up what I, as a practitioner, have learned:
First, scenario exercises under heavy pressure from the participants’ political
standpoints, such as “A tragedy” and “Nuclear Power Scenario 2007”, are very
difficult to conduct.
Second, in order to secure a free space amid existing agendas, the facilitator could
employ the ‘derailment’ process seen in “Energy 2030”, whereas in “Nuclear Power
Scenario 2007” ‘derailment’ effort turned to be unsuccessful.
Third, assuming possible government failure in scenario stories is a tough task, both
for the facilitator and participants from Japanese public sector.
Fourth, there is a difference between private and public entities as clients. Unlike the
CEO, who had to face the possible closure of the large factory and the consequences
for his job, bureaucrats in general expect (at least in theory) that the political process
will work itself out externally to their workplace, which provides a destined policy
objective set for them.
3. Analysis and Discussion: Scenario projects in government
Following is a trial to generalise my experience and discuss. Academic works related
to the scenario planning and the Japanese public policy making processes are referred.