21
organised solely to pressure the government
and alter public opinion, but
influencing gentile opinion still constituted a significant field in their activities.
The Conjoint Committee favoured a discreet approach not only in its
dealings with the Foreign Office but also in the way it publicised its campaigns.
The leaders of the Anglo-Jewry did not want to risk the gains of emancipation
they had acquired during the nineteenth century. The image of the British Jews
as a law-abiding and well-integrated section of the population was always
guarded very carefully. This meant that the Conjoint Committee opposed
public rallies and marches because they threatened the respectable image of the
Anglo-Jewry and were thus counter-productive. The Conjoint believed that
nothing could be gained by demonstrations.
43
This did not mean that no public
action was taken, nor did it mean that everything happened behind closed
Conjoint doors. Campaigns
in the press were common, not only in the Jewish
weekly newspaper, the
Jewish Chronicle, but also in the mainstream press, in
which pieces clarifying the ‘real’ situation in Romania (or elsewhere) were
written and replies to any hostile articles were quickly produced.
For the most part, research on British early twentieth century international
relations has traditionally focused on the developments leading to the First
World War, with much emphasis on the ‘threat of Germany’ and other
comparable matters. British-Romanian relations in the period 1900-1914 have
been for the most part ignored. Furthermore,
there is no modern, all-
encompassing study on British-Romanian relations
44
.
‘Romania ... seldom has been an area of serious concern of Britain’s foreign
policy’.
45
This summary by Paul D. Quinlan holds true especially for the time
period prior to the First World War. British interests in Romania were chiefly
connected with trade and finance. The main British investments in Romania
were in oil, but Romanian grain exports and Danube navigation were also
matters of interest. As far as the political issues were concerned, the Jewish
question played a large role. The interests of Great Britain in the Romanian
Jewish question originated partly in its international
standing as one of the
Great Powers, which justified its interference in the affairs of other, smaller
countries. Britain had traditionally been the Power which was most likely to
take action on behalf of human rights causes. However, there were also
domestic factors that made Britain pay attention to the Romanian Jewish
43
Black 1988, 302; Levene 1981, 30.
44
A classic general history is Nicolae Iorga’s
A History of Anglo-Roumanian Relations
(1931). Iorga’s study discusses the period
before Romanian independence. Iorga
mentions Jews in a hostile tone. There is a separate volume,
a supplement to the
periodical
Anuarul Institutului de istorie si arheologie ”A. D. Xenopol” (1983), containing
articles on British-Romanian relations and covering economic, political, and cultural
relations. These articles are based on presentations given in the colloquy of
Romanian and British historians in Iaşi 1981. Amazingly, the Jewish question is not
discussed at all. W.N. Medlicott’s two-part classic article,
The Recognition of
Roumanian Independence (1933), is based on British diplomatic correspondence and is
therefore particularly interesting. It gives a detailed
chronological account on
diplomatic developments, and the Jewish question features prominently.
45
Quinlan 1977, 13, 15.
22
problem: the strong domestic Jewish lobby and the consequences of Jewish
immigration to Britain.
The British policy towards the Romanian Jewish question was related to
the possibility of diplomatic intervention in Romanian internal affairs.
46
The
Treaty of Berlin (1878) was the international legal document that determined
the position of Romanian Jews. The Congress promised to recognise Romanian
independence on the condition that Romania guaranteed equal rights to
persons of all religious confessions. Consequently, Romania passed a new
naturalisation law in which the treaty provisions were very narrowly
interpreted.
The Treaty of Berlin also brought about
the idea of Great Power
intervention — that is if one accepted that the Treaty allowed for joint Great
power action on behalf of the Romanian Jews and that the Treaty provided for
the possibility of joint Great Power action on behalf of Romanian Jews. The
Treaty of Berlin was often referred to by the British government in 1900-1914,
and the possibility of intervention was brought up frequently, not only in the
context of the Jewish question, but when discussing other Balkan problems as
well.
1.5 Research questions
Based on the considerations outlined above, my study concerns British and
Anglo-Jewish views on the Romanian Jewish question
in the early twentieth
century. The topic will be approached from the viewpoint of Jewish diplomacy,
international protection of minorities, and international relations. The research
problems are related to the following themes:
1) The conduct of Anglo-Jewish diplomacy on behalf of Romanian Jews
2) The attitude of the British government as related to Jewish diplomacy
3) The factors that shaped Jewish diplomacy and British foreign policy in
the Romanian Jewish question.
46
Barry H. Steiner has studied preventive diplomacy directed at conflicts produced by
ethnic rivalry within a state. According to Steiner, the conflict
is between the ethnic
group that controls the government and another group that is in a weaker position.
Steiner has remarked that the great powers are rarely ready to intervene in internal
ethnic disputes until the conflicts become violent. The great powers have to perceive
the conflict to be an international issue. There are two objectives of preventive
diplomacy: to enable the conflict to be discussed and negotiated, and to localise the
dispute so as not to affect great power relations. However, at no point was it believed
that the Jewish problem in Romania would escalate into an armed conflict. Certainly,
the Peasant Revolt of 1907 had such undertones, but even the revolt did not include
violent confrontation between Jews and the Romanian government. Neither did the
Jewish population at any stage take up arms against the Romanians to resist
government policy. Therefore,
in the case of Romanian Jews, the issue of ‘preventive
diplomacy’ was hardly applicable. Two of Steiner’s examples have some relevance to
Romania, namely the Bosnian Revolution of 1875-1878 against the Ottomans and the
Armenian unrest before the First World War, again in the Ottoman Empire. Steiner
1998, 4, 10-13.